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PREFACE
The study and/or investigation of Judaism, Zionism, 
and the state of Israel is one of general interest to the 
modern world, for more reasons than its place in contemporary 
world affairs; it is also closely connected with a high 
degree of emotionalism. The primary reason for this 
emotional interest is. that Israel— the old Palestine— is
i ^
the natal land of three major religious sects: Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam.
The period of time covered by this thesis— -1914- 
19 22~=»is of significance tp the investigation of modern 
Israel in that the Twentieth Century state was born during 
this brief span of time. The success of a late national­
istic movement, late in comparison to the emergence of 
nationalism, can be seen in the natal stages. Perhaps more 
than a nationalistic movement, the Zionist movement was a 
nativistic attack on Europe in that Zionism fulfills the 
terms of a defined nativistic movement, i.e., a belief that 
your group is being submerged, and that everything— real and 
idealogical— is being taken from you. Just as Wivoka of the 
Paiute appeared at a propitipus time in his cultural hiptory, 
so did*Theodore Herzl and Chaim Weizmann appear in the Jew's. 
Whereas most of these movements do not ultimately succeed,
the Zionists did. They accomplished their goal of universal 
recognition as a group, and as a nation.
Whereas this thesis covers a vital period in the 
history of Zionism, it is not a systematic and complete 
analysis of the subject. The emphasis, rather, is on the 
evolutionary political/diplomatic process which created the 
Jewish state, from whence sprang many of the current and 
contemporary problems of the world. The use and spelling of
Arabic and Turkish terms and names created some problem, in
that different sources-used different spellings. With the 
exception of direct quotations I have adopted a consistent 
system of spelling for this enterprise. Although it might 
differ from contemporary spellings, the forms used, did tend 
to appear in sources more frequently than others.
In an attempt such as this, full acknowledgement of 
help— scholastic and other— can only be barely touched upon.- 
The careful and considerate advice and direction of my 
advisor, Dr. A. Stanley Trickett, should be duly noted, and 
much thanks given for his patience. To Dr. Ert Gum,
Dr. Roy M. Robbins, and the other members of the graduate 
faculty at the University of Nebraska at Omaha, greatful
appreciation is felt for the course work and also for the
opportunity to complete my Master of Arts program through 
the aid of a iGraduate assistantship, without which this 
degree could not have been completed. To Marian Nelson 
special thanks are offered for the constant "prod," the
needed and necessary criticism, and the welcome friendship.
t
Although only indirectly connected with this thesis, the. 
faculty and' my students of John F. Kennedy High School, in 
Bloomington, Minnesota, should be mentioned as a catalytic 
agent in my completion of the requirements for this degree. 
The time and work of my typist, Mrs. Henry Pinkerton, is 
also recorded with, great appreciation, but is also deeply 
felt, in that she took on the job when I was desperate, and 
did so with no complaint.
Last, but definitely not least, this thesis could 
not have been completed without the loving consideration and 
encouragement of my family. My mother, who aided in portions 
of the preliminary typing; my father for his interest and 
willingness to discuss problems and theories; and to my 
brother Francis, and sister CeLora for their concern, if not 
their understanding, in the enterprise. To my family, then,
I deeply and lovingly offer my thanks for the constant query: 
"How's the thesis coming?"
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Let the sovereignty be granted us over 
a portion of the globe large enough to 
satisfy the rightful requirements of a 
nation; the rest we shall manage ourselves.^
— Theodore Herzl
The issuance of the Balfour Declaration of
November 2, 1917 was not a spontaneous action on: the part of
Great Britain. Rather it was an effort to support- common
British and Zionist interests in the Middle East, primarily
in Palestine, and represented the culmination of joint
British and Jewish activities in the nineteenth and early
twentieth* centuries. It appeared that world events, and the
needs of Zionism, "embraced each other at the most propitious
moment as if the two Were "on a divinely pre-arranged planned 
2parenthood."
Zionist philosophy, a new interpretation of the 
Jewish quest for a homeland, sprang from the reactionary 
pressures exerted by nineteenth century Eastern Europe, and
■^Theodore Herzl, The Jewish State: An Attempt at a
Modern Solution of the Jewish Question (New York: American
Zionist Council, 1946) , pT 28. Hereafter cited as, Herzl. f 
Jewish State.
2
Max I. Dimont, Jews, God and History (New York: 
Signet Books, 1962), p. 395. Hereafter cited as Dimont, Jews
an increasingly antir-semitic Western Europe. The basic aim 
of Zionism was the preservation of Jewish culture in spite 
of growing forces aimed at its destruction. Despite 
opposition*, the Jews developed a blueprint for. their state; 
and a concept for survival was, by the late nineteenth
3
century, being forged into an actual strategy for survival.
British affairs in the Middle East were grounded in 
nineteenth century imperialistic interests, and the need to 
protect the lifeline to India and the Far East. Although 
less importantly and less obviously, there also appears to 
have been- a strong desire,to rectify the wrongs that had been 
committed against the Jews. The factors contributing to the 
eventual creation of a Jewish state, however, would evolve 
from political and diplomatic motivations, rather than 
religious idealism.
While the British interest in the Middle East was 
relatively recent, the restoration of the Holy Land to the 
Jews was not a new idea, nor was Great Britain the only 
nation interested in the plan. With the decline of the 
Turkish Empire during the nineteenth century, there was a 
growing interest on the part of European powers to establish 
a better basis for influencing, and controlling, developments 
in the area. The three dominant contestants in this battle
3
Dimont, Jews, p. 395. cf. Ben Halpern, The Idea of 
the Jewish State (2nd ed.; Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 19b9), pp. 55 ff. Hereafter cited as Halpern, State.
for influence and supremacy were France, Russia and Great 
Britain, and after the completion of the Suez Canal this 
contest increased. The significant questions to be answered 
were: How’ did the modern Jewish program for autonomous
Jewish statehood come into being? And, what nation .could 
best sponsor the drive for the establishment of a Jewish 
state in Palestine?
As the contest for imperialistic supremacy between 
France, Russia and Great Britain' developed in the Middle East, 
a movement among Eastern EuropeansJews occurred simul­
taneously. The transformation of a nebulous idea, or theory, 
regarding a Jewish state into an actual plan for such a state 
began to take place about 1860, At that time the messianic
idea of a return to Zion was converted” into a hard political
4reality for a return to Palestine. The general attitude 
among Jews appeared to be that a peaceful life could not be 
achieved by simply moving to another country, or another 
city, but only through the establishment of an independent 
Jewish state. According to Judah Pinsker, an early Zionist,
4S.W. Baron, A Social and Religious History of the 
Jews (12 vols. ; New York: Columbia University Press, 1937),
II, 329. Hereafter cited as Baron, History. The motivating
factor in this change in philosophy appears to be when the 
anti-Jewishness of the Middle Ages changed to the anti­
semitism of Modern History; the old feelings being one of 
religious prejudice and the new one of racial prejudice. 
Dimont, Jews, p. 395. cf„ Esco Foundation for Palestine,
Inc., Palestine: A Study of Jewish, Arab, and British
Policies (2 vols.; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947),
II, 1. Hereafter cited as Esco, Palestine.
anti-semitism was a problem that could onot be solved by- 
exchanging a mingrity status in one country, for minority 
status in another. Anti-semitism, according to Pi.nsker, was 
a permanent, psycho-pathological phenomenon which could only
be eliminated through the creation of a separate Jewish
4- 4 - 5state.
Through the authors of a series of books and pamphlets 
published between 1860 and 1890, the route from the Diaspora 
to Palestine was "paved with a succession of i d e a s . T h e  
authors of these tracts were primarily East European Jewsy 
and it was through their writings that the way was prepared 
for the man who would be the epitomy of the militant Jew-^- 
Theodore Herzl.
The result of the nineteenth century drive to achieve 
the "Jewish ideal" was the World Zionist Organization, 
largely the work of Theodore Herzl. The creation of an 
independent state in Palestine became the goal of that group. 
Political sovereignty, however, was nob an absolute and 
immediate goal of the movement. Whereas in other nationalist 
movements of the nineteenth century, sovereignty was an
5
Leo W. Schwarz, ed., Great Ages and Ideas of the 
Jewish People {New York: Random House, Inc., 1956) , pi 435.
Hereafter cited as Schwarz, Ideas.
^Among these nationalist authors can be found such 
names as Moses Hess, Peretz Smolenskin, Samuel Mohilever, 
and .Judah Pinsker, whose Auto-Emancipation was; definitely 
anti-assimilationist in its outlook, and became a dominant 
theme with Herzl. Dimont, Jews, p. 396.
urgent demand, the Zionists first desired a land in which to 
concentrate their efforts; sovereignty was., therefore, of 
secondary importance. It was the search for a homeland that 
dominated Zionist activities in the early stages of develop­
ment. ^
Herzl's interest in the Jewish problem was not 
dominant in his life until 1882, when he discovered Eugen 
Duhring's The Jewish Problem as a Problem of Race, Morals
Q
and Culture. Prior to the reading of this book, Herzl felt 
that assimilation was the solution for the problem confront­
ing tjie Jews of Europe. After reading Duhring, however, with
its dominant theme of the need for reinstitution of the
9
Medieval ghetto, Herzl amended his■philosophy. Where he had
previously thought that assimilation through any means— even 
apparently impractical ones, such as mass baptism, or a 
romantic confrontation between Gentile and Jew in a public 
duel— were desirable, there was one train of thought common 
to, all of his proposals: the firm conviction that' the Jewish
question had to. come to the attention of the. public, and had 
to be openly discussed, by both Jew and Gentile, if a
^Halpern, State, pp. 22-23.
Q
This work, published in 1881, represented an: early 
attempt to give a scientific basis for’ anti-semitism.
9Alex Bein, Theodore Herzl: A Biography;, trans. by
Maurice Samuel (Philadelphia: Jewish Publishing Society,
1940), p. 35. Hereafter cited as Bein, Herzl.
10workable solution was to be found.
The Dreyfus Affair in France acted as the catalytic 
agent that drastically changed Herzl1s philosophy, for in. 
this trial he recognized the complete failure of his earlier 
theories of emancipation and assimilation. .Dreyfus person­
ified the assimilated Jew, and in the treatment received by 
him, Herzl saw the emancipated-assimilated Jew forced back 
into the ghetto and role of scape-goat. To him the entire 
affair embodied more than a judicial error, it embodied
the desire of a vast majority of the French to condemn 
a Jew, and to comdemn all Jews in this one Jew.""^ It was 
only after he had accepted this revelation of the basic 
fallacy in hi-s previous theories, that the, idea of a Jewish 
state began to dominate his philosophy. Only after he 
realized that anti-semitism stemmed from a characteristic of
the social structure— and not a religious difference— did
12Theodore Herzl become a Zionist.
Realizing that the primary problem confronting widely 
separated Jews was the absence of political leadership, Herzl 
formulated a theory to rectify the difficulty. With the 
initiation of the publication Per Judenstat, the messianic
Josephine Kamm, The Hebrew People: A History of
the Jews (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 177. Hereafter
cited as Kamm,;. Hebrew. At this time Herzl was not aware of 
Hess and Pinsker, and thought .of his philosophy as a unique 
one.
"^Herzl, Jewish State, p. 34
12Dimont, Jews, p. 398.
desire for a return to Zion became an active and cohesive
political force. The philosophy of the Zionist movement was
simply stated in the preface of Herzl1s book: "The idea
which I have developed in this pamphlet is a very"old one:
13it is the restoration of the Jewish State." In giving
definite expression to the idea of an independents Jewish
state, Herzl verbalized the- old ideal of the Jewish people—
14"Next year in Jerusalem!" At no place in the pamphlet did
he specifically mention a preferred .territory, although two
areas referred to were Argentina and Palestine— one was
fertile with a good climate and small population; while the
other was the historic homeland of the Jewish people. The
ultimate choice of location, determined by Jewish public
opinion, would make the resultant move a voluntary exodus to
a selected and defined area possessing potential for the
15evolution of an autonomous Jewish state. In an effort to 
aid colonization by Jewish settlers in the proposed terri­
tories, the Jewish Colonization Association was established 
in 1891, with a founding capital of 4^2,000,000.^  The
■^Bein, Herzl »■ pp. 160-61.
14D. R. Elston, Israel: The Making of a Nation
(London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 11. Hereafter
cited as Elston, Israel.
15Dimont, Jews, p. 398.
"^Nahum Sokolow, History of Zionism: 16QQ-1918
(2 vols.; London: Longmans and Greene, 1919) , if] 258.
Hereafter cited as Sokolow, Zionism. Memorandum of 
association: "To assist and promote the emigration of Jews
initial plan was to seek the financial aid of wealthy Jewish
bankers and philanthropists, and acquire a charter from the
Ottoman Sultan which would permit Jewish colonization in
Palestine, for it was felt that the Jewish immigrant could
not love the Argentine as he loved the "Promised Land" and
17the "historic home" of Jerusalem, despite the geographic
advantages offered by the Argentine.
During the convocation of the first Zionist Congress
in Basle, 1897, the Zionist Organization firmly stated its
basic purpose:
The aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people 
a home in Palestine secured by public law . . . CandJ
preparatory steps towards obtaining government cojgent 
. . . to the attainment of Lthis] aim of Zionism.
After the establishment of the Zionist Organization 
and the formal statement of its philosophy, steps were taken 
to find a sponsor. It was not surprising that Herzl's native 
state, Germany, was the first choice. The bulk of the 
Zionists held German or East European heritage, but negoti­
ations with the Kaiser's government deteriorated into a
from any part of Europe or Asia— and primarily from countries 
in which they Cmay be persecuted or discriminated against]—  
to any parts of the world, and to form and establish colonies 
in various parts of North and South America and other 
countries for agricultural, commercial and other purposes.
"To purchase and acquire . . . any territories, lands,
or other property . . . for developing - . - the same for
colonization." Ibid., I, 253.
■^Sokolow, Zionism, I, 259.
1 8
Ibid., I, pp. 268-69. cf. Basle Program, 
Appendix A, p. 15 2.
frustrating discussion of conflicting interests and claims. 
Discouraged by Germany's response to the suggestion of 
establishing a protectorate, the Jews began the search for 
another sponsor.^
In 1901 Herzl attempted to convince the Sul/tan that
Jewish industrial and intellectual awareness could be of
great assistance in the reorganization and modernization of
the Turkish economy. The Sultan expressed interest in the
idea, however, he appeared to be more interested in having the
Zionist Organization fund the national debt of the Ottoman 
20Empire. The following year a final attempt was made to 
obtain the permission'of the Ottoman government to establish 
a Jewish land commission for Palestine. Hopefully, such a 
commission would be allowed to plan for unlimited Jewish 
settlement, with local autonomy for the settlements. The 
Sultan, however, refused to accede to the requests for 
autonomy, but offered instead, permission to settle, in all 
parts of the empire— with the exclusion of Palestine, as
19The reversal in Germany's original interest in the 
proposal was probably the result of her fear of upsetting 
Turkey, who disfavored the plan; and out of the apparent 
possibility of creating trouble with the Triple Entente—  
each of which had a very real interest in the Middle East, 
cf. Bein, H e r z l p. 30 7.
20Howard Morley Sachar, The Course of Modern Jewish 
History (New York: Dell Publishing House, 1958"), p. 273.
Hereafter cited as Sachar, Modern Jewish History, 
cf. Schwarz, Ideas, p. 437, and Leonard Stein, The Balfour 
Declaration (London: Vallentine-Mitchell, 196l"F] p7 23.
Hereafter cited as Stein, Balfour.
21citizens of the Ottoman Empire.
Another bid for sponsorship, made to the Vatican,
proved to be unsuccessful also. Through Cardinal Merry del
Val, of the Papal court, the Church refused sponsorship to
the Zionists as long as they remained unconverted to
Catholicism. The Pope, more outspoken than his representa-
22tive, stated simply: "We cannot favor this movement."
Desperately turning to Russia for sponsorship, the 
Zionists pointed out to von Plehve, the representative of the 
Tsar, that support of their program would bring an end to 
much of the religious turmoil in Russia. Von Plehve, anxious 
to rid Russia of the troublesome Jewish element, appeared 
interested in the scheme, only to reverse his opinion when 
diplomatic negotiations- revealed that other members of the 
evolving Triple Entente were not in favor of such a move.
The dire political situation in Russia also necessitated 
immediate attention, to the abandonment of the Zionist pro­
gram' and its possible support by the Tsar.
The Jews were finally forced to turn to Great Britain 
for the support necessary to allow the implementation of their
plans for the founding of a Jewish state— a program which had
23gained the endorsement of the World Zionist Conference. It 
was in England that Herzl saw possible* success because "of
21 22Schwarz, Ideas, p. 439. Ibid.
23Bern, Herzl. p. 379.
the general situation there it was the Archimedian
24point where the lever could be applied " most effec­
tively. The Zionists felt that England seemed more willing 
to recognize the significance of their movement and with the 
convocation of their Fourth Congress in London (1901), th©
English publicly issued comments favoring the drive for a 
25Jewish state.
The Zionist hierarchy entered into negotiations with
Great Britain for an area of land in the Sinai Peninsula—
El-Arish— an enterprise eventually .doomed to failure because
of British affairs in Egypt, and the arid conditions of the
area whiph were not favorable to agrarian enterprise. In
the summer of 190 3, however, Herzl was notified by Joseph
Chamberlain that an ideal location had been found for Zionist
settlement— in Uganda, a portion of British East Africa. The
terms of the, Uganda Project were stated in a letter to
L. J. Greenberg, which included a proposal for a Jewish
Colonial Trust to support the settlement in East Africa and
26to initiate the colonization process'. Herzl reluctantly
accepted the Uganda offer as offering temporary Jewish 
asylum, and prepared to present the British offer to the 
Sixth World Congress (1903) for ratification.
During the Jewish-Turkish negotiations the once- 
uniled Zionist front had suffered an internal breach which
24Sokolow, Zionism. I, 295. 25Ibid. , I, 29,6.
26Ibid.. I, pp. 296-97.
continued to expand and which became openly apparent at the
Fifth Zionist Congress (1901). The difficulty centered on
internal opposition to Herzl and his leadership* The
Congress split between those loyal to Herzl and his belief
that persistent diplomacy would win the fight for a Jewish
state; and the "Politicals" (The Democratic Zionist Fraction)
—  the activists— who felt that since diplomacy, had failed,
violence and weapons must be employed to decide the question 
27of statehood. The latter segment included, primarily,
Russian Jews who, because of the severity of the pogroms of
1903-1904, felt an almost fanatical need to reach Palestine,
and, thus, expressed open dissatisfaction with the -slowness
of the diplomatic methods of Herzl. It was to these Eastern
Jews— the Democratic Zionist Fraction— that the ultimate
leadership of the movement would pass. This group, while
not ignoring the political character of Zionism, tended to
emphasize the cultural aspects of Judaism, and aimed for an
expression of nationalism which was- based on a common
28cultural heritage of world Jewry.
The dissension in the Zionist Organization became 
openly evident in 1903, when Herzl presented the alternate 
British proposal of a Jewish settlement in Uganda. In spite 
of the fact that he stressed that it was to be used as a 
Nachtasyl— a temporary home— and a preparatory step towards
^Dimont, Jews, p. 399.
28Halpern, Jewish State, p. 1
the eventual colonization of Palestine, the proposal was 
received with mixed emotions. Herzl1s opponents felt that 
the basic policies of Zionism had been betrayed. As a result, 
Menahem Mende Ussishkin, head of the Russian delegation, 
presented a resolution to the meeting that Herzl not be 
allowed to continue the negotiations for territorial recog­
nition in the name of the Conference, unless the territory 
involved was Palestine or Syria. Nothing but Palestine,
"the land of the Book," would be acceptable to the eastern
29faction of the Congress. The faction that supported Herzli,
on the other hand— the western or aristocratic faction—
tended to agree with Herzl, that a quick political settlement,
30even though temporary, was the best possible action to take.
A committee sent to investigate Uganda as a possible 
area for settlement, reported in 19'05 that the proposed terri­
tory was unsuitable for agricultural settlement. After the 
majority of the Congress voted against Uganda as a stepping 
stone to Palestine, or as an end in itself, the project was 
shelved.^
The East African offer
not only precipitated a crisis within Zionism, but 
also— and here-in lies its significance— raised 
Zionism to the rank of a political movement of 
international importance, and demonstrated the
29Elston, Israel, p. 12.
30Sacher, Modern Jewish History, p. 278.
^Esco, Palestine, I, 49.
interest of the Bri^sh Government in a solution of 
the Jewish problem.
Even though Herzl1s one political success, the Uganda scheme,
failed, it established a very important precedent for future
negotiations between the two parties. It set the stage for
the Zionist's shift from Germany and Turkey and concentration
of all her efforts on England1. In the future, the door that
had been carefully opened by Chamberlain’s African offer
33permitted "an easier access to the England of Balfour ."
and, eventually, to the recognition of a Jewish state.
The refusal of the Eastern Jews to follow Herzl
resulted in their calling a separate convention in Kharkov,
Russia, where they committed themselves "permanently and
34exclusively to the idea of Palestine" as the sole site for
Jewish colonization. It was the idealogical conflict within
the Jewish movement that revealed, to the Herzl faction, the
strength of the eastern faction's desire for Palestine.
It was then, too, that Herzl grasped an inescapable 
portent: it was only a matter of time before the
potent reservoir of Ostjuden ^Eastggn Jews] would 
take over the movement altogether.
With the death of Herzl and the election of David
Wolffsohn as President, in 1907, a fusion of the "practical"
^Sokolow, Zionism, I, 297-98.
33Herzl, Jewish State, p. 16.
34Sachar, Modern Jewish History, p. 278.
35 Ibid.
and the "political" elements occurred, and this united group
pledged itself to seek Palestine as the area for settlemen/t,
as the only area that would satisfactorily solve the problem
of persecution in Eastern Europe. It was generally conceded
that all agricultural settlements in areas other than
Palestine had failed, and it was
not far from Russia Hand Central Europe], and £was] 
unquestionably so adapted to cultivation that as 
soon as the soil [was] prepared the main s^geam of 
* - . migration Ewould) be directed - . -
there. The Congress of 190 7 created the Palestine Department
to aid in the colonization of Palestine. The next decade
would witness the bulk of the major developments in the
Zionist movement taking place in Palestine, and on the eve
of World War I, the World Zionist Organization of the German-
Jewish "politicals," came under the control of the "more
numerous and infinitely more passionate folk-Zionists of the 
3 7Pale" — the Eastern Jew.
While negotiations for recognition and support had 
been going on, Jewish settlement in Palestine had been 
slowly, but steadily, taking place. In 1905 a new wave of 
immigrants began to arrive in Palestine— the second Aliyah, 
(the first having been in 1882 by the "lovers of Zion.1') 
Small, but consistent, and primarily agrarian based pre- 
World War I colonization occurred, so that by the outbreak
3 6Sokolow, Zionism. II, lii.
3 7Sachar, Modern Jewish History, p. 283.
of the war approximately forty Jewish settlements in
Palestine existed, with a total population estimated at
twelve thousand on farms and an estimated fifty thousand
3 8Jewish settlers in towns or cities. The language problem, 
resulting from the varied nationalities of the settlers, 
resulted in the encouragement of Hebrew as a national 
language— a development which aided in' the formulation of a 
national identity and unp-ty.
As a result.of the activities of the Zionist Congress 
and its subsidiaries, the foundation of a Jewish home in 
Palestine had already effectively been started by 1.914. 
Political recognition of the Zionist cause had received 
tentative approval by both German and English governments, 
but public recognition and acceptance was still required if 
a Jewish state were to become a reality.
The "moral-legal" foundation for establishing a 
Jewish state in Palestine was built during the first World 
War, the resultant Peace Conference at Paris, and creation 
of the League of Nations. The accomplishment of this fact 
came about, primarily, as the result of two documents: the
Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, and the Mandate for 
Palestine, which implemented the Balfour Declaration, issued
38Arthur Ruppfn, The Jewish Modern World (New York: 
Macmillan, 1934), p. 368. Hereafter cited as Ruppin, Jewish 
World. The Israel State Handbook, Facts About Israel 
(Jerusalem, 1966), gives the total Jewish population in the 
area as being 85,000.
on July 24, 1922. Thpee main groups or factions were 
connected with these documents, and, therefore, with the 
resolution of the problem of political recognition of a 
Jewish state. The desires of the Jews to have a homeland 
was the first, and foremost, concern of the Jewish element" 
second, the desire of the Arabs to obtain independence from 
the Turks must be met; and the imperialistic interests of 
England and* France, in reference to the Middle East, had to 
be reconciled. The solution to the problem of the Jewish 
state was inextricably tied up with all three, and the 
creation of the Mandate for Palestine evolved out of a 
comedy of errors resulting in attempts to solve all three 
problems without regard'for the future consequences of the 
multiple promises made during the course'of the negotiations.
CHAPTER II
SECRET TREATIES' AND ABORTIVE PROMISES
. . . andj whosoever considers that the nature of
men, especially of men in^authority,{is inclined 
rather to commit two errors than to retract one, 
will not marvel that from this root:Lof unadVised- 
ness, so many and tall branches of mischief have 
proceeded. ^
-— Clarendon, History of the Rebellion
The assassinationxof ArchduKe Franz Ferdinand at 
Sarajevo and^  the- world - war which followed, ^ reshaped many 
states in Europe and -the' Middle East, and instituted a marked 
change in the world Jewish community. Despite the fact that 
during thp same period a new wave of anti-Semitism swept the 
continent/ the Zionists gained additional support for th^ir 
program and finally achieved their goal of reaching 
Palestine— the British would conquer the Middle East, "and 
the Zionist dream Qwould^ become a reality." It is doubtfult 
if this goal could have been realized, had it*not been for 
the violent transformation i^n diplomacy which evolyed as a 
result of the all-encompassing conflict of the Great War.
Elie Kedourie, The Chatham House Version and Other 
Middle-Eastern Studies (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970),
p e 82. Hereafter citfed as Kedourie, Chatham House.
2Abr,am Leoni Sachar, A History of the Jews (5th ed. ; 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 197Q), p. 362. Hereafter cited
as Sachar, Jews.
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The dichotomy of Great Britain's foreign policy was part of
this process. England had to shelve long-term goals in the
interest of relatively short-term goals; goals that were'
necessary for "securing immediate tactical advantage over 
3
the enemy."
Between early August and the end of October, 1914,
Great Britain tensely waited for a move by the Turkish Empire
to end its neutral status and, because of the immediacy of
the situation, England was forced to make a "number of
4
contradictory commitments " among them the Husain-
McMahon Agreement and the Sykes-Picot Treaty— negotiations
dictated by need and expediency. Should the Turks enter the
war on the side of Germany,. England would be faced not only
with a two-front war, but also with the possibility of losing
access to natural resources and supplies from the East.
Because of this great threat, the War Office worried about
the defense of the route to India, while the Admiralty was
equally concerned over the safety of English oil resources in 
5Persia, for the
3
George E. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East: 
From the Rise of Islam to Modern Times (New York: Frederick
A. Praeger, 1960), p. 129. Hereafter cited as Kirk, History 
of the Middle East.
^Ibid., p. 124.
5
Ann Williams, Britain and France in the Middle East 
and North Africa (London! MacMillan, 1968) , pi 9~. Hereafter 
cited as Williams, Britain and France. For an explanation 
of the impact of Persian oil cf., Yahya Armajani, Middle 
East: Past and Present (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1970), pp. 228 ff. Hereafter cited as Armajani, Middle 
East.
. . . Turkish. Empire/., lay across the track by land
or water to CBritainlsj great possessions in the 
East . . . .  It was vital for . . . ^England' s
interests that once the Turks "declared war against 
- - . {]"her~j , £they~j should defeat - them.
Prior to the outbreak of the; war in 1914, the Foreign
Office gave onl„y > slight attention to ‘relations with the Arab
people^, primarily because of it's traditional poligy towards
the Ottoman Empire— a policy dictated by- the nepessityi to
protect routes to the Middle East, and the Far East. Any
independent contact with the Arabs would directly violate
this policy and would question the supremacy- and sovereignty
of the Ottoman government in this area. England could not-
risk antagonizing the Porte in any-way so long as it remained
neutral. Lord Kitchener, British Agent|and-Consul-General in
7 .Egypt, however, toyed with the idea of British sponsorship
of the establishment of .an Arab state to offset an^ imperial
loss of influence, which might resultvfrom the' growing
8friendliness between the Sultan and Germany. As earlyi as 
February, 1914/ the Arabs had approached Kitchener, through 
their representative Abdullah, one of the sons of the* Sharif
^David Lloyd George, War Memoirs (6 vols.; London: 
1933-36), IV, 1802-03.
7
Sir Llewellyn Woodward, Great Britain and the War 
of 1914-1918 (London; Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1967), p. 114. 
Hereafter cited as Woodward, Great Britain.
8H. W. V. Temperley, ed., A History of the Peace 
Conference of Paris (6 vols.; London: Henry Frowde and
Hodder & Stoughton, 1924), VI, 120. Hereafter cited as 
Temperley, Peace Conference.
of Mecca; regarding the possibility of British aid, or
support for an Arab revolt against the Turkish Empire. The
Consul-General refused the representative's request, and even
denied a request for partial aid. Great Britain felt she
could not support a rebellion against a country with which
she had friendly diplomatic relations. However, to ascertain
the exact wishes and position of Husain, Ronald Storrs,
Oriental Secretary to the British Agency in Egypt, was sent
to Abdullah shortly after this initial contact had been made.
Storrs was asked "categorically whether Great Britain would
9
present the Grand Sharif with a dozen machine guns"
to be used by the Arabs against thp Turks. This request was 
refused by Storrs, who once again reiterated that Great 
Britain could not support a rebellion against aicountry with 
which she had a working diplomatic arrangement.*^ Although 
nothing came of these early Anglo-Arab conversations, a* 
foundation had been, established for future contacts between 
the two parties, should the need arise.
From August through October, 1914, the Turkish govern 
ment continued to maintain a neutral position,} at lea^t theo­
retically. However, when it became apparent that Turkey was
^Ronald Storrs, Orientations (London: Ivor Nicholson
and Wasson, 1937), p. 143. cf. G. P. Gooch and H. W. V. 
Temperely, eds., British Documents on ‘the Origin of the War 
(10 vols.; London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1926-38)
X, 827. Hereafter cited as Gooch and Temperley, Documents.
"^Storrs, Orientations, p. 143.
moving towards a German alliance, Great Britain rapidly 
revised her policies toward the Arabs. New arrangements 
were necessary to fill the vacuum which would result from a 
German-Turkish alliance. After Turkey entered the war on 
November 5, 1914, England prepared to exploit the mutual 
antagonism that existed between the Arabs and the Ottoman 
Empire. Generally, it was the attitude of the British repre­
sentatives in Khartoum and at Cairo, that successful military 
campaigns against the Turks required Arab support for the
11allied effort. Should the Ottoman Sultan declare a Jihad
against the allied countries, by claiming the war to be anti-
Muslim in its orientation, the possibility of countering such
a program in the Arab world, as well as among Moslem troops
of the Indian Army, could only be found in some form of
12Anglo-Arab alliance.
Lord Kitchener directed Storrs, in September, 1914-, 
to approach Husain on the possibility of an alliance between 
England and the Arabs. In return for Arab support, Kitchener 
proposed to supply and support an Arab revolution, which he 
had previously refused to do. The Sharif, in a rather 
ambiguous and noncommittal statement, replied that he would 
be willing to negotiate such an agreement with England, but
11Jihad is Arabic for "holy war." To participate in 
Jihad was one of the metriods to achieve Paradijse, according 
to Islamic doctrine.
12Kedourie, Chatham House, p. 16. cf. , Temperley; 
Peace Conference, VI, 120.
indicated that immediate- military action onLhis part was not
possible because of the lack of preparedness among the 
13Arabs. He offered cooperation in non-violent ways, however,
by agreeing to refuse the Jihad to be proclaimed in any of
the mosques under his control.
Initiation of formal negotiations between Husain and
Great Britain can be dated with the cable which Kitchener
14sent to Cairo on November 1, 1914:
If Arab nation assist England in this war England will 
guarantee that no intervention,takes place in Arabia 
and will give Arabs^gvery assistance against external 
foreign aggression.
Husain, repeating his earlier message’, informed the Fqreign
Office in ^ Cairo that he favored supporting England and
desired British aid in any revolution, but stipulated that
overt actipn against Turkey could not come from the Arabs
without extensive preparation. He mainati.ned that the Arabs
lacked sufficient*strength, at that time, to wage an all-out
rebellion against Turkey.^
Great Britain declared war* on Turkey,;, November 5
13Gooch and Temperley, Documents, X, 831-32. cf., 
Storrs, Orientations', p. 175.
■^Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 120. The Ottoman 
Empire had joined Germany on October 31, 1914, and the 
British telegram was sent the following day.
15Storrs, Orientations; p. 176.
"^George Antonius, The Arab Awakening in the Story of 
the Arab National Movement (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1939),
pp. 132 ff. Hereafter cited as Antpnius, Arab Awakening.
1914, thus abandoning her traditional Eastern policy and
included the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire as one of her
war aims. According to Grey, it was " the Ottoman
Government who rang the death-knell of Ottoman
17dominion not only m  Europe, but in Asia , " not
England and her allies. In The Times. November 16, 1914,
the British Foreign Office, now convinced of the importance
of an Arab revolt against the Turks, stated that England had
no plans to conduct military operations in the Near East
unless it became absolutely necessary to protect Arab
interests "against Turkish aggression, or to support
attempts by Arabs to free themselves from Turkish rule."
Hoping to expedite Husain's actions, Sir Reginald Wingate,
18Governor-General of the Sudan, received instructions to
encourage the Arabs to break with the Ottoman Empire, by
19issuing "liberal promises of future aggrandisement," and 
to let it be known that should the Turks be defeated, Great 
Britain would make it one of the peace conditions that the 
Arabian Peninsula .and the Holy Cities of the Hejaz be left
17The Times (London), November 10, 1914.
18Wingate wanted to back the Arabs and was openly 
sympathetic towards their cause. He also felt that an Anglo- 
Arab alliance would greatly increase Great Britain's position 
in the area, for the " . . .  historic position of the Arabs 
within Islam made them the only effective counterpoise to the 
anglophobia of the Ottomans, which . . . would increase after
the war." Kedourie, Chatham House, p. 17.
19 Ibid., p. 14.
in the control of an independent Moslem state. Husain still 
delayed in talcing any military action against the Turks, but 
did fulfill his promise of refusing the Sultan's request to 
preach Jihad against the allies, which had been declared orl 
November 23, 1914.
While the fighting had just begun in the East* the
diplomats of the Western powers already assumed "the death
21of the Turkish Empire and were planning its obsequies."
These movements and activities involved the completion of 
viable agreements with the Arabs, England, France, and 
Russia, and also included plans for the dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire.
Great Britain sought an Arab alliance with full 
awareness of Arab animosity towards the fulfillment of French 
imperialistic desires in Syria and Palestine. Working for a 
strengthened position in the area, the British viewed the 
mobilization of Arab and Bedouin troops along the southern 
border of Palestine as a definite threat to the security of 
her position in this area. The unsuccessful Turkish attack 
on the Suez Canal in February, 1915, brought the strategic 
importance and location of Palestine as a possible sight for 
future Turkish-German attacks on the canal, forcibly to the 
attention of the British War Office.
20Armajani, Middle East, p. 291. 
21Will iams, Britain and France, p. 11
In the early spring of 1915, the Foreign Office
appointed a committee, under the chairmanship of Sir Maurice
de Bunsen^, to study the problem of the future of the Ottoman 
22Empire. Instructions to this committee directed them to' 
pay special attention to British desiderata in the Middle 
East, and more specifically to Palestine.
In accordance with British interests in the area, 
the committee reported to the War Council on June 30, 1915, 
that, in their opinion, the French should not be allowed to 
annex Palestine, for a" French Palestine might pose a future 
threat to British security in the Suez region. They opposed 
British annexation, however, for the ". Empire Iwas]
wide enough already and [the] task £was) to consolidate the •
_ 23
possessions [theyj already ^held] , , 1 not to increase
r
the imperial confines. They proposed, rather, a new formula 
for Turkish partition, and, in anticipation of the eventual 
defeat of Turkey, nine specific areas of interest were
22The Committee was composed of: Mr. G. R. Clerk,
Foreign Office; Sir J. W. Holderness, India Office; Admiral 
Sir H. B. Jackson, Admiralty; Major-General C. E. Callwell, 
War Office; Sir Mark Sykes and Sir T.i H. Smith, Board of 
Trade. A copy of the committee's report can be found in the 
Austen Chamberlain Papers, (Box AC 19), University of 
Birmingham, Birmingham, England.
23Great Britain, Cabinet, Ad Hoc Committees (secret), 
"Report, Proceedings and Appendices of a Committee Appointed 
by the Prime Minister. 1915. British Desiderata in Turkey- 
in-Asia, 1 Cabinet Meetings 27/1, p. 4. Hereafter cited as 
Cabinet, Ad Hoc., as cited by Aaron S. Klieman, Foundations 
of British Policy in the Arab World: The Cairo- Conference 
of 19 21 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 5.
Hereafter cited as Klieman, British Policy.
proposed or identified. The committee recommended official 
"recognition and consolidation" of England's position in the 
Persian Gulf, for the exploitation of the oil production in 
this area; the "exploitation of Mesopotamia as a granary" 
and a possible area for future Indian immigration; apd the 
solidification of England's position in the Eastern Mediter­
ranean and Persian Gulf through a "minimum increase of naval 
expenditure and responsibility." The de Bunsen Committee 
also gave specific recommendations concerning the Arabs, by 
recommending the enforcement of the "assurances" that had 
already been given tp Husain and any that might be made in
the future. The retention of the Moslem Holy Places "under
24independent Moslem rule" should be guaranteed. Lastly,
Palestine had to be recognized as a country whose destiny was
the concern of both belligerent and neutral, and, therefore,
should be the subject of special negotiation aftpr the con-
25elusion of the war. The consensus of the committee was
that partition of the area was the answer to the Eastern
question, but with retention of a substantially intact Empire
2 6with a decentralized administration, which, besides being
24Klieman, British Policy, p. 5.
25Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers (House of 
Commons and Command), 1939, Vol. XIV (Reports, vol. 83),
’ Citind. 59 74, "Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain 
Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of 
Mecca in 1915 and 1916," p. 51* Hereafter cited as Great 
Britain, Report.
26Kedourie, Chatham House, p. 15
of vital interest to England, would "give Turkey in Asia some
prospect of a permanent existence," and yet free Anatolia,
Armenia, Iraq and * Palestine from Ottoman domination, thereby
allowing "them a chance ta foster and develop their own
27resources " and destinies.
The members of the* committee thought that their
recommendations would satisfy England's allies who were
insisting "upon an alteration of the status quo ante bellum
28and an end to Ottoman independence. " The tone of the de
Bunsen findings was detached and simplyhadvisedi Great Britain
to abandon any idea of claiming Palestine, for the committee
was certain that the French would not be successful in their
attempts to claim the area, and, therefore, Britain would not
29have* to be overly worried about its disposal. The de 
Bunsen proposal, however, never received official endorsement 
by the government, and it soon became evident^that only the 
complete dissolution .of the- Ottoman Empiore would satisfy the 
various interests of the Entente. Evenithough the modest 
recommendations of the de Bunsen committee failed to receive 
government endorsement, its basic frameworkj was used in the 
future negotiations - with the Arabs, French and the Zionists.
2 7*'Cabinet, Ad Hoc, p. 6.
28Klieman, British Policy, p. 6
29Stein, Balfour, p. 247.
The dei,Bunsen statement became), the pivotal point for. the
ensuing British diplomatic relations with regard to the
Middle East. The Commiftee report provided for
any future policy at a time when the exigencies of 
war, the effects of uncoordinated decision-making, 
and the* excesses of secret diplomatic bargaining 
had ngg yet cpmpligated Great Britain's position
in the Middle East.
In th^ early months of 1915, Great Britain..was still
free of any- obligations to supports an Arab revolution, but
31she- I^ ad made a commitment to recognize an Arab state. On)
July> 14, 1915, the first move towards actiye Anglo-Arab
collaboration was made when Husain.,, who had been tentatively
accepted a^; Arab spokesman by the Arabs, after he had agreed
32to accept the terms of the Damascus Protocol, sent, jthe'*
33first of many letters to Sir Henry McMahon.i In* -this letter
the Sharif asked for England's approval of several "funda­
mental proposition^, 1 if-a revolt against the Turks was to 
become a reality. The proposals requested British recog­
nition of Arab independence in ithe Arabian Peninsula and all
30Klieman, British Policy, p. 5.
31i'Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 123.
3 2-
The Damascus Protocol stated that if the Arabs 
revolted against the Ottoman Empire, England would have to 
recognize an independent* Arab state in Arabia, Palestine, 
Syria and Iraq, Kirk, Higtory of the Middle East, pp, 125t: 
26.
33Antpnius, Arab Awakening, p. 157.
of Syria, Trans-Jordan*, Iraq, and Palestine. Aden was 
excluded from the demands and was to be left as it was— under 
the control of the British. The area proposed as Arab was to 
be bounded to the east by Persia, on the west by the Mediter­
ranean up to Mersina and Adana, on an anqle where the Syrian
34coast joined Asia Minor. In return for British acceptance 
of these terms, Husain promised to give preferential economic 
treatment to Great Britain in the newly created Arab 
countries.
McMahon, not authorized to accept, nor prepared to 
expect, such definitive territorial demands, replied to Husain 
on August 30, that Great Britain would be willing to’ stipulate 
that the Arab Caliphate for the creation of an independent 
Arabia was the desire of the British government, providing a 
Moslem majority desired thi-s. The territorial demands of 
Husain's letter were left unanswered, McMahon basing dismis­
sal of the boundary question on the premise that it was too
34 /Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers (House of
Commons and Command), 19 39, Vol. XXVII (Reports, vol. 5 73,
misc. No. 3), Cmnd. 5957, "Correspondence between Sir Henry
McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo, and the
Sharif Hussein of Mecca: July, 1915— March, 1915," p. 3.
Hereafter cited as Great Britain, McMahon Correspondence.
'"England to acknowledge the independence of the Arab
countries, bounded on the north by Mersina and Adana up to
the 3 7 of latitude, on which degree fall Birijik, Urfa,
Mardin, Midiat, Jezirat, Amadia, up to.the. boarder of Persia-
on the east by the boarders of Persia up to- the Gulf of
Basra; on the south by the Indian Ocean, with the exception
of the position of Aden to remain as it- is; on the west by
the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina." Ibid.
35premature to consider such matters at that time. Husain's
reply of September 9, offered no concessions to his original
territorial demands, and he re-emphasized their importance
by stating that they were not merely based on personal desire,
but rather represented the wishes of all Arabs. He inferred
that this territory was necessary for the creation of a work-
3 6able Arab state. These first letters, while not generally
accomplishing anything, set the tone for future contacts by
revealing the divergent emphasis that would be placed on
3 7territorial acquisition by the two parties.
McMahon had one immediate objective in conducting this 
correspondence with the Arabs: acquisition of Arab committal
to revolt against the Turkish Empire, thereby allaying an 
Islamic front in the East. Because of the immediacy of the 
situation, he wanted to avoid any long, drawn-out1 negotiations 
that might hinder direct and immediate action on the part of 
the Arabs. His terms, therefore, tended towards the abstract. 
Husain, om the other hand', delt with specifics— the form of 
military and financial aid required and what would have to 
be supplied, and specific territorial boundaries to delimit 
future Arab states. He wanted definite commitments before 
any action on his part. The British negotiations were 
directed with short-term goals in mind, whiTe the Arabs worked
35Ibid. 3^Ibid., p. 5
37Klieman, British Policy, p. 9.
for long-term goals. On October 9, McMahon wired the Home 
Office that immediate action was necessary if the Arabs were 
to be. brought ;into the conflict as allies. Commitment could
3 8no longer be avoided.
Doubting that Husain was ip fact representing the
total Arab element, Great Britain contacted an. Arab who had
39deserted from the Turkish Army— Muhammad al-Faruqi.
Al-Faruqi asserted that though the Arabs would like to obtaip 
total independence— meaning independence of all Arab areas—  
they were aware of French interests and concerns in Syria and ! 
the British interests ip. Iraq; The Arabs, accordingly then, 
would undoubtedly*insist on the independence of Aleppo, Hama, 
Horns, and Damascus in any negotiated agreement, but they would 
understand and probably agree to "a general reservation of the
,s
areas I n  which Great Britain was not free to act" because of 
other arrangements and/or treaties.^
McMahon, with the* approval of the British government 
and, with the knowledge of al-Faruqi's statement, sent Husain 
the key-letter of the eight month correspondence on 
October 24, 1915. In itihe stated that Great Britain,, with
3 8Kedourie, Chatham House, p. 17.
39Al-Faruqi was a staff officer m  the Ottoman Army 
and had met with Faisal in April, 1915, at Aleppo. He was 
aware of Arab plans and was regarded by McMahon and Sykes as 
being representative of the Arab leaders. Elie Kedourie, 
England and the Middle East (London: Bowes( & Bowes, 1956),
pp. 36 ff. Hereafter cited as Kedourie, Middle East.
40Antonius, Arab Awakening, pp. 168-69.
certain reservations, would be willing to accept the terms of
Husain's letter dated July 14, 1915. With special reference
to the territorial demands, however, two areas would have to
be.excluded: "the two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta
and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of
41Damascus, Horns, Hama"and Aleppo." These areas could not be
included because they were not purely Arab, and portions of
the described territory were of special interest-to France,
therefore, England could not make any conclusive^ promises or
42guarantees concerning thgse areas. Great Britain, also 
stated that the vilayets of Bagdad and Basara, because of 
their geographic position and EnglandJs interest in^them,
would require special administratiye arrangement^ to be
43 . . .established in the* future. Subject to,the modifications
lifted, McMahon stated that Great Britainj". was prepared
to recognize anct support the independence of the Arabs in all
the regions within.\ the limits demanded by the Sherif of 
44Mecca."
Husain ireplied to this offer on November 5, agreeing 
to the British provisions concerning Mersina and Adana, but 
adamantly refusing to exclude the vilayets of Aleppo and
4^Great Britain*, Report, pp. 23-24. cf. McMahon 
Correspondence, pp< 7-8, and the Wingate Papers, file 135/4, 
dispatchifrom McMahon to Grey, October 26, 1915.
42Ibid. 43Ibid.. p. 24.
44Great Britain, Report, p. 24.
Beirut, since they were a purely Arab population, and also
withholding concession to the British demands concerning
Bagdad and Basara, which were historically Arab areas. He
agreed, however, to temporary military occupation by the
English after the wary provided a "suitable sum- £be"3 paid as
compensation to the Arab Kingdom for the period of occupa- 
45tion." The Home Office appeared reluctant to accept 
Husain's demands, but Wingate pushed for the acceptance on 
the grounds that no harm could possibly come from the govern­
mental approval of Husain's terms.
If the embryonic Arab state comes to nothing, all our 
promises vanish and we are absolved . . * — if the
Arab state becomes a reality, we quite sufficient
safeguards to control it - . . . 1
Further, no matter which of these resulted, Great Britain
required the support of the Arabs as a counter-balance in the
Middle East.
Despite the necessity of acquiring Arab support, the 
Foreign Office, through McMahon's letter of December 14, 
flatly refused the Arab demands concerning Aleppo and Beirut 
on the grounds that England could not give concessions involv­
ing these areas because they were of interest to France. 
Husain, in a letter to McMahon dated January 1, 1916, agreed, 
for the time being, to drop the question of the Syrian coast
45Great Britain, McMahon Correspondence, p. 6.
46Wingate Papers, file 135/5, as cited by Kedourie, 
Chatham House, p. 19.
because of the Anglo-French negotiations. He reserved the
right, however, to reopen and pursue, after the war, the
Syrian question until Arab wishes had been satisfied. It
was completely impossible fpr the Arabs, according to Husain,
"to allow any- derogation that gave France a span of
47land in those regions." The British were reluctant to
accept this temporary solution, and in the eighth letter of
the series, dated January 25, 1916, McMahon warned Husain
that the Anglo-French alliance would, in all likelihood, be
stronger after the war than it was at the present, and,
therefore, her position on Syria would undoubtedly remain the 
48same.
In a letter dated February 18, Husain accepted the
terms of the British as they had been stated by McMahon's
letter of October, 1915; the Arab revolt would not become a
49reality, however, until July, 1916. With the conclusion of
the correspondence, the Anglo-Sharifian negotiations emerged
framed in a manner consistent with any Anglo-French agreement
50that might materialize m  the future.
To further deal with the situation of the Ottoman 
Empire, outside of the Arab situation; two secret treaties
47Great Britain, McMahon Correspondence, pp. 13-14.
48 __Ibid., p. 15.
49
Infra., chap. iv, p. 82.
50Kedourie, Chatham House, p. 21.
among the allies, during an era of secret treaties and agree­
ments, were directly concerned with the disposition of Turkey
and-, therefore, with Palestine; the Constantinople-Agreement
51and the Sykes-Pipot Treaty*.
The Constantinople Agreement consisted of a.-' series of
diplomatic exchanges between^Russia, France, and Great
Britain over a period of five weeks from March-4, to April 10,
1915. Sergei Dmitrievich Sazanov, the, Russian Foreign
Mipister, initiated th,e formaL negotiations for the agreement
when he approached the French and British ambassadors at
Saint Petersburg. He informed them that Russia was interested
in annexing Constantinople and the Dardenelles, if the. allied
52 . .war effor-f proved successful. The British gave tentative 
agreements to Russians wishes to control Constantinople and 
the Straits, if Russia would honor French and British| counter­
claims in the area. England was interested in certain sareas 
of*Persia jwhiqh had previously been designatpd( as neutral in 
the Anglo-Russian Agreementiof 1907, and they also wanted an
51Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great 
Britain and Palestine: 1915-1939 (London: Oxford University
Press, , 1939) , p. 7. The treaties and suggestions thjat were 
concerned with th^ Ottoman Empire, in general, were: The
Franco-British Treaty, Sazanov Agreement and the Anglo- 
Italian(Convention— 1914; the London Pact and the Anglo-Hejaz 
Treaty— 1915; the Saxonby-Paleclogue Agreement and the Sykes- 
PicotfcTreaty-— 1916. Sachar, Jews. p. 365.
5 2E. L. Woodward and R. Butler, eds., Documents on 
British Foreign Policy: 1919-1939 (12 vols.; London: Her
Majesty's Stationary Office, 1952), 1st Series, IV, 634-36. 
Hereafter citgd as Woodward and Butler, Documents.
independent Moslem power to be created in Arabia which would
5 3have complete control over the Moslem Holy Places.
France also agreed to the Anglo-Russian statement,
with the stipulation that her approval be contingent upon a
settlement which would insure her interests in the Middle
East— the annexation of Syria, " together with the
region of the Gulf of Alexandretta and Cilicia up to the
Taurus ^MountainJ r a n g e . I t  was assumed, on the part of
the French,,' that the term Syria included Palestine, but to-
assur.e that this was the case, Maurice Paleologue, French
Ambassador, informed the Russian Foreign Minister that "the
French Government [referred] also to Palestine when speaking 
55of Syria." The Tsar agreed to the French terms and France,
on April 10, 1915, gave formal approval to the Russian ^ claims
56to Constantinople and the Dardanelles.
No final statement as to the specific conditions or 
demands, however, appeared during the above series of diplo­
matic encounters, and the question of the disposition of the 
Ottoman Empire remained open. French and British interests 
in the Middle East, at this time, conflicted with reference
53Ibid., pp. 636-38.
54J. Polonsky, trans., Documents diplomatiques 
secrets russes 1914-1917 d 1apres les archives du ministere 
des affairs etrangers a Petrograd (Paris, 1928), pi 288. 
Hereafter cited as Polonskyi, Documents . . . Petrograd.
55 /Polonsky, Documents . . . Petrograd, pp. 636-38.
56Woodward and Butler, Documents, IV, 638.
to portions of Syria— primarily Palestine. Some- arrangement
or compromise had to be arranged between the two countries
before any definitive settlement v<?oul.d be finalized.
Fearing thq.t Britain would be denyipg therself the
spoils of a successful war, "while her present allies— but
57potential rivals— acquired new territory ," England
opened formal negotiations with^Husain in July, 1915, and by
October these negotiations approachecj a ,satisfactory stage.
Sir Edward Grey, anticipating a successful- conclusion of the
Husain-McMahon correspondence, although originally opposing
the Pan-Arab movement— having agreed with Austen Chamberlain,
that such a scheme would be< a useless and embarrassing
5 8liability and would make agreement witjh France impossible, " 
thought it was time to inform the French of these negotiations. 
The British-French accord over the Mi-ddle East was, in fact, 
initiated just prior to the end of the Husaip-McMahon,nego­
tiations, and the opening of the Anglo-French discussions
were definitely^related to the progress of this correspon- 
59dence. On October 21, therefore, Grey ngtffipd the French
Ambassador in London*, Paul Cambon, of the Husain-McMahon
60correspondence and of the conditionsjthat then existed.
5 7Klieman, British Policy, p. 6.
5 8Kedourie, Chatham House, p. 20.
59 Stein, Balfour, p. 249.
60Temperley states that. R. S. Baker believed .the 
Frenph to be ignorant, of the Husain-McMahon»i Correspondence
He then proposed that the two governments meet to discuss'
the questions of their mutual interests in any- future par^
61tition of the Ottoman Empire.
Great Britain appointed Sir Mark Sykes, an authority
on Middle Eastern affairs, to act ini. their behalf. The
French appointed Charles Francois Georges-Picpot, formerly
the French Consul in Beirut, as his counterpart. In the
beginning of these negotiations,! France evidenced extreme
skepticism regarding any Arab movement, as did certain mem-
6 2bers pf the British government. On November 23, Picot,
illustrating his country's skeptipism and self-interest,
stated that Mosul, Bagdad and Basra would be sufficient for
any Arab state, and claimed all of Syria and Palestine, minus
the Holy Places, for France. A compromise, between the two
countries was finally arranged where Syria (Horns, Hama,
Aleppo, and Damascus) would comprise an Ar.ab state under
6 3French influence and guidance. By February, 1916, Sykes 
and Picot agreed on a provisional formula for the future
until March| 1919, although this is not the generally 
accepted interpretation of thje situation. Temperley,
Peace Conference, VI, 128.
rr -|
For the pre-arrangement situation See Stein, 
Balfour, pp. 240 ff.
6 2The British Foreign Office was skeptical and the 
India Office was definitely opposed to any support of an 
Arab nationalist movement by Great Britain.
63E. Marmostein, "A Note on Damascus , Horns p Hama,r 
and Aleppo," St. Anthony's Papers, no. XI, 1961.
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partition of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The 
principle terms of this joint effort subsequently received 
endorsement by Cambon and Grey.
Basically the agreement stated that neither the
British nor the French would annex any -territory in the
Arabian Peninsula, nor allow a third party to do so. This
would .assure the creation of an independent Arab state in
Arabia. The areas of Iraq and Syria— excluding Palestine—
were to be divided into four zones. Two letter zones, (A)
and (B), and two color zones, Blue and Red, were created and
assigned to the two powers. Zone (A) was toi. be composed of
the interior of Syria, from and including the cities of Horns,
Hama, Aleppo, and Damascus to the west, to and including the
Mosul district in the east. Zone (B), that area lying to the
south of (A), was to be bounded on the west by a line running
from Gaza to Aqaba, crossing the Trans-Jordan eastward to the
Red zpne, with a northern arm jutting into Persia‘and a
southern extension toward the Persian Gulf. The Blue zone
was to be the province of Cilicia and all of coastal Syria.
west of (A) with the cities of Horns, Hama, Aleppo, and
Damascus on the fringe of the border. The Red zone was to
be composed of the provinces of Basra' and Bagdad. Palestine,
which was west of the Jordan and south of Galilee, was to
64comprise a fifth region designated as the Brown zone.
64Woodward and Butler, Documents. IV, 245. 
cf. Appendix. I, 163..
The creation of this special.zone was the result'of the 
strong interests of both countries in Palestine, both 
desiring domination of the area.
In (A) and (B), Great Britain and France agreed to
recognize semi-independent Arab states, or a confederation
of Arab states under a single leader. However, the privilege
of appointing foreign advisors and the right of certain
economic considerations and privileges would be guaranteed
to the French in (A) and to the British in (B). In the color
zones, France (Blue) and England (Red) were to "be allowed to
establish such direct or indirect administration or control
as they []desired]] and as they £might have thought]] fit to
65arrange with the Arab State or Confederation ," and
that the Brown zone constituted an internationally adminis­
tered area, the form to be created after consultation with
66Russia, the other allied powers, and the Sharif of Mecca.
In Palestine, Great Britain was to control the ports 
of Haifa and Acre, thereby,forming an enclave in the inter­
national zone, and Haifa was to become a free port for the
65Woodward and Butler, Documents, IV, 245-46.
^ Ibid. , p. 246. "That France and Great Britain are 
prepared to recognize and protect an independent Arab State 
or a Confederation of Arab States in the area (A) and (B) 
marked on the annexed map, under the suzerainty of an Arab 
Shiek. That in area (A) France, and in area (B) Great 
Britain, shall have priority of right of enterprise and local 
loans. That in area (A), and in area (B) Great Britain, 
shall alone supply advisors or foreign functionaries at the 
request of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States." 
Ibid,, p. 245.
British. England also received assurance of control of the
6 7proposed Haifa-Persian Gulf Railroad.
Sykes and Picot, after reaching the above agreement, 
presented the agreement to Sazonov and the Russian govern­
ment, in March. Russia accepted the proposal, with the 
condition that an agreement allowing it to annex certain 
areas in Asia Minor be attached to any formal document. The 
area that Russia wanted was the southern area of the eastern 
end of the Black Sea— Trebizond, Erzerum, Van, and Bitlis, 
and the region of Kurdistan.^ A Franco-Russian agreement 
concerning these terms was negotiated in 'a series of corres­
pondences in April, 1916, in which Russia agreed to the terms
69of the Sykes-Picot Treaty.
In spite of protests of Paleologue, who was still
desirous of a French Palestine, and with Russia's acceptance
of the terms, Grey and Cambon, believing the agreement to be
the most equitable agreement that could be arrived at, pushed
70the treaty through for ratification on May 16, 1916. This
agreement existed as a product of the times,
. . . a time when there was as yet no decided plan
formed of launching a definite campaign in the East, 
when the prime necessity was some sort of agreeme^J, 
since otherwise no progress would have been made.
^ Ibid. . p. 246.
68Woodward and Butler, Documents, IV, 248.• -  — - _ - — _ _ l  i
69Ibid., pp. 241-43, and 249-51.
70 71Ibid., pp. 245 ff. Sokolow, Zionism, II, xxvi.
Therefore, in May of 1916 the position of Palestine 
was, one of proposed international control and administration. 
At the same time, Great Britain accepted the Sykes-Picot 
Treaty with a definite' understanding between the three signa­
tories, that Horns, Hama, Aleppo,, and Damascus were tp qom- 
prise an independent Arab state or confederation. This 
understanding was in complete harmony with the terms of the 
Anglo-Arab agreement tbat had been arrived at by Husain and 
McMahon.^
Had the situation remained as it was in May, 1916, 
when the Paris Treaty was signed, many complications might 
have been avoided. This proved not to be the case, however.
Because of its concern and occupation with Arab 
affairs and their diplomatic relations with other members of 
the Entente, Great Britain had not carried on,any serious or 
active negotiations with the Zionist movement. However, the 
Zionist movement possessed active involvement in their Pales­
tine program and certain prominent and influential members of 
the British government were beginning to listen attentively 
to Zionist positions and statements. Though no true progress 
was made on the part of the Zionists during the early years
72The Sykes-Picot Treaty, as ratified, remained 
one of the war's many secret treaties, until it was published 
by the Bolsheviks in Pravda, on December 20, 1917; it also 
formed the foundation for the Anglo-French talks concern^ 
ing the Middle East at the Paris Peace Conference.
Tempereley, Peace Conference, VI, 5.
of the war, definite advances appeared during 1916-1917, 
in spite of the secret agreements arrived at between the 
Entente.
The secret negotiations were systematically compli­
cated and confusing enough, and those countries involved in 
them were engaged in
. . . back door intrigues in the attempt to
guarantee and advance . . . £their[3 own political
and economic interests. And then in the midst of 
all the conferences and negotiations, Britain.^ 
officially endorsed the Zionist program .
by issuing the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917.
What had previously been a muddled and complicated state of
affairs, became even more so when Great Britain issued this
statement.
^Sachar, Jews, p. 366.
CHAPTER III
BRITISH ALLIANCE WITH ZIONISM 
A DIPLOMATIC NECESSITY
The Jews have always hoped— it was an article 
of faith for the,religious and even non­
religious Jews^-that a day might come when 
they would be allowed to return to the land 
of their ancestors. ^
— Chaim. Weizmann
The Zionist movement immediately prior to the out­
break of the war was at an apparent^ political standstill. * 
fact recognized at the Eleventh Zionist Congress (1913),
when, cognizant that encouragement for their cause would not
2
come from the "Turkish nor from any< other Government*,"
Chaim Weizmann declared that the greatest hope for the reali­
zation of the goals of the movement rested with the Jewish
3
people, not with any national power.
During the early weeks of World War I, when the Arabs
Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great 
Britain and Palestine: 1915-1945 (London: Oxford University
Press, 1946), pp. 17-18.
2Stein, Balfour, p. 65.
3Ibid. p .  66. "The greatest of the Great Powers we 
have to deal with is the Jewish people. From this Power we 
expect everything; from the other powers very,.little. "
Zionist Congress, Report to the Xllth Zionist Congress, 
Protocol, (London: National Labour Press, 1921), p. 168.
Hereafter cited as Xllth Congress.
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were striving for recognition and acceptance of their terri­
torial claims in the Middle East, the Zionists participated 
in activities which they hoped would lead to the establish­
ment of a Jewish state in Palestine. However, the war was 
disruptive to the cohesiveness of the Zionist organization. 
The division of Europe, into two antagonistic camps made any
concerted effort on behalf of the Organization's goals diffi- 
4
cult. The primary problem facing the Organization was where 
to relocate the central offices, which, in 1914, were in 
Berlin. Selection of a site was complicated by the fact that 
any choice would be regarded as an indication of the support 
of the policies of one or the other combatants, and the 
alliance of Zionism with one antagonist or the other. A 
compromise solution was eventually engendered, with no true 
central offices created or continued. In accordance with the 
compromise proposition the Organization office in Berlin 
remained, to handle the affairs of Central Europe; a bureau 
was created in a neutral zone— Copenhagen; Nahum Sokolow and 
Dr. Yehiel Tschlpnow were transferred from Berlin to London 
to create a bupeau for the allied countries; and an individ­
ual, already in the United States, was designated as a repre-
5sentative to handle affairs m  thp Western Hemisphere.
4 _ ,
William Yale, The Near East: A Modern History (Ann
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1958), p. 262.
Hereafter cited as Yale, Near East.
^Stein, Balfour, p. 97.
Regardless of v. the compromise nature of the arrangements, 
however, the outbreak of the war witnessed the inevitable 
transfer of the center of the Zionist movement from the 
continent of Europe to Great Britain and the United States. 
These two countries would provide the impetus for the solidi­
fication of purpose and method to foster the creation of a 
Jewish state.
World events soon determined that the bureau in 
England would become the center of the movement. Tschlenow 
and Sokolow went to England fgr two reasons: to secure
British recognition of Zionism, and to gain the actual 
support of the English Jews.^ London soon assumed the 
responsibility for formulation of political policy and insti­
gation of negotiations.
It was at once clear that England was destined to 
play a most important part in Zionist politics.
London from the beginning was the . . . centre of
the Zionist Organization and the Meccatof political 
Zionism.
Weizmann assumed the leading role in the negotiations 
with Great Britain, even though Tschlenow and Sokolow offi­
cially represented the Organization. Weizmann had originally 
emigrated from Russia in 1904 to work as a teacher at The
Victoria University in Manchester, where he eventually became
8involved in important defense work. Feeling that England
1 0 VIbid.. p. 170. Sokolow, Zionism, II, 43.
8For the early aspects of Weizmann's life and activ­
ities see Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error (New York: Harper
48
was the country most interested in, and, therefore, most
likely to support the Zionist cause, Weizmann wanted to begin
political negotiations with the Government immediately after
9the war broke out. As early as Sept,ember, 1914, he 
requested permission of the Zionist leaders to initiate 
negotiations with influential officials in the British 
government. The leaders of the movement, however, favored, a 
more cautious approach, not wishing to commit themselves to 
a losing power and thereby* forfeit all chances for recogni­
tion of their program. They preferred to wait for the propi­
tious moment to arrive when they could safely select a power 
with which to work.
When Turkey declared war on Great Britain Asher 
Ginsburg— Ahad Ha'am— indicated to Weizmann that "the great 
historic hour for the Jews and for Palestine ^had^ struck 
. and urged immediate action. Ginsburg felt that 
moderation must be the by-word in any and all talks, and that 
the immediate goal should be the right of colonization and 
the freedom of cultural expression in Palestine— nothing more.
&c Bros., 1949). Hereafter cited as Weizmann, Trial and 
Error. The defense project that he was concerned with 
involved the search for a smokeless gunpowder. He eventually 
came up with the use of cordite to contain the amount of 
visible smoke.
9
Sokolow, Zionism, II, 46.
Asher Ginsburg, Iqqrot Ahad H a 1 am (6 vols.; Tel 
Aviv: Yavne, 1923-1925), V, 204, as cited in Esco, Palestine,
I, 78. cf. Weizmann, Trial and Error, pp. 139-41, 215-16, 
231-32, et passim.
In the event these goals were achieved it was hoped that
ultimately an autonomous state, under English control, could 
11be secured. The enumeration of these goals represented a
definite step, a firm commitment; through it the Zionists
indicated their belief that the allies would be victorious
and recognized the fact that British support was essential
12for the success of their program.
While working to secure government support, Weizmann,
already a good friend of Lord Rothschild, a leader of the
British Jews, approached former Prime Minister Arthur James
Balfour, a Conservative leader. Balfo”ur listened attentively
to his account of the plight of the Jews and asked Weizmann
to explain Zionist proposals regarding a solution to the
problem. Weizmann gave no definite answer, but requested
that once the military situation stabilized, the Zionists be
allowed to return to Balfour with the outlines of a program
for Jewish settlement in Palestine. Balfour "enthusiastically"
replied that he would be more than willing to talk further
with the Organization representatives, as they worked for a
13great cause, one m  which he was deeply interested,
C. P. Scott, editor of the Manchester Guardian, also
14came under the influence of Weizmann and, in addition to
11Ibld. 12Yale, Near East, p. 266.
13Blanch E. C. Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour' (2 vols.; 
London: Hutchinson, 1936), II, 224. Hereafter cited as
Dugdale, Balfour.
14Scott acted as a "confessor" and confidant of 
Weizmann. Weizmann, Trial and Error, pp. 177-78.
50
his pro-Zionist editorials> further contributed to the move­
ment by introducing Weizmann to Herbert Samuel and David 
15Lloyd George. Samuel, the first non-converted Jew in the 
British Cabinet, evidenced both sympathy and enthusiasm for 
the idea of the restoration of the Jewish state, and began 
'broaching the subject after the Turkish declaration of war.
In November, 1914, he quickly suggested to Edward Grey that 
the changing situation in the Middle East provided the ideal
1 Q
opportunity to create a Jewish state in Palestine, espe­
cially since
Turkey had thrown herself into the European War and 
that it was probable that her empire would be broken 
up, the question of future control of Palestine
was likely to arise.
Because of the difficulty which would arise from the division 
of the area, due to European jealousies, and with the disin­
tegration of Turkey, " perhaps^ there might be an oppor-
18tunity for the restoration of a Jewish State."
Grey replied to this proposal in a trUely "political" manner,
stating that the idea of a Jewish state "had always had a
19strong sentimental attraction for him ." and that he
■^Stein, Balfour, p. 131.
"^Kedourie, Chatham House, p. 52.
17Viscount Herbert Samuel, Grooves jof Change: A Book
of Memoirs (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1946), pp. 139-42.
Hereafter cited as Samuel, Grooves.
18Herbert Samuel, Great Britain and Palestine 
(London:- Cresset Press, 1935), pp. 12 ff. Hereafter cited 
as Samuel, Great Britain. cf. Stein, Balfour, p. 103.
19Samuel, Grooves, p. 141.
would be willing to work for the idea if the opportunity
20should ever present itself.
In January, still pursuing some form of official
commitment on the Cabinet's part, Samuel sent a memorandum
to Lord Asquith, which, he in turn gave to the Cabinet. In
it, Samuel argued " that British imperial interests
required a British protectorate over Palestine and that this
21might provide an opportunity for ." Jewish immigration
into the area. Samuel received instructions to present this 
opinion in a formal memorandum, to again be presented to the 
Cabinet for their consideration and possible approval.
In March, 1915, Samuel circulated the formal memo­
randum among the members of the Cabinet. He included five 
possible solutions to the problem of the disposal of Pales­
tine. As he saw the situation, the possibilities were:
France might annex Palestine; the area might remain under 
Turkish control; an international commission might be created 
to govern the territory; an autonomous Jewish state might be 
created; or, Great Britain might establish a protectorate
22over the area and encourage unlimited Jewish immigration.
The memorandum received mixed reactions, and failed to
20Samuel, Grooves. p. 141.
21Kedourie, Chatham House, p. 52.
22Samuel, Grooves, p. 142. cf., Leonard Stein, 
Zionism (London: Keegan Paul, 1925), p. 81; and Halpern,
Jewish State, pp. 162-62.
23acquire total acceptance by- the Cabinet members, and no 
action was taken on tljieir part.
The progress of*.the Eastern campaign inflate 1915, 
the threat of a .iTurco-German attack on-, the- Suez Canal, and 
the increasing adamancy of French claims and demands for
Palestine, convinced Samuel that Palestine had to become a
. . . 24British territory. Although his proposals appeared to be
falling on barren soil, he remained persistent.
By the end ,of 1915 Zionism began to receive favorable
recognition and consideration in some areas of the* British 
25government. The primary concept for the re-creation of a 
Jewish state began to be associated with various strategies 
concerned with strengthening England's military position in 
the Middle East. Herbert Si^lebotham, in the Manchester 
Guardian, pointed out. that with the loss of the Ottoman 
Empire as an ally, a void had been created in the British 
defense of the East. To fill this chasm he suggested the 
creation of a buffer state in\Palestine, which would protect 
the Suez ,area. He .further proposed that the Jews^would be
23Herbert Henry Asquith, Memoirs and Reflections, 
18,5.2-1927 (2 vols. ; London: 19 28), II, 71 and 78. !rT
confess JE am not attracted by this proposed addition to our 
responsibilities, . . . .  Curiously enough, the only other' 
partisan of this proposal besides Samuel is Lloyds George, 
who I need not say does not care a damn for the Jews or 
their past or their future - - - ." Ibid.
24Stein, Balfour, p. 108.
25Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 172.
the most likely to succeed in building such a state, because
2 6of their desire to return to the area.
After reading the article, Weizmann approached the 
editor with the idea of elaborating upon his original articl 
for possible submission to the Foreign Office as an official 
memorandum from the Organization. Sidebotham agreed and the 
revised memorandum was submitted to Ronald Graham, head of 
the Near and Middle Eastern division of the Foreign Office, 
in April, 1916. The Foreign Office, however, proved unfavor 
able to the Jewish plan, for at that time they favored a pro
Arab alliance to counteract the vacuum created by Turkish
27 .desertion. The entire course of discussion on the
Sidebotham memorandum emphasized political realism— -the
illustration of how the British could benefit from a Jewish
alliance in this area. With the collapse of the old Middle
Eastern policy, a new stratagem was required if the Suez
Canal and Egypt were to be protected. Sidebotham argued
that the Jews represented the only people who were truly
capable of forming a strong state capable of opposing the
enemy. Even if this were not the case, the restoration of
the Jewish state definitely qualified as one of the basic
ideals that, the war was being fought over-^the maintenance
2 6Manchester Guardian, November 22, 1915. cf>, 
Herbert Sidebotham, Great Britain and Palestine (London: 
1937), pp. 24-27. Hereafter cited as Sidebotham, Palestine; 
and Kirk, History of the Middle East, p. 150.
27Sidebotham, Palestine, p. 33.
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of- international law and justice, and the protection of
. . 28 national minorities.
During the Sidebotham-Graham discussions, the War 
Office contemplated the possible advantages of supporting 
Zionist desires in Palestine, not in preference to, but 
rather in conjunction with, the pan-Arab movement. Would 
open support of the restoration of Palestine to the Jews, as 
a Jewish state, aid the war movement in any way? It was the 
general consensus of prominent non-Zionist English Jews, that 
there would be some benefit derived from such an alliance; 
such an association might possibly lead to world-wide Jewish 
support for the allied cause. Even though this non-Zionist 
element voiced regret at the formation of a nationalistic 
Jewish organization, they felt that if any wide-spread Jewish 
support was to become a reality, the Zionist program would 
have to be included in any governmental program.
The British were correct in assuming the strength of 
the Zionists in swaying public and governmental opinion, 
especially in the United States, and Great Britain was 
especially interested in obtaining the support of the United 
States for her war effort. The Honorable Louis D. Brandeis, 
Associate Justice of the U. S. Supreme Court, and head of 
the American Zionist Organization, was apparently responsible 
for the success in "persuading President Wilson that a pledge
op
Ibid., pp. 38-40.
of support to the Zionist organizations would be a good
29thing , " and Wilson's neutrality slowly turned toward
support for England and France.
While the Zionist Organization was increasing it's
activities, the Board of Deputies of British Jews, under the
leadership of Lucien Wolf, submitted a memorandum to the
Foreign Office in March, 1916. In this statement Palestine's
attraction to the Jews is referred to as an historic .interest
but any definitive terms which would officially recognize a
30national character of Judaism was intentionally avoided.
Negotiations, had reached the point where England was 
beginning to seek the opinions and advice of her allies in 
reference to recognition of the Zionist program. Sir George 
Buchanan, British ambassador in Petrograd, informed Sazanov 
in an aide-memoire. dated March 13, of England's proposed 
intention of recognizing Jewish claims to Palestine. The
29Frank H. Epp, Whose Land is Palestine^ The Middle 
East Problem in Historical Perspective (Grand Rapids, 
Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing House, 1970),
p. 135. Hereafter cited as Epp, Whose Land is Palestine. 
Brandeis, two years before the Balfour Declaration, gave the 
aims of Zionism as being " . . .  to establish in Palestine, 
for such Jews as chose to go and remain there, and for their 
descendents, a legally secured home, where they may live 
together and lead a Jewish life, where they may expect 
ultimately to constitute a majority of the population, and 
may look forward to what we should call home rule." Book of 
Documents. General Assembly of the United Nations Relating 
to the Establishment of the National Home for the Jewish 
People (New York: The Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1947),
p. 2.
30Great Britain, Foreign Office, Zionism Peace Hand­
book . No* 162, 1920, p. 39. Hereafter cited as. Great Britain 
Handbook. cf., Halpern, Jewish State, p. 166.
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aide-memoire stated that despite the major split among world-
Jewry— Zionism vs. Assfmilationism— there appeared, to be a
uniform feeling among the Jews that a proposal concerning
31their interest in Palestine was needed. Because
. . . the most influential part of Jewry in all the
countries would very much appreciate an offer of 
agreement concerning Palestine which would completely 
satisfy the aspirations of the Jews. {^Favorable 
results could be achieved by such action, such asj 
. . . the conversion, in favour of the Allies, of
Jewish elements in the Orient, in the United States, 
and in other places, elements whosg2attitu^e - - -
[was] opposed to the Allies cause.
Great Britain wanted an agreement which would ensure Jewish
support for their cause in the war. Because of the political
and military results that might evolve out of such an action,
Great Britain was contemplating such a diplomatic move. The,
possibility existed that countries or areas currently neutral
or hostile to the war might be swayed to the allied cause, if
influential Jewish pressures to form some type of an alliance
31Leonard Stein, Zionism (London: Keegan Paul,
1925), p. 81. Hereafter cited as Stein, Zionism. "In the 
event of Palestine coming within the spheres of influence of 
Great Britain and France . . . the Governments of those
Powers will not fail to take account of the historic 
interest that country possesses for the Jewish community." 
Ibid.
3 2E. A. Adamow, ed., Die Europaischen Machte und 
die Turkei wahrend des Weltkrieqes: Die Aufteilung der
asiatischen Turkei nach den Geheimdokumenten des ehem. 
Ministeriums fur Auswartige Angelegenheiten (5 vols.;
Dresden: C~. Reisner, 19 30-1932), V, 64-65, cited by Stein,
Zionism, pp. 138 ff., and Halpern, Jewish State, p. 166.
with the Entente, were applied in key governmental 
33positions. The French were not enthusiastic over this 
plan, feeling it to be too restrictive to achieve any worth­
while results.^
By the middle of 1916 the Zionist program for coloni­
zation in Palestine achieved positive consideration among 
the. Entente members as a probable means of expanding their 
war effort. The time had arrived when the program, which 
had originally been proposed in Basle at the first Zionist
Congress, could no longer be thought of as the dream of a
35few fanatics or idealists.
During the negotiations with the Grey Cabinet, the 
Zionists and Conjoint Foreign Committee, still divided, 
recognized that a united Jewish front would have more strength 
with which to negotiate, and made an attempt to form a work­
ing coalition that would be representative of all Jews. The 
Foreign Committee, however, held far less interest in the
3 6colonization of Palestine, than did the British government.
33 "The only object of His Majesty's Government is to 
devise some agreement which will be sufficiently attractive 
to the majority of Jews to facilitate the conclusion of a 
transaction securing Jewish support. [With this in mindj, 
it appears . . . that if the scheme provided for enabling
the Jews, . . .  to take,in hand the administration of the 
internal affairs of this region . . . , then the agreement
would be much more attractive for the majority of Jews."
Stein, Zionism. p. 81, as cited from Adamow, pp. 161 ff.
34
Dugdale, Balfour , II, 227. Ibid.
^Stein, Balfour, pp. 174-75.
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Hoping to salvage some unity of action, Nahum Sokolow
proposed that the two organizations solidify their actions
by concentrating on the improvement of the civil rights of
the East European Jews. He felt that the problem and
question of Palestine need have no bearing on any 30inti
action of the two organizations. The Zionists would deal
with any formal negotiations concerning Palestine* the
Conjoint Foreign Committee could remain aloof from any
involvement in this area. Lucien Wolf, on behalf of the
Conjoint Committee, rejected the plan, on the grounds that
any activity involved with the colonization of Palestine
would endanger and infringe upon those freedoms and rights
that the assimilated Jew had already managed to obtain. The
idea of any concerted action disappeared, and the wealthy
English Jew, once again became openly opposed to Zionism.
This opposition came "from a small, well-placed group of
wealthy English Jews who were concerned lest Zionist propa-
3 7ganda expose Anglo-Jewry to the charge of 'dual loyalty'."
In spite of their attempts to abort the negotiations, the
Zionist Organization had gained the ascendency in govern—
38mental recognition of Jewish programs.
In October, 1916, an official proposal stating the
3 7Howard Morley Sachar, The Course of Modern Jewish 
History (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1958), pi 373.
Hereafter cited as Sachar, History.
00
Dugdale, Balfour, II, 228.
Zionist program was submitted to the Foreign Office for
39their consideration and possible approval. The document 
made no specific reference to a Jewish state, but adminis­
trative powers were to be granted to a Jewish charter 
company, or the area would be granted autonomy. This docu­
ment represented the first official proposal by the Zionists,
and was based on the assumption that the area would come
40under the influence of either Great Britain or France.
The British government, deciding to open negotiations 
with the Zionists, hoped to influence the United States. In 
fact, when Woodrow Wilson had rejected the terms of the 
Sykes-Picot Treaty, Sir Mark Sykes was advised by James A. 
Malcom, President of the Armenian National Committee in 
London, to influence Wilson through Justice Brandeis.
Malcolm believed that by guaranteeing Palestine to the 
Zionists, Brandeis, as head of the American Zionist Organi­
zation, might be induced to bring pressure upon Wilson to
41give support to the British.
39 "Outline of a Programme for a New Administration of 
Palestine for a Jewish Resettlement of Palestine in accord­
ance with the Aspirations of the Zionist Movement." cf., 
Appendix B, p. 154.
40When this proposal was submitted the Zionists were 
not aware of the Sykes-Picot Treaty, nor had Sykes been in­
formed of the negotiations with the Zionists. S. Landman, 
"Balfour Declaration: Secret Facts Revealed^, " World Jewry,
London, February 20, 19 35, p. 6.
^^Times Literary Supplement (London) , Letter frorA 
Malcolm Thomson, July 22, 1949, p. 473, citing Dr. Adolf 
Boehm, Die Zionistische Bewegun, II, p. 556. cf., Halpern, 
Jewish State, p. 161, and Yale, Near East, p. 268.
Sykes, at some time during 1916, became enamored with
the Zionist cause® In addition to the possibilities of
influencing the United States, he also saw the possibilities
of a cultural link between Europe and Asia with a Jewish
restoration, and a definite improvement in the economic
situation in the Middle East, if a joint Jewish-Arab effort
42could be successfully organized. When the Second Coalition 
Government was formed under David Lloyd George, Sykes acquired 
the, authority to initiate negotiations with the Jews. After 
the establishment of initial contact between Sykes and Weiz­
mann, Sykes agreed to meet with the Zionists at the home of
43 \Dr. Moses Gas ter, and official negotiations between the
44two parties opened on February 7, 1917. The British
finally appeared willing to declare their interest in, and
intent to create a Zionist state in Palestine.
The Zionists adamantly demanded British sponsorship
of. the embryonic state and completely opposed any idea of a
45condominium or internationalized control of the area.
Sykes pointed out, to the members of the meeting, that the
42 Stein, Balfour, pp. 234-35.
43For information on Moses Gaster m  the English 
Zionist Organization, cf., Stein, Balfour, chap. xviii.
44Sokolow, Zionism. II, 52. Those in attendance 
were Sir Mark Sykes, Lord Rothschild, Mr. Herbert Bentwich,
Mr. Joseph Cowen, Dr. Mose3 Gaster, Mr. James de Rothschild, 
Mr. Harry Sachar, Herbert Samuel, Chaim Weizmann, and Nahum 
Sokolow. Ibid.
45 Stein, Balfour. p. 278.
real obstacle to their proposed plan was France, for with
French demands for all of Syria, Palestine's future status 
46was doubtful. Before any promises could be made, the
French would have to be consulted, and he recommemded that
,the Zionists select a representative to approach Georges-
Picot with the proposed plan for Palestine. Nahum Sokolow
was chosen by the Gaster committee to carry out future
47negotiations with France. No matter what the motives of
the British government, it appeared that the Zionist's goal
of reaching Palestine, with international approval, was
48nearing fruition. The interpretations of the members of
the government as to the reasons behind this movement toward
the Organization, differed.
Some observers believed that the declaration would 
win the support\of the powerful Jewish financial 
interests in the United States and Europe; others 
that it would be bait to the Jews of Russia, who 
might be influential in keeping Russia in the war; 
still others that it would add another to the dis­
contented and aggiring minority groups among the 
Central Powers.
^Halpern, Jewish State, p. 273.
^Sokolow, Zionism, II, 52, and Stein, Balfour,
374.
48George Antonius suggests that Great Britain 
supported the idea of a Jewish state because of their desire 
to control Palestine, to the exclusion of France, and that 
they chose the Zionist movement as their method for obtaining 
this goal. Antonius, Arab Awakening, p. 263.
49 Sachar, History, p. 366. Asquith reported in his 
Memoirs that Lloyd George favored the Zionist cause in 
Palestine because he thought it would "be anr outrage to let 
the Holy Places pass into the possession or under the protec­
torate of 'agnostic atheistic France.'" Asquith, Memoirs, 
p. 71.
The propagandist impact of this type of declaration could 
not be underestimated.
Preliminary conversations were held between Sokolow 
and Picot on February 8 , 1917. Sokolow pointed out the 
possibilities of solving the Jewish question in Europe by 
creating a Jewish homeland in Palestine. When asked what 
nation would sponsor a drive for this state, Sokolow candidly 
replied that the choice of the Organization was Great Britain 
and that England had tentatively accepted such a sponsorship. 
Picot voiced his support of the ideas of the Zionist cause,
i
but added that his country would not easily renounce its
50claims to Palestine. Sokolow returned ,to Weizmann and 
Sykes with a report of his talks with Picot, and with tenta­
tive French approval, began drafting plans for the opening 
of future international negotiations. The three men pre­
pared a six-point program— the Bases de 1 1 accord——•which
51became the framework for these negotiations.
50 Stein, Balfour. p. 376.
51Esco, Palestine. I, 95. Composed under the follow­
ing headings: 1. Recognition of Palestine as the Jewish 
National Home; 2. Regulations for Jewish Settlement in 
Palestine; 3. Immigration into Palestine; 4. The establish­
ment of a Chartered Company; 5. Communal autonomy; 6 . Lan­
guage. There appears to be some confusion as to the exist­
ence of this document, although N. M. Gelber, Hazarat Balfour 
ve-Toledoteha (Jerusalem: Zionist Organization, 1939), does
refer to it and gives a file reference* where it can be found 
in the Zionist Archives. Paul L. Hanna, British Policy in 
Palestine (Washington, D. C . : American Council on Public
Affairs, 1942), reports that he’was unable to find any trace 
of such a document. Ibid. '
In Marc^h, 1917, Sokolow went t9 Paris to discuss the 
program with the French gpvernmenti Alexandre Ri^bot, head of 
the Frenph Ministry, informed him, on March 22• that Francq 
favored the program, and had infgrmed the Zionigt Organisa­
tions in*. Russia and the United States of its position on:
52the issue. However, while the Organization succeeded with
the French government-, they failed to gainr the endorsement or
support of the French Jews— the Alliance‘Israelite Univer- 
53selle =— although no open opposition emanated from them.
The silence of the French.Jews resulted primarily from the
work of Edmond- de Rothschild, who had insured their silence
during the Sokolow-Ribot talks, and- this silence cannot, be
over-emphasized in determining*the favorable outcome, of these 
54talks. Had the French»Jews voiced their protest over the 
Zionist's proposals, i*tp is doubtfulj that thp French govern­
ments would-have listened to Sokolow.
Sokolow iwent to Italy in thg month following the 
relatively successful French * (talks, where he was even more 
successful, although, again, not totally so. While not 
receiving complete support from the Italian Jewsi he obtained 
an endorsement from the Italian Federation of Jpwiph
^Sokolow, Zionism, II, 52.
5 3George W. Robnett.j Conquest through Immigration 
(Pasadena: Institute for Special Research, 1968), p. 117.
Hereafter cited as Robnett, Conquest.
54Sokolow, Zionism, I- xvn.
64
Communities. With the aid of Angelo Sereni, leader of the 
Jewish community in Rome, Sokolow presented the program to 
Prime. Minister Boselli. Italy, through Boselli, gave the 
complete support of its government to the Bases de 1 ‘accord." 
Sokolow "was assured that the Italian Government in conjunc­
tion with the Allied' Powers would support the Zionist pro- 
56gramme." While m  Rome, the Zionists contacted the Pope.
He also promised that the Church would not oppose the Zionist 
program so long as the Holy Places were given special atten­
tion and consideration.^
Upon, returning to Paris after his Italian venture, 
Sokolow and the Zionists received the official French state­
ment concerning the Zionist program. The French declared
5 8their readiness to support the Zionist^plans in Palestine.
(A French veto to the proposal at this juncture would, have
59aborted the as yet unborn Balfour Declaration. )
With the success of these diplomatic negotiations, 
the next logical move was to secure American- acquiescence to
55 Stem, Balfour. pp. 413-15.
*“7
Sokolow, Zionism, II, 53. Ibid.
5 8Sokolow, Zionism, II, 53. cf., Stein, Balfour, 
p. 418. "The French Government, which entered the present 
war to defend people wrongfully attacked, and which continues 
the struggle to assure the victory of right over might, can 
but feel sympathy for your Cthe Zionist! cause, the triumph 
of which is bound up with that of the allies." Sokolow, 
Zionism, II, 53.
"*^ Ibid., I, xvii.
the program. This was accomplished shortly after the
entrance of the United States into the war in Aprils 1917,
60and resulted from joint Anglo-Zionist activities. Wilson's 
response to the Zionist program appears to have been a fairly 
rapid one. When asked by the British, through Colonel Edward 
House, for his feelings on the situation, Wilson gave a posi­
tive response and declared his approval for the program as it 
had been outlined to him.. Wilson's feelings on the subject 
were not, however, universal among the members of his 
Cabinet, nor within the United States government. The 
British seemed satisfied with his acceptance, as did the 
Zionists, however, and the negotiations between the Zionists 
and His Majesty's Government continued.
Great Britain now felt able to issue an open statement 
of policy concerning the Jews, and their interest and concern 
in Palestine. All that remained to be settled were the terms 
of the actual statement. The government's decision to 
support the Jews must have come prior to the official note 
from France, which was released in June, for on May 20, 1917, 
Chaim Weizmann announced in London that he had received word 
that " His Majesty's Government was ready to support1!1
the Zionist plans.^
With the public acknowledgement of British support
^Yale, Near East, p. 269.
61 Sokolow, Zionism, II, 56.
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for the Zionists, the non-Zionist element(in England voiced
its opposition to the program. Once again the assimilated
Jew, through the Conjoint iForeign Committee, voiced his
concern over the promotion of the idea of a Jewish race,
whiqh was being indirectly inferred by theLidea of a Jewish
62state for the Jewish people. Public opinion,; however,.
6 3supported the Zionigt program.
Despite this, the British government could not
completely* |gnore^ the opinions of the wealthytfassimilated
Jew, and their objections eventna^lyi [Led to the modification
of the* terms of the Balfour Declaration. Had the assipiila-
tionists not possessed the*, influence that they did, the
Declaration would have been more definite i n <its terms.
The Political Committee of the Zionist Organization,
after manyitrial drafts, prepared a statement to be con-
64sidered for endorsement by the government. Lord Rothschild 
presented the draft on July 18, 1917, to the Lloyd George*.
/* o
The Times (London), May 24,1917.
6 3The Times (London), May 29, 1917, editorial, "The 
Future of the Jews," showed th^t thp paper was convinced of 
the^justice of the Zionist program; again on October 23 and 
26, The Times, urged goyernmen-t-al support^for the Jewish 
state; othgr favorable articles appeared in^New Europe, tlie 
Manchester ‘Guardian and the Yorkshire Post. For a complete 
listing of those magazines and newspapers favoring the 
Jewish state cf., Sokolow, Zionism, II, 64-80.
64This statement was written through the ]Oint efforts 
of Weizmann,, Sokolow, Ginsberg, Jacob Unger, Sachar and 
James de Rothschild; before submissionit was read and 
approved by Sykes, Edmond de Rothschild, and President 
Wilsont cf.., Appendix C, p. 155'.
Cabinet. The members failed, however, to agree on the memo­
randum. Although Balfour, Lloyd George, Milner, and Cecil 
were for acceptance, Lord Curzon hedged on affixing his
approval, because of a confusion of some of the terms, and
65the lack of an adequate definition of Zionism. Adamant 
refusal to accept the memorandum came from Edwin Montagu, 
Secretary of State for India. Montagu, an assimilated Jew, 
was afraid of the connotations that might be derived from 
such a statement, fearing that the political status of the 
Jew might be questioned.^
The Cabinet, as a result of the disagreement,
modified the Zionist draft and received approval for it from
the Foreign Office on September 19, 1917. While this formu­
lation was being forwarded to Woodrow Wilson for his approval, 
the anti-Zionist element was working for further modification 
of the statement with some success. The resulting statement 
was then sent to Wilson for his consideration, in October, 
and after minor alterations by the American Zionist Organi­
zation, the draft was returned to London with Wilson's 
6 7approval. This amended document was .then sent to the 
Zionist Organization where Sokolow and Weizmann gave
65Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, II, 1122-32.
66Ibid., II, 1132.
6 7Jacob de Haas, History of Palestine: The last Two
Thousand Years (New York: MacMi11an, 1934), pp. 485 ff. 
cf., Appendix D, p. 156.
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reluctant approval. They approved the document, although it
proved not what they had expected, nor been led to believe
would result. Despite their disappointment they regarded
the proposed declaration as a point of departure for future
68considerations. A launching pad had been created.
Upon receipt of the Zionist’s approval, Balfour pre­
sented the final draft to the Cabinet for ratification. 
Acknowledging the internal disunity of the Jews, Balfour 
explained that, in spite of this, a Jewish majority in Russia 
and the United States favored a statement regarding Pales­
tine.^ The French^ and American governments also favored 
such an announcement. With the qualification that the term 
"national home" meant some form of an allied protectorate 
with Jewish autonomy, and not an independent Jewish state,
71the War Cabinet ratified the document on October 31, 1917.
On?November 2, 1917, Arthur James Balfour informed
Lord Rothschild, by letter, of the support of the British
government for the Zionist program in Palestine. Great
72Britain had issued the Balfour Declaration.
68Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 203.
69Lloyd George', Peace Treaties, II, 1135 ff.
70Balfour read the French statement of June 4, 1917. 
supra, p. 64, f.n. 58.
71Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, II, 1135 ff. cf., 
Stein, Balfour, p. 546.
72From the British point of view, it was "less of a 
political commitment" to issue the Balfour Declaration to 
Rothschild, a philanthropist, as opposed to giving it to
69
The Zionist victory was, in reality, only half a
triumph, for "the launching of the Balfour Declaration at
73that time was due to propagandist reasons." The allies 
were in a serious situation— the Rumanians had been crushed. 
The Russians were hovering on actual withdrawal from the war. 
The French were bogged down on the Western Front. The 
Italians had been defeated at Caporetto. And the United 
States had not yet been able to send troops to the Western 
zone. British shipping was constantly threatened and lost 
tonnage at tremendous rates. In such critical times it was 
hoped that by issuing the Declaration, Jewish sympathy would 
confirm American Jewish support, thus making it difficult for
Germany "to reduce her military commitments and improve her
. . , „ . 74economic position m  the Eastern front . .
The issuance of the Balfour Declaration would also, 
it was hoped, influence the Russian Jews in exerting force 
on the Russian government to remain in the war. The major 
evolutionary steps of the Declaration took place during the 
interval between the Russian Revolution of March, 1917, and
Chaim Weizmann who was a politician. Charles Raddock, 
Portrait of a People (3 vols.; New York: The Judaica Press,
Inc., 1967), III, 158. Rothschild communicated the declara­
tion to the English Zionist Organization on November 18,
1917. cf., Appendix E, p. 157.
73Great Britain, Report of the Palestine Royal 
Commission: The Peel Report, June 22, 1937, Cmnd. 5479,
(1946 reprint), pp. 17-18. Hereafter cited as Great Britain, 
Peel Commission.
74Great Britain, Peel Commission, pp. 17-18.
the events immediately preceding the Bolshevik coup in
November, 1917. England hoped to insure the loyalty of the
Russian Jew, if not the government.
The Zionists realized fthat
Palestine was not being designated as the terri­
tory to be set aside for the creation of a Jewish 
majority leading to statehood; the final language 
was that a Jewish national, home would be created 
in Palestine, and the very imprecision of this 
formula was to help leac^to all the troubles of 
the next three decades.
Basically the Declaration marked the end of an era 
and the beginning of another. Four days after the" Declara­
tion, the Bolsheviks seized control in Russia. Simultane­
ously with this revolution, came the increasing impact on 
world affairs of the United States— acting as an anti- 
colonial force.
In 1917 . . . the end of empire was already
visable; with Lenin's and Wilson's proclamations, 
there began the vast popular upheaval wl^ch led 
to Asian and African independence - * . "
and the end of nineteenth century imperialism. The Jews, and
Great Britain, had seized a moment: for action "which might
77never have returned."
The idea at the time of its issuance was " that
75 . ...Sokolow, Zionism, I, x v m .
V 6Meyer W. Weisgal and Joel Carmichael, eds., Chaim 
Weizmann: A Biography by Several Hands (London: Wedenfeld
and Nicolson, 1962), p. 166. Hereafter cited as Weisgal, 
Weizmann.
77Weisgal, Weizmann, p. 166.
a Jewish State was not to be set up immediately by the Peace
Treaty without reference to the wishes of the majority of
78the inhabitants ." of the area. It was assumed, how­
ever, that when it became necessary for "according represen­
tative institutions to Palestine, if the Jews had meanwhile
responded to the opportunity afforded them and had
79become a definite majority ." m  the area, then
Palestine would become a Jewish Commonwealth.
78Great Britain, Peel Commission, p. 18.
CHAPTER IV
MOTIVATIONS AND REACTIONS
While the direct responsibility for the 
calamity that overtook the Palestinian Arabs 
was on the heads of the Zionist Jews who 
seized a Lebensraum for themselves . . .  a 
heavy load of indirect, yet irrepudiable, 
responsibility was on the heads of the United 
Kingdom. .
— Arnold Toynbee
Great Britain, through the issuance of the Balfour
Declaration, became more deeply involved in the struggle for
pre-eminence in the Middle East. She became involved with
her ally, France, in the matter of the Syrian and Lebanese 
*
regions of Greater Axabia as well as in the contest between
Arab and Zionist for Palestine. The world-wide reactions to
this declaration were not of the spontaneously positive
nature that Great Britain had originally expected, nor that
she had been led to expect.
Jews throughout the world welcomed the Declaration
2as a pseudo-Magna Carta — as a Jewish Declaration of Indepen­
dence. "The caution and ambivalence of its formulation could
^"Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History (10 vols. ;
New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), VIII*
2
Abba Eban, My People: The Story of the Jews (New
York: Random House, 1968), p. 366. Hereafter cited as Eban,
My People.
3not dim its inner glow, 1 and Jews, internationally, were
ecstatic because of its issuance. In a manifesto issued by
the Zionist Organization, ancl signed by Weizmann, Sokolow,
and Tschlenow, it was declared that the aspirations of the
Bas.le program had been achieved with the- Balfoup Declaration.
"The period which began \]the movement] was Expectation
4
the period which npw begins is Fulfillment*. " Jews,' 
generaldy, regarded the document as elaborating the founda­
tion upon which t]ie Jewish state would arise.
The English people received the Declaration with 
mixed emotions, especially invthe Jewish cqmmunity. The 
Conjoint Foreign Committee— the group of wealthy English 
Jews— failed to participate in the celebration of the 
Zionists. Several weeks after the Declaration, the Conjoint 
Committee was responsible for the formation of thp League of 
British Jews, with the goal and intention of altering the 
political implications of the Declaration. Especially 
important among t^ ie Committee's conscience was the question
of citizenship of British Jews who ,| while professing the
5Jewish faith, wished to remain*., >subj ects of the Crown. Such 
Jews feared that the Declaration contained the possibleI i
recognition that the Jews pomposed a separate and distinpt 
political nationality. The anti-Zionist element in^Britain
^Ibid. ^Spkolow, Zionism, II, 124-27.
5
Stein,, Balfour, p. 565.
remained irreconcilable, at least until the end of the war, 
after which the Anglo-Jewish community appeared to be more
g
united in support of the Zionist's aims.
A more favorable reaction met the Declaration on 
December 2, 1917, at a demonstration of appreciation and 
celebration held at the London Opera House. There govern­
mental officials, Zionist leaders, and several representatives 
of foreign powers, and members of various ethnic groups-, 
voiced their approval of the Declaration. Lord Robert Cecil, 
reiterating the opinion of the British government, stated 
that England's " wish [was] that Arabian countries
pshouldj| be for the Arabs, Armenia for the Armenians and
7
Judea for the Jews." Nevertheless, while seeming to suggest 
a unity of purpose, the meeting was not representative of the
3
whole British community..
In France and Italy the Balfour Declaration was not
received with any great enthusiasm. Both countries felt that
they had a right to participate in arrangements involving
9
any future partition of the Middle East. Neither of the
6 7Ibid., p. 566. Sokolow, Zionism, II, 127.
3
Using the Jewish representatives as being illustra­
tive of the "un-representative" nature of the meeting, the 
situation can clearly be seen. Those present were, Herbert 
Samuel, Chaim Weizmann, Nahum Sokolow, James de Rothschild, 
and Dr. Moses Gaster. Not a representation of the Jewish 
community, but of the higher echelons of the Zionist Organi­
zation.
9France by the Sykes-Picot Treaty, and Italy by 
the ‘Conference of St. Jean de Maurinne.
two had been consulted by Great Britain before the issuance
of the Declaration, although brief unofficial contact had
•been made with both by the British branch of the Zionist
10Organization, regarding the matter. Balfour, when asked
in the House of Commons if the Jewish national home in
Palestine was an allied war aim, or strictly a British goal,
admitted that no " official communication Chad] been
made to the Allies on the subject, . but because of
the Zionist activities in the allied countries it was
believed to have been a common goal, and that His Majesty's
Government understood that both President Wilson and the
Provisional Russian government were favorably inclined
12towards such a Declaration. Balfour was also aware that 
Germany and the Turkish Empire were also -making overtures 
to the Zionists at this time and, with this knowledge, urged 
Great Britain to act when she did because delay would have
lessened the impact of the Declaration, or rendered it
i 13 useless.
Pressure to secure the approval of Italy and France 
for the Declaration was applied, but, once again, the effort
^Supra. , chap. iii, pp. 63-64.
^ G r e a t  Britain, Parliamentary Debates (House of 
Commons), 5th ser., Vol. XCIX (19 November 1917), col. 838. 
Hereafter cited as Pari. Debates.
12The only countries that had been contacted by 
governmental representatives were the United States and 
Russia.
13Weisgal, Weizmann, p. 161.
came from the Zionist Organization.rather than the British 
government. In January, 1918, Nahum Sokolow went to Paris 
to seek the French government's approval of the British 
statement of policy. Acting in conjunction with Baron de 
Rothschild, Sokolow, on February 9, received from Minister 
Pichon a statement of French support for the Balfour Declara­
tion, and official French approval was published in the form
✓ 14of a communique on February 14, 1918.
Italy objected to the possible English monopolization
of the Palestinian area, but since the Italian Jews, in 1917,
had voiced their support of the Zionist program, the Italian
government could not ignore the Balfour Declaration. No
formal endorsement came from Rome until May 9, 1918, when
the Italian Ambassador in London, the Marquis Imperiala,
acting on instructipns from Foreign Minister Sonnino, issued
15a .statement of Italy's approval of the Declaration.
14February 9, 1918: "Monsieur Sokolow, representing
the Zionist Organizations was this morning received at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Monsieur Stephen Pichon, who 
was happy to confirm that there is complete agreement between 
the French and British Governments in matters concerning the 
questions of a Jewish establishment in Palestine." Sokolow, 
Zionism, II, 128. February 14, 1918; note from Pichon to 
Sokolow: "As arranged at our meeting on Saturday, the 9th
of this month, the Government of the Republic, with a view 
to defining its attitude towards Zionist aspirations looking 
to the creation of a national home for the Jews in Palestine, 
has published a communique 'in the press." Ibid.
15 Sokolow, Zionism, II, 129. " . . .  H.i s Majesty's
Government are pleased to confirm the declarations already 
made through their representatives . . . to the effect that
they will facilitate the establishment in Palestine of a 
Hebrew national centre . - - ." Ibid.
The United States, like France and,. Italy, was hesi- 
tant to identify itself with the Declaration, although for 
different/ reasons^ Whereas France and Italy were at war 
with the Ottoman iEmpire and, therefore, concerned with the. 
disposal of territory they regarded as wa^ spoils, the 
United States possessed no involvement^ in the Turkish con­
flict. Robert Lansing, in recognition, of this non-combatant 
status, urged thg President to not officially recognize thp 
Declaration. Wilson, taking Lansing's advice, " dropped-
the idoa of making it publicly known that hLe approved the 
Declaration. As a result/, ten imon^hs elapsed before
Wilson yielded to Zionist pressures, and issued a statement 
concerning the,, Balfour Declaration. This occurred after 
Rabbi Stephen Wise, Brandeis1 successor as the head of the 
American Zionist Organization,jpointed ou£ th^t no mention 
had been made of the war, or post-war arrangements for 
governing- the protectorate. The questign of suzerainty 
would- be determined at the peace talks, andy hence, the 
United States should be vitally interested in the situation. 
Accordingly, Wilson*. in a letter to Rabbi Wise,tdated 
August 31, 1918, assured the Zionists of his good wishes for 
their program, although he stil^. withheld any formal state-
■^Stein, Balfour, p. 594. cf., Esco,, Palestine j, I, 
240 ff., for an analysis of the Lansing-Wulson role in 
reference to recognition oft. the Zionist program and Balfour 
Declaration.
ment.concerning official American policy on the subject.17
When the Balfour Declaration was communicated to 
Husaig in^January, 1918, "he took it, philosophically, con­
tending himself witfr an expression of goodwill towards a
kindred Semitig race, which he understood was to lodge in. a
18house owned by the Arabs."
Britain's allies were confused by the ambiguous 
wording of the Balfour Declaration and it is proper to ask 
the question, "what had Britain actually meant?" Di£ the 
goyernment desire to establish a Jewish state, or did theyv. 
only me^n to create-in Palestipe^a refugee center for dis­
placed Jews? What had motivated Great Britain tot takej a step 
so confusing to her allies without consulting them?
Lloyd George maintained that a Jewish state would, 
at some time in ,thp futures, be established in ,,Palestine.
This "Jewish Commonwealth" would become a reality after the 
Jews had demonstrated their ability tp handle the problems
attending such a state, and when the Jews constituted a
19majority of tl^ e population in the area. Although the
17Sokolow, Zionism, II, 130-31. The Congress did not 
give recognition to^the Declaration until September, 1922.
1 8Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 132. Husain, 
speaking on Jewish immigration: "We saw the Jews . . .
streaming to Palestine from Russig., Germany, Spain, America 
. . . , they knew that the country was/ for its .original sons,
for all their differences, a sacred and beloved homeland." 
Misha Louvish, ed., Facts About Israel (Israel, 1966), p. 14.
1^Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, II, 113§-39.
Declaration was not explicit in its terms, this represented
the Prime Minister's interpretation of it, and his view
was received with almost universal approval of the 
British press, fandj was nearly everywhere accepted 
as a promise of a Jewis^state to be created within 
some measurable future.
Therefore, the Declaration was "understood" to be an offer 
of oppurtunity offered to the Jews for settlement and coloni­
zation in Palestine. Thus, while nothing definite was 
intended in the matter of the immediate creation of a Jewish
state, the development of such a commonwealth was expected
. 2 1  . . to come about in due time. The British were seeking "to
reconstitute a new community and definitely building for
22numerical majority in the future."
The motives behind the Declaration, already alluded
23to, vary according to the individual and vary also m  a 
spatial sense, for over the years the need for reinterpre­
tation and re-evaluation of the document became almost 
mandatory. Prior to the end of the war no definite answer
was given by any of the Cabinet members questioned by Parlia-
24ment as to the meanings of the Balfour Declaration. Lord 
20Paul L. Hanna, British Policy m  Palestine 
(Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942),
p. 37. Hereafter cited as Hanna, British Policy.
21Lloyd George, Peace Treaties. II, 1139. Cf. C. R. 
Ashbee, A Palestine1 Notebook: 1918-1923 (New York: Double-
day, Page and Co *, 19 23), p. 6 7.
22 23Stein, Balfour, p. 625. Supra., chap. iii, pp. 55ff
24 , vPari. Debates (House of Commons), 5th ser., Vol.
XCIX (19 November 1917), col. 99.
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. Curzon, in the House of Lords during 1920, cited strategic
reasons for its issuance; it was nothing more than a war
. . 25policy.
Winston Churchill, elaborating on this idea in 1922, 
gave the motive for issuance as providing a method of obtain­
ing both the moral and financial support of world Jewry for
2 6the war effort. Lord Harlech, in 1937, however, declared
that the motivation for the Declaration involved the restora­
tion of the Jewish home in Palestine, with a secondary cause
27of war support. Lloyd George, of course, maintained that
the Declaration represented a purely propaganda measure.
Great Britain, according to him, issued the document when
the Zionists promised "to rally to the Allied cause Jewish
28sentiment and support throughout ,the world." Balfour's
motivation stemmed from some strange sense of idealism,
having been converted early in his life to the Zionist cause
and having become "convinced that the revival of Jewish
29unity ." had to become one of the allied war aims.
^ Ibid. . (House of Lords), 5th ser. , Vol. XL (29 June 
19 20), col. 10 28.
Ibid., (House of Commons), 5th ser.. Vol. CLVI 
(4 July 1922), col. 3289.
27Pari. Debates (House of Commons), 5th ser..
Vol. CCCXXVI (21 July 1937), col. 3289.
28Lloyd George. Peace Treaties, II, 1139. Asquith's 
interpretations of Lloyd George's motivations were quite 
different from his own. Supra. , chap. iii, p. 52f f.n. 23..
29Dugdale, Balfour, II,- 215.
The strategic consideration provided the essential 
30motive, however — the protection and strengthening of Great
Britain's trade routes to the East, and the impact.that such^
an announcement *would have Lon the Jewish communities in the
Central power countries. In September, 1917, Germany,
realizing the impact Jewish support could have^ on their war
effort made^"serious efforts to capture the Zionist move- 
31ment." It was also apparent tpat a declaration favoring 
the Zionist program would strengthen England's position^in^ 
Palestine<"when the,time came to establish administration\ x i ■* < '■ ’
32for tl^ Lp Sykes-Pipot Brown Zope . " Through’ careful
negotiations England gained the ascendency i n ,Palestine, 
there-bytdisplacing tlje French. The first diplomatic move 
placed the area ^under international control in the Sykes- 
Pi,coti Treaty. Great Britain saw th^ possibilities of 
eventually creating a British protectorate in the area. It 
tlje British army conquered Palestine, creating possession by 
conqjiest, the necessary moral backing for a position^ip 
Palestipescould be achieved by supporting tpe Zionists for a 
Jewish national home in the area. Lloyd George fe.ltl. that 
England would be in Palestine byiconquest, and that she 
would remain entrenched in the-, area.; Any problems that might 
be created by her position tl^ere, could be handled in the
30Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 171.
31Ibid.. VI, 173.^
3 2kanna, British Policy, p. 37
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33future.
Husain and the British had reached their agreement in 
January, 1916, but Husain withheld action until June, when he
i
decided that a noncommittal policy was no longer beneficial.^
On June, 5, 1918, the, Sharif ' s sons— Ali 'and Faisal— deplared
35their father King of the Arabs, after which they waged a 
successful campaign against the Turks at Mecca. This revolt 
received British support; the British ultimately provided 
two British artillery companies from the Egyptian Expedi­
tionary Force to aid the insurgents. With the fall of Mecca, 
Husain was declared. King of the Arab countries by an assembly 
of Arab leaders, which hp had conyen^d, on November 2, i91f5. 
Those Arab princes' and notables not at thetconvention, and 
Great Britain denipd recognition of the title, although) 
England finally accorded him recognition as King of the 
Hejaz, On January 3, 1917.
The main importance of the Sharifian troops, who
were trained and equipped by the*, British and led by 
3 6Lawrence. ‘ and other English officers, to the campaign in
^Stein, Balfour. p. 628.
34The "motivation" for Husain's action against the 
Turks was the threat of invasion of the Hejaz by a Turkish 
contingent, which was being led by a German Military Mission.
35Antomu§, Arab^ Awakening, pp. 194-95.
36The military importance of Lawrence was not as 
strategic as i-y might appear to be^ when compared with the 
gigantic proportions of\the total war. No other figure, 
"carried sq mysterious a glamor of romance, enhanced as> much
the Middle, East outside the Hejaz. As the British forces
prqgressed towards Palestine, the importance of Arab troops
and, of the, Syrian rqvolt played nq apparently essential role
in thevdetermipatiqn of the^ outcome^ of the Palestine 
3 7operation.
With the cabinet change in^late^1916, the Eastern
campaign wais stppped up with thq appointment of Sir Edwardt,
Allenby, an extremefLy able c o m m a n d e r a s  head of the Egyptian
Expeditionary Forces in June, 1917. Allenby <L"had immense
vitality and detgrmir^atio^i, and was popular withihj-s troops 
3 8." having earned a good reputation in France. The
British initiated the attack on^the Turkish-German forces in
39October, and captured Begrsheba. on Octojbe:^ 31st — thev same
day the Cabinet approyed the Balfour Declaration. On
December 9, Allenby accepted the surrender of Jerusalem. Tl^ e
40Eastern campaign then slowed down for several mpnths, but
of his aloofness and wilfulness as by superb^prose in\which 
he has recounted his story." The so called Lawrence'of Arabig. 
myth distorts the truth• C. R. M. F. Crutwell^ A History of 
the Great War: 1914-1918 (2nd ed.; Oxford: The Clarendon
Press, 1936), p. 613. Hereafter cited as Crutwell, Great 
W a r .
3 7Temperley,^ Peace Conference,kVI, 130.
3 8Llewelyn Woodward, Great Britain and the War: 
1914-1918 (London: Methuen and* Co., Ltd.,) 1967), p; 118.
Hereafter cited as Woodward, War.
39The Tui^ks were generally outnumbered by nearly two 
to one in infantry and ten tq one in^cavalry. Crutwell,
Great W a r , p. 613.
40This slow dgwn wag the result of the German offen­
sive on the Western front,v and tl^ e withdrawal, of 60,000
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in September, 1918, the British moved into the Jordan valley.
This tr.oop movement preceeded a rapid advance to the north
41and the-capture of Damascus, Beirut and Aleppo. In the
final days of Allenby's campaign in 1918, the Arab troops
assisted in conquering Syria and-in the capture of Horns and
Hama. "The., Turkish armies, i]^l-supplied, and with no hppe
42of adequate reinforcements, were beginning to break up." 
ConstantinopleM  by way of Thrace, was now accessible, andj. 
the Turkish government.* possessed no alternative, but 
surrender. On October 20, 1918, Turkey asked for an armi­
stice, j and on October 30, 1918,^a truce was signed'aboard
43the British battleship Agamemnon.^
Because of the disorderly retreat of the Turkish 
forces from Palestine and Syria,^ civil records were destroyed 
or taken with the rapidly departing Ottoman officials.
troops from t^e Middle East to reinforce thoqe troops i- 
France. Woodward, W a r , p. 121.
41Although Faisal "occupied" Damascus, it is believed 
that he was merely allowed to occupy if, 'the- actual fighting 
being done- by a company of Australians; Faisal was then 
allowed .to claim Damascus for the Arabs, thereby giving an 
incentive to otl^ ier Arab troops in.the war. Elie Kedourie, 
England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman
Empire, 1914-1921 (London: Bowes & Bowes, 1956)", pp. 120 ff.
Hereafter cited as Kedourie, England and Middle East.
42Woodward, War, p. 122. The Ottoman government 
appeared to be more interested inv acquiring territory in the 
Caucusus region,jbecause of Russia's collapse, than in saving 
Palestine by reinforcing her position there. Ibid., p. 402,
^ Ibid. , p. /-12.2.
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During the last month of the Palestine campaign the political
44problems of the area outweighed the military. As a result 
of the lack of civil administration and the increasingly 
confused situation in the area, a temporary military adminis­
tration was established. The newly established "government" 
of the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration hoped to solve 
immediate civil problems* to implement the terms of the Sykes-
Picot Treaty, in recognition of the adamant demands of the
45French; and also to meet their obligations to the Arabs.
46The administration of the area was divided into three zones: 
Palestine, north to Acre and east to Jordan, was placed under 
English control; the coastal area of Syria was placed under 
French administration, and comprised the northern area of the 
Territory; Trans-Jordan and non-coastal Syria was placed 
under the control of Faisal, and comprised the eastern zone 
of occupation. Although not strictly satisfying the terms 
of the Sykes-Picot Treaty, since Palestine was not inter­
nationalized, the arrangement tended to satisfy the French, 
and the Arab zone was treated as had been stipulated in the
44Crutwell, Great War, p. 122.
45Kedourie, England and Middle East, pp. 117 ff.
The Occupied Enemy; Territory Administration consisted of the 
Military governor, thirteen district military governors, 
fifty-nine British assistants, and seventeen Arab officers. 
Epp, Whose Land is Palestine, p. 140. For connection to the 
Sykes-Picot Treaty cf., Kedourie England, and Middle East, 
pp. 128 ff.
4 6Kedourie, England and Middle East, p. 128.
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47secret treaty. Conflict over the occupation of certain
areas, however, developed. Some means of modifying the terms
of the Sykes-Picot Treaty had to be devised, or it had to be
abandoned completely. The necessary modification came with
48the joint Anglo-French resolution of November 8, 1918.
The Arabs, watching the French and British entrench 
themselves in the Middle East and learning of the secret 
Sykes-Picot Treaty and the Balfour Declaration, began to 
voice concern over their status and position in the Middle 
East.
Husain, upon learning of the Declaration, asked for
a definition of its meaning and Great Britain's intentions
in Palestine. Accordingly, England sent David George Hogarth,
a member of the Arab Bureau in Cairo, to offer explanations
49of British intentions., on January 4, 1918. The basic
intent of his mission was to reassure Husain that the allied
countries still desired the creation of an Arab state in the
Middle East, and, also, to inform him of the future status of
50Palestine as he understood the situation. According to the 
message, no nationality in Palestine would be subject to
47 Supra., chap. ii, pp. 39-43.
: 4 8 — — 0 AInfra., p. 94.
4°)
'Antonius, Arab Awakening, p. 267.
50Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great 
Britain and Palestine: 1915-1939 (London: Oxford University
Press, 1939), p. 115. Hereafter cited as International 
Affairs, Great Britain.
another. Because of the multiplicity of religions, however,
there would have to be some type of "a special regime to 
51deal with" the holy places. The Mosque of Omar,.' however,
52would not. be controlled by a non-Moslem authority. Hogarth,
clearly stated that England had decided to aid the Zionist
cause in Palestine and
in so far as fit wasj compatible with the freedom 
of the existing population, both economic and 
political, no obstacle fwouldj be.^gut in the way 
of the realization of this ideal.
Husain, according to Hogarth, agreed to the plan as it had
been outlined, although the Sharif adamantly opposed any
54independent Jewish state in the area. Husain appeared to 
understand that England was expecting to aid the development 
of a Jewish home in Palestine, and that Palestine, because 
of their commitment to the Zionists, was to be excluded from 
any Arab state created in the Middle East. The basic intent 
in the Hogarth-.message was to reassure the Arabs that they 
would not be dominated by the Jews, and that all Jewish
5 5settlement would be closely ^ supervised by Great Britain.
51 Stein, Balfour , p. 632.
52 International Affairs, Great Britain, p. 116.
53 54Ibid., p. 117. Stein, Balfour, p. 633.
55The Hogarth message can be found in Great Britain, 
Parliamentary Papers (House of Commons and Command), 1939,
Vol. XXVII (Reports, vol. 881, misc. No. 4), Cmnd. 5964, 
."Statements made on behalf of His Majesty's Government during 
the year 1918 in regard to the Future States of certain parts 
of the Ottoman Empire," p. 3. Hereafter cited as Great 
Britain, Hogarth Report.
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Shortly after the Hogarth mission, the Bolsheviks 
published the secret Sykes-Picot Treaty, which further com­
plicated the situation. With the public knowledge of this 
document, Jamal Pasha, the Ottoman governor of. Syria, made a 
diplomatic attempt to regain Arab allegiance. Jamal Pasha 
attempted to convince Husain that Great Briatin was- using 
the Arabs "to serve their own ends" by making "mendacious 
promises" with no intention of keeping them. He cited the 
Sykes-Picot Treaty as positive evidence that England had 
never contemplated an independent state, and that the Entente 
had made definite plans to divide the Arab area among them­
selves.^^ Husain's motives in rejecting the approach remain 
obscure— whether he rejected Jamal Pasha's plan because he 
considered the terms unsatisfactory, or if he felt unable to 
"escape from his involvement with the Entente Powers," or if
England discovered the negotiations, and he put on a fajjade •
57to placate the British, remains subject to conjecture.
Great Britain, acting rapidly to conteract the 
Ottoman statements, and hoping to set Husain's, mind at ease 
in reference to the Sykes-Picot Treaty, sent a telegram, 
through Wingate. This telegram stated that the Sykes-Picot 
Treaty had been drawn up by the three Entente members in
56Antonius, Arab Awakening, p. 255.
57Kedourie, England and Middle Eastr p. 10 7- The 
entire year of 1917 was disastrous for the allies, the climax 
of which was the defection of Russia shortly after the 
Bolshevik coup. Ibid.
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‘1916, but since Russia had withdrawn from the war, its terms 
;no longer were applicable to any future considerations in 
the Middle East. On February 8, 1918, a formal, though vague 
and non-commital, note was sent to Husain by J. R. Bassett, 
British Agent at Jedda, reaffirming the terms of the previous 
British pledges to the Arabs. Great Britain regarded herself
C O
as firmly committed to the "liberation of the Arab peoples."
Early in 1918, Great Britain sent a Zionist commission
to Palestine to study the situation and evaluate the possi-
59bilities for future Jewish settlement in the area. Upon
reaching Palestine, Weizmann, who headed the commission,
approached General Allenby with his credentials from the
government. Allenby informed Weizmann that the mission was
useless— nothing could be done at that time.
The messianic hopes £that the Zionists]] had read 
into the Balfour Declaration suffered a perceptible^ 
diminution when [they3 came into contact with . - .
General Headquarters.
The attitude of the British officers toward the Jews
was distinctly antagonistic and presented an atmosphere.
unfavorable for any concise action on the part of the
58Antonius, Arab Awakening. p. 432. cf. Kedourie, 
England and Middle East, p. 109.
59The delegation was composed of representatives of 
the allied countries* Levi Bianchini, Italy* Sylvan Levi,, 
France; and Joseph Cowen, Dr. David Ebcr, Mr. Leon Simon, 
and Mr. I. M. Sieff, England.
60Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 218.
commission.^ The anti-semitic attitude of the military was 
widely known among the Sharifians in Palestine, and they 
felt "encouraged to hope that their natural and long-standing 
opposition to Zionism could deflect the British
from a policy " favoring the Jewish settlement of the
62 * area. Whether the Arabs got active encouragement from the
British officers to oppose the program or not, "Arab
6 3hostility gained in momentum as the days passed ."
Hoping to use the commission to allay growing Arab
restiveness, Allenby suggested that Weizmann approach Faisal
and, hopefully, obtain tentative Arab agreement to the
64Zionist program. The Zionists readily agreed to the
suggestion and proceeded to Faisal's encampment in June, 1918
Handling the situation in an extremely diplomatic
manner, Weizmann assured Faisal and the Arabs of the honorabl
intentions of the Zionists. The Zionists onlyvwanted the
right to settle in Palestine, and in no way would this
settlement "be to the detriment of any of the great commu-
65nities already established m  the country ."
^ Ibid.. p. 221. The Jews constantly complained 
about the "lack of sympathy" of the military administration 
in Palestine, until Samuel's appointment and "the official 
records in the archives does bear out their complaints." 
Kedourie, Chatham House, p. 57.
6 2Kedourie, Chatham House, pp. 5 7-58.
6 3Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 224.
64 65Ibid. , p. 232. Stein, Balfour. p. 634..
Faisal informed Weizmann. of his agreement with what had been
said, and promised to relate the convexsations to his father.^
Weizmann's explanation of the Zionist's goals appeared to
have had "a gratifying affect and. had produced a better 
6 7atmosphere."
It soon became apparent to Weizmann and' the other 
members of the commission that they could do little work or* 
study in Palestine, for the country was under Military 
administration, and. the army- was preparing for another offen­
sive push in^ the Middle East. The commission, realizing- that
"the war was working up to its crisis" left- Palestine for
68their respective countries. Upon reaching London, Weizmann 
made an^appointment to relate his findings to Lloyd George.
The appointment was set for November 11, 1918; although the 
two men did meet, the tuppoil resulting from thje announcement 
of the., armistice discounted any ftruely finite discussions of 
the subjegt.^
In the spring of 1918, seven Syrian leaders, in 
exile in4Egypt, submitted a memorandum to the Foreign Office 
in. Cairo,, in wljich they voiced their concern over the dis­
posal of Arab territory ip the event of an allied
^Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 235.
6 7Stein, Balfour, p. 634.
68Weizmann, Tri^l and Error, p. 238.
69Ibid. . p. 239.
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70victory. On. June 16, 1918, England answered the questions
of the seven nationals, taking the opportunity to once again
71attempt to reassure the Arabs. The declaration made 
specific reference to four territorial categories: lands
that were free and independent before the war; Turkish terri­
tory that had been liberated by the sole activity of the 
Arabs; those areas that had been liberated through the con­
certed action of the allies and Arabs; and, those areas that
72were still under Turkish domination. Areas that came under
the first two categories, those that had been free prior to
the war and those liberated by the Arabs, would be recognized
by England as being completely independent - under Arab aegis.
Those areas that were liberated through concerted action
would be administered on the "principle of the consent of the
73governed ." The Turkish areas would have to be dealt
with after the war, but England would continue to work for
the freedom of the area, and the independence of the people 
74in the area. Great Britain pledged itself to the recognir- 
tion of the independence of any Arab area that had been 
liberated from Turkish control through independent^ Arab
70The seven Syrian nationals were members of the 
Party of Syrian Unity, which wanted the independence and 
sovereignty of Syria. Kedourie, England and Middle East, 
p. 113.
71Ibid., pp. 113 ff. The Declaration to the Seven 
is printed in Great Britain, Hogarth Report, pp. 5-6.
72Klieman, British Policy, p. 16.
73 74Antonius, Arab Awakening, p. 434. Ibid.
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75action.
The Declaration to the Seven, which was made to the
V 6seven anonymous Syrians, basically represented a reaffir­
mation of British policy in the Middle East, and Arab troops 
operated almost solely in those areas to which they had been 
assigned in the Sykes-Picot Treaty. Although the total 
independence of these areas was inferred in the Declaration 
to the Seven, such,independence was not to become a reality 
(with the exception of those areas designated in the Sykes^- 
Picot Treaty). Palestine, as in past statements, from the
Jordan to the Mediterranean was excluded from any commitments
77m  the Declaration. The motives prompting the British 
statement were partially to counter the growing strength and 
frequency of German and Ottoman propaganda, and to, once 
again, reassure the Arabs of their good* intentions in the 
area.
Arab restiveness, in spite of the many statements of 
1918, tended to increase in* magnitu.de throughout the year.
By the end of 1918 Arab unrest had reached such a point of 
turmoil> that the War Cabinet received messages from the 
Middle East emphasizing the seriousness of the situation.
75Kedourie, England and Middle East, p. 116.
V 6Ibid., p. 114. The Seven remained anonymous 
because when compared to Husain, they had little authority 
and were afraid of retribution on the part of Husain. Ibid.
77T. E. Lawrence, The Seven Pillars of Wisdom,
(Garden City: Random Housed 1935), pi 555.
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Lord Curzon, addressing the Middle Eastern Committee of the
Cabinet, warned that the activities of the Zionists in
Palestine had antagonized and aroused the suspicions of the
Arabs. There was " . an! increasing friction between the
78two communities ." and something had to be done if a
peaceful solution was to be found for the situation in the 
Middle East. British strategy in the area had been dependent 
upon fostering the national aspirations of the Arabs arid also 
the Zionist goals in Palestine. In carrying out these 
strategems, England had created a vacuum in Palestine into 
which both groups were rushing.
Hoping to finally reassure the Arabs, without 
alienating the Jews, and to also illustrate the "unanimity" 
that existed between the allies, a joint Anglo-French decla­
ration was issued on November 8, 1918. England and France
decided to assure the Arabs that they had no desire to annex
79the territory which had been promised to the Arab state.
This declaration gave the formal, statement of the allied war
aims in the East as being
the complete and definite emancipation of the
peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the
establishment of national Governments . . . from
the initiat^jje and free choice of the indigenous 
population.
70
Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, II, 1143.
^“^ Kedourie, England and Middle East, p. 132.
80 International. Affairs, Great Britain, p. 118.
"The object aimed, at by France and Great Britain in prosecut­
ing in the East the War let loose by»' the ambition of Germany
Though the tone of the joint^ declaration is one of general­
ities, the specific mentign of Syria and Mesopotamia, and
the. failure to mention Palestine are relevant. The exclusion•* . - i
of Palestine is indicatiye of England's intent to fulfill her
promises to±both the Arabs and the Ziopists.
The documents that succeeded the Balfour Declaration—
theiHogarth Message, Bassett Letter, the Declaration to the
Seven, and the Anglo-French Declaration— all represented
attempts to reassure the Arabs of ^ British intent-to fulfill
the promise of Arab independence in Syria apd Iraq. Because
of increased self-interest, concern over Arab unrest, the
rapid movement of the military campaigns, and Woodrow
Wilson's twelfth point concerning self-determination, Great
Britain created a serigs of declarations which, intentionally
or unintentionally, encouraged Arab hopes, while, in all
reality, they attempted to limit and define “that endorsement
81of Arab independence fiyst extended j.n 1915.“ These
is the complete and definite emancipation of the peoples so 
long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of natipnal 
governments and administrationsjderiving their authority from 
the igitiatiye<, and free choice of the indigenous population. 
“In opder to carry out,these intentions France and Great 
Britain. aret at one in encouraging and assisting the estab­
lishment of indigenous^ Governments and administrations in 
Syria and Mesopotamia, now liberated by the.. Allies, and in 
the territories the liberation of which they are n^w engaged 
in securing, and recognizing these as soon as they are 
actually established.“ Great Britain, Pari. Debates (House 
of Commons), 5th ser., Vol. CXLV, col. 36.
81Klieman,^ British Policy, p. 17.
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documents did not rescind the Balfour Declaration, nor did 
they alter thp special status of Palestine in the, future 
post-war decisions, for b y (not including Palestine in any of 
the documents, its * special status was emphasize^ in a det 
facto manner.
Attempting to allay the cynical and contradictory 
impact of the Sykps-Picot Treaty., and to usg Arab, nationalism 
for tl^ e promulgation of their own desires in the Middle Ea^t, 
Great Britain,^ perhaps, acted before carefully considering 
the results. Thijs, however, was, common sounder the stress of 
war>. The results of its diplomacy would have to be treated 
after thq war at the peace conferences. Thp primary problem 
in ,tl}e Middle East remained one of handling the rampant 
natipnalism that§ Great Britain h^d so eagerly^ encouraged.
The nationalism of the Arabs— aspipant nationalism— tended 
tp be. more interested in thp spipit of the pledges made 
during the wari( rather than the specifics of these promises.
Although the war with Turkey took less tiipe to fight 
than thp Western aspects of the. conflict, and despite her 
complete defeat, peace negotiations took longer than with^ 
the other members of ithe defeated forces. The primary blame 
for this lies in the dupligipy of agreement^ and arrangements 
whiph concerned this area. In 1919 the^battlefield and the 
strategy were not military*, but irath^eri political and diplo­
matic.
CHAPTER V
A FAILURE AT PARIS
Appetites, passions, hopes, revenge, starva­
tion, and anarchy ruled the hour; and from 
this simultaneous welter all eyes were turned 
to Paris. ,
— Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis
The end of World War I signaled the defeat of the 
Central Powers by the. twenty-four allied powers. The Peace 
Conference, held in a vain attempt to create some stability 
out of the chaos of war, commenced its deliberations with 
little, if any, true preparation or sentiment favoring a 
negotiated peace. The war had ended, but disruptive forces 
now threatened the work of the Conference from within.
The various tasks of the Conference included consid­
eration of the question of the possible creation of a Jewish 
state. Palestine existed as ah idea, rather than a reality, 
until the boundaries had been determined and the mandate 
awarded. The essential problem of establishing a Jewish 
state was complicated by self-interest on the part of the 
powers at th»e Conference. While the Paris Peace Conference 
was attempting to re-structure a broken Europe, there were 
three groups working for national^ supremacy in the,Middle
^Kliem^n, British Policy, p. 33.
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East: the Franco-British group, which was involved in an
imperialistic contest for dominance of the region; the
Zionists, who wanted the fullest implementation of the
Balfour Declaration; and the Arabs, represented by Emir;
Faisal and others, who wanted the assurance of independence
2
that they had been promised during the war.
The British, after the Treaty of Mudros, felt that 
the Sykes-Picot Treaty* was no longer binding upon them and 
felt it should be modified, in order to safeguard His 
Majesty's Government's interests in the region. At the end 
of military operations British troops were stationed through­
out the Fertile Crescent, exercising exclusive occupation and 
control of the Palestine-Mesopotamia region, and sharing 
joint occupation, with France and Faisal, in Syria. In
3
matters "of men and material, the overwhelming expenditure,"
in the Middle Eastern campaign had been British. This fact,
above all others, determined the thinking of the British in
enumerating peace claims at Paris.
Another complication at the Peace Conference concerned
the three diplomatic agreements arrived at during the war:
the McMahon-Husain Pledge to the Arabs; the Sykes-Picot
Treaty arrived at with the "plenipotentiary of a sovereign 
4nation"; and the Balfour Declaration, a public statement of 
2Klieman, British Policy, p. 34.
3 4Ibid., p. 20. Ibid., p. 21.
intent to thp, Zionist Organization. These three agreements
were recognized by all of the signatories— thp Sharif Husain,
5
the French, the Zionists, and the British. Because of the 
change in war aims, however, and the renewed and intensified 
interest iipi the Middle East by members of the Entente, 
revision of the agreements between France and;Gre^t Britain 
waSi necessary,* if war commitments were to become a reality.
On November 30, 1918,^Clemenceau and Lloyd George met 
in London to consider concessions th^t might be made to 
achieve thgir national desires and*- determine what procedure 
would be followed at Paris. Lloyd Georg-e askedv for twp major 
revisions to thp Syke^s-Picot Treaty: the addition of the
Mogul , to Great Britain's area of control ip. the Middle East, 
and the removal of Palestine from the, area of international 
supervision and its placement s in the British sphere.^ His 
request, which wa,s based on an expanded concept of tljie 
strategic importance of the Middle East apd stemmed from a 
passion for possession thrgugh cpnquest, was accepted by 
Clemencqau. The French acceptance was based op a qui,d pro
7
q u o  for eaqh concession, and France agreed to the British 
demands, if it received certain,concessions on thp Rhing and
Q
also an appropriate share of the oil resources in the Mosul.
5
Williams, Britain and France, p. 18.
6Woodward and Butler, Documents, IV., 340 and 483.
7
Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 182.
8Williams, Britain and France, p. ,19..
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France also solicited complete British support against any 
possible American objections to her territorial demands, and,
> \ i- ' / i t
if the Mandate system was^ adopted, British support of French
mandates that included Damascus, Aleppo,, Alexandretta,, and 
9
Beirut. Although these t^lks were unofficial, they pre­
determined the fin^l negotiations concerning the Middle East 
and were in.keeping with thetimperialistic temper of the 
future conference.^ Revisions of >. the*. Sykps-Pipot Treaty u
were agreed to in Pari^ on January 30,^1919, when;i at thfs:
and subsequent ^ meeting^, Lloyd George requested redugtiqns 
of the^ French a^ea of control in the Middle\East. "The 
French Government-, however, regarded thgse proposals as
absolutely unacceptable, and quite inqapable of being>
11defended i n xthe French.Chambers." The former allies nearedl i ' \
an^  impasse i n snegotiations and events in early|1919 soon 
revealed that th^ Entente Cordiale of 1904 did not assure 
agreement onfall matters. The facade of Anglo-French unity, 
while it^may have temporarily suppressed hfstoricaf differ­
ences,, had not resolved .t^ iem. France still retained her'
interest in Syria and the Middle East, and actively*,. voiced
12concern over British attempts at dominance in the area, 
g.
Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 182; cf. Williams, 
Britain and France, p. 19.
■^Temperley, Peace Conference, IV, 182.
11Ibid., p. 142.
12Klieman, British Policy, p. 26.
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The French were determined to maintain a hold on
territory in the Middle East, partly as compensation for
losses in the European theatre, but primarily because of a
traditional position of economic interest in the Levant.
Clemenceau, therefore,, demanded Syria— as agreed upon in the
Sykes-Picot Treaty— in the hope of limiting Great Britain's
pre-eminence in an area which promised to be of "great
13economic potential and strategic importance." France also
refused to be bound by any promises that Great Britain had
14made to the Arabs during the course of the war. The
British Prime Minister replied to Clemenceau with apparent
surprise at the French attitude, closing his message with
the hope that Anglo-French relations would not become so
strained as to. halt the Conference, and-that the alliance
which had won the war would continue to be a viable force in
15world affairs. Despite these assurances, Lloyd George was
determined to get Palestine into a British sphere of influ- 
16ence.
With the rapid disintegration of mutual good faith 
between the two countries, little direct, concise action 
could be taken in reference to the Arab-Zionist question.
14Woodward and Butler, Documents, IV, 5 21.
15Ibid.. IV, 489.
1
Lloyd George, Peace Treaties. I, 288.
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The breach, whi<ph had reopened in the final stages of the
•war, widened in the clash of ideas and personalities in
1919, and persisted thereafter as an important irritant in
the rectangular relationship between the French, British,
17Arabs, and Jews. In spite of this difficult* and near- 
explosive * situation, both the Arabs and the Zionists prepared 
their delegations to present war claims and platforms to the 
Peace Conferenge.
Realizing that some type of accord between the Arabs 
and the ^Zionists was required, if peace were to be successful 
in the Middle East, Great Britain advised Faisal to come tp 
England for consultation prior tp thp opening of the* Con7 
ference. Lloyd George was also interested in promoting a 
meeting between Faisal and the French, hoping that Faisal 
could be persuaded to accept the French claims to Syria, and 
that the French would then be .willing to make concessions in 
Greater Syria toi. Great Britain. Acting as the representative 
of his, father, Husain, Faisal arrived in France on November 26, 
1918.*, where he received a rather cool welcome, and subse­
quently went to London^on December 10.
His stay in England^ was marked by a display of g^reat 
cordiality and good will which left hiiji ±n\ no doubt 
of the sincere desire of the Government, . . . to
do what was possible in furtljigranpe of legitimate 
Arab and Syrian aspirations.
17Klieman, British Policy, P- 28.
18Temper ley, Peace Conference IV, 142.
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While in London, the Emir was advised to accept the possibil­
ity of French control in^Syria. Faisal was beginning to 
realize that the Arab position at the impending Conference
would be that of a supplicant, and not as an equal member
19"of the victorious coalition" that had won the war. Aware 
of French opposition to the war claim of independence by the 
Arabs, and still uncertain as to British intent, Faisal 
turned to the Zionists as a potential ally for the future 
negotiations.
At the end of December, 1918, Faisal met with 
Zionist leaders in London. He entered these negotiations on 
the hope that out of them would come an accord and unity of 
action. On December 12, he was quoted by The Times as 
saying:
The two main branches of the Semitic family, Arabs 
and Jews, understand one another, and I hope that 
as a result of interchange of ideas at the Peace 
Conference, which will be guided by ideals of self- 
determination and nationality, each nation will 
make definite progress towards the realization of 
its aspirations. Arabs are not jealous of Zionist 
Jews, and intend to give them fair play; and the 
Zionist Jews have assured the Nationalist and 
Arabs ofitheir intention to see that2^hey too have 
fair play ii^  their respective areas.
Faisal stated that no modern state could grow and 
prosper in the Middle East without the aid of the heritage
19Klieman, British Policy, p. 35.
20Moshe Perlmann, "Chapters of Arab-Jewish Diplomacy, 
1918-1922," Jewish Social Studies, vol. VI, No. 2, April, 
1944, p. 133. Hereafter cited as Perlmann, Arab-Jewish 
Diplomacy.
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of Europe; the Jews were the perfect intermediaries to trans­
late this heritage into a formula that fit the Arab situation.
The Arabs, through the Emir, promised to support Jewish
21demands at Pans. Extending the terms of his meeting
with Weizmann in June, 1918, Faisal signed an agreement with
the Zionists to concert their actions in Paris, on
22January 3, 1919. The nine articles of this agreement were
designed to promote the "good will and understanding"
23between "the Arab State and Palestine." The Balfour
24Declaration of November 2, 1917, was to be implemented in 
any settlement, and in return for Arab support the Zionist 
Organization promised to use "its best efforts to assist the 
Arab, State in providing the means for developing the national
21 "In Palestine the enormous majority of the people 
are Arabs. The Jews are very close to the Arabs in blood, 
and there is no conflict of character between the two races. 
In principles we are absolutely at one. Nevertheless, the 
Arabs cannot assume the responsibility of holding level the 
scales in the clash of races and religions that have, in 
this one province, so often involved the world in difficul­
ties. They would wish for the effective super-position of 
a great trustee, so long as a representative local adminis­
tration commended itself by actively promoting the material 
prosperity of the country." David Hunter Miller, My Diary 
at the Conference of Paris, 1918-1919, (22 vols.; New York:
Appeal Printing Co., 1924), IV, 298 ff. Hereafter cited as 
Miller, Diary.
22A copy of the agreement can be found in Antonius, 
Arab Awakening, pp. 43 7-39.
23Pearlmann, Arab-Jewish Diplomacy, pp. 135-36.
24 "In the establishment of the Constitution and 
Administration of Palestine all such measures shall be 
adopted as will afford the fullest guarantees for carrying 
into effect the British Government's Declaration of 
November 2, 1917." Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 247.
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v 25resources and economic' possibilities ." of the natal
Arab state. Both,, oarties' further stipulated that if a dis­
pute should arise between(the two groups, Great Britain 
would be asked to act as the arbitrator.
In signing the agreement, Faisal incorporated a* 
Dro-viso that the agreement would be "deemed void and of no 
account or validity if the Arabs failed to obtain the inde­
pendence which they sought through the good offices of Great 
2 6Britain." The effectiveness of this Arab-Zionist accord,
then, would be determined by the treatment accorded the
27Arabs by the Great Powers in Paris. This agreement implied
Faisal's acknowledgement that Palestine would not be incor­
porated ipto a larger Arab state, and that the area^remained 
outside the territorial limitations of the Husain-McMahbn 
Correspondence. While the Faisal-Weizmann agreement indi­
cated an accord; between Arab and Zionists, this was not the 
case, for the Arabs in Palestine were already beginning to
display open opposition to the Balfour Declaration and Jewish 
28immigration. When tension increased between Arab and Jew, 
25Pearlmann, Arab-Jewish Diplomacy, pp. 135-36.
2 6Kliemann, British Policy, p. 35.
27 "If the Arabs are established as I have asked in 
my manifesto of January 4th addressed to the British Secre­
tary of State for Foreign Affairs, I will carry out what is 
written in this agreement. If changes are made, I cannot be 
answerable for failure to carry out this agreement."
Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 247.
28The Zionist archives report the opposition included 
widespread propaganda meetings, "gatherings in private homes 
attended by officers serving Faisal's army, agitation \n ^
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Faisal ignored the January accord by implementing his post­
script; since the Arab demands had not been met, he regarded
29the agreement as null and void. It soon became apparent 
that Faisal's apprehensions and anxiety concerning the status, 
of the Arabs at the Peace Conference were not unnecessary,
■)
for the Arabs were rapidly becoming a pawn in the imperial-
istically-oriented "games" that were taking place in Paris.
On January 1, 1919, the Hejaz delegation submitted a
memorandum, to the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference,
which stated the aim of the Arab nationalist movement: the
eventual unification of all Arabs into one nation, as an
30independent* and sovereign state. In a supplement to this
memorandum, dated January 29, 1919, and implementing Woodrow
Wilson's principles as a defense for their demands, the Arabs
stated that the Hejaz peoples hoped that the European powers
would attach a greater degree of "importance to the bodies
and souls of the Arabib speaking peopljes than to their own
31material interests."
Faisal, accompanied by Colonel Lawrence, appeared
cafes, the allocation of money for arms purchases, complaints 
to the authorities against alleged pro-Jewish discrimination,
. . . and threats against Jewish Homes." Aharon Cohen,
Israel and the Arab World (New York: Funk and Wagnails,
1970), pi 147. Hereafter cited as Cohen, Israel.
3^Ibid. , p. 143.
3^MillerJ Diary. Ill, 297.
3lMiller, Diary. IV; 199.
10 7
before -the Supreme Council on February 6 ^ 1919, to present
the Arab, case,, which had previously been outlined in the two
32memoranda of January 1,and January 29, respectively. His
remarks were in^keeping with his agreement with Weizmann and 
33the Zionists. The presentation of the Arab case resulted 
in avid discussion among thq delegates and it initially 
appeared that the chief delegates were reacjy to make some 
concrete proposals concerning the matter. England and France, 
however, reversed the situation when they became enmeshed in 
arguments
deriving from t]aeir persistent differences over the 
secret>treaties, apportioning responsibility for 
them, and^Jhe degree to which they were? still bind^ 
ing .
uppn the signatories.
With the apparent abortion of the unanimity that was
needed between France and Great Britain;, the possibility of
finding a solution was remote. President Wilson pointed out
to the Council that Russia had been a signatory to the .1916
agreement, "but had now disappeared, and the partnership of
35interest had therefore been dissolved," making a new accord 
necessary. To overcome the impasse, he suggested that those
^ L l o y d  George, Peace Treaties, II, 1039-40.
^Cohen, Israel, p. 143.
34Klicman, British Policy, p. 36. cf. Miller, Diary, 
IV, 2^7-99, and .Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 145-48.
35Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 148.
108
peoples directly concerned with the situation should be,
consulted on the question as to which power would become the
mandatory. An international committee proposed by Wilson,
would ultimately be senti to the Middle East to ascertain the
3 6wishes of the inhabitants.
Both Clemenceau and Lloyd George gave tentative^ 
approval to the idea of such a commissipn, as did Faisal, who 
placed great hope on thp outcome of the copmijssion's findings. 
France soon ,changed her mind, however, andi indicated that she 
would not participate in anytinvestigation, the sole intent of 
which was to expose anti-French attitudes in* Syria. With^ the 
extension of the Committee's area of investigation to Pales­
tine, Mesopotamia, and Armenia, Great Britain also withdrew 
support. Wilson, however, had already appointed the two 
United States representatives^— Dr. Henry C. King and Charles R. 
Crane— and they had left for the Middle Eaqt by May, 1919.
At the meeting of the Council of Four, on March 20, 
1919, a compromise was reached with the French, but-* a 
betrayal of the Anglo-Arab promises of independence was the 
cost of this rather tenuous solution. Lloyd*George adamantly 
maintained that Great Britain had no designs on Syria, but
the French remained wary, and tension still continued between
37the two countries.
3 6Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919 (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1939), pp. 143-44. Hereafter 
cited as Nicolson, Peacemaking.
3 7Williams, Britain and France, p. 20.
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In April, 1919, Faisal met with Clemenceau, who
informed him that France expected to receive the mandate for
Syria. Great Britain had abandoned its support of an Arab-
Zionist front to oppose French claims in the area, apparently
having given in to some of the French demands and claims to
the area. This reversal of policy left Faisal bereft of any
3 8truly strong allies -to* back up hi^ s claims.
Faisal left Paris in May, greatly discouraged, but
still hanging onto the hope of a favorable finding on the
part of the King-Crane. Commission. Attempting to prepare
his people for the investigation, he addressed an assemblage
of Syrian notables in Damascus, on May 5. Pledging himself
to continue the pursuit of a program for independence, he
asked the Syrian leaders to "depend and trust in Qthe^ Allies
who helped ^them^ and who wished £them} good success and
39progress." After receiving verbal proof of their
support, the Emir proceeded to instruct the convocation on
the manner in which to answer any questions that might be
asked by the Commission. He directed the people of the area
"to ask for complete independence for Syria, and, at the
same time to express a hope that it £would} be granted to
40other Arab countries." This was, possibly, his last chance
^Cohen, Israel, p. 151.
39Woodward and Butler, Documents, IV, 267-72.
40Ibid., IV. 264.
110
to gain independence for Syria, and by makipg such a demand, 
Faisal hoped to unify the Arabs, indicating a desire on his 
part to fulfill his father's wish for a united Arab state.
If ■independence was not granted, the Syrians wouldnot be 
willing to accept France as the mandatory power, if neither 
Great Britain nor the United States would accept thfe trustee­
ship, then a joint commission of Great Britain and France
41would be acceptable.
Even though the* other powers had pulled out of the 
investigation, there-by compromising the success and authority 
of the fact-finding expedition, thp King-Crane Commission, 
which was already in the Middle East, received instructions 
to carry out the investigatory inquiry from June until 
August. While their final reporb.confi-rmed the anti-French 
attitude of the Syrians and their total rejection of a 
French mandate, the findings were not acted upon by the 
Conference— possibly because of embarrassment at lack of 
Conference participation, and also because of a desire to 
satisfy individualistic imperialist desires. In the report 
thp
majority of the Syrian population desired absolute 
and unqualified independence; that failing such 
independence America would be preferred as the 
Mandatory Power, and, failing America, Great 
Britain; but that strong ggposition to control by 
France‘had been revealed.
41Ibid., IV, 265.
42Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 149.
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The report also designated Palestine as an area that should'
be connected to Syria, under the leadership^of Faisal, and
not given to the Zionists under any conditions. This aspect
of the report, had it been officially recognized by- the
Conference, would havetled to a great deal of difficulty
for the Jews. The American inquiry, however,
produced no practical results’, for before-the 
return of the Commission to Paris, the more 
important treaties had begg;signediand President 
Wilson had left for home.
While Faisal and the Arabs had presented their cause 
to the Conference, and he had departed to prepare his people 
for the, "Allied CommissiQn" of inquiry, the Zionists fever­
ishly prepared for their appearance before the Supreme Coun­
cil and the statement of their demands. Although it was 
still impossible to convene a Zionist Congress, because of
the still chaotic post-war conditions, a number of leading
44Zionists gathered in London in January, 1919. A commis­
sion, created out^ of this assemblage, set about drafting a 
statement of official policy for thg Organ^Lzatign, for 
presentation to the Supreme Council.
This committee, under the chairmanship of Herbert
44Among those that assembled m  London were: Dr.
Shmarya Levin (New York), Victor Jacobson (Copenhagen),
I. L. Goldberg and Israel Rosoff (Russia), Mr., Jacobus 
Kahn (Holland), Herbert Samuel, Chaim Weizmann, and 
Nahum Sokolow (Great Britain).
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45Samuel prepared the draft of policy and Simon Marks 
presented it to Ormsby-Gore, who represented the British 
Foreign Office. The proposal was rejected by the Foreign 
Office, however, on the grounds that it was too impractical,
arid the Zionists were informed that it would not be accepted
. 46unless the Organization came "down to earth," and eliminated
such outrageous demands as a Jewish governor and the require­
ment that the majority of the governmental officials be
1 . 47Jewish.
All the same, the draft which Ormsby-GOre had con­
sidered so fanciful formed the substantial basis of 
the statement which was eventually submitted to the 
Conference on February 23, 1919.
While the Actions Committee continued its sessions in
London, discussing possible revisions of the statement, a
summons came requesting the Zionists appearance before the
Supreme Council. Weizmann left for Paris where he joined
49Sokolow and the other members of the Zionist delegation m
50order to appear before the Council.
45 Other members of the committee were Meynard Keynes, 
Lionel Abrahams, and James de Rothschild. Weizmann, Trial 
and Error, p. 243.
46t, . 47t, . ,Ibid. Ibid.
48 Ibid., Infra., Appendix F, pp. 158-59.
49Nahum Sokolow, Zionist Organization; Jacob de Haas, 
United States Zionist Organization; Andre Spire, French 
Zionists; Sylvan'Levi, French Jews. Miller, Diary, XV, 
104-05.
50The Council of the Ten was composed of, for the 
Zionist presentation, Balfour and Lord Milner for Great 
Britain; Tairdieu and Pichon ,for France; Lansing and White
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Appearing before the Council of Ten, the Zionist
presentation was begun by Sokolow with a "short, concise
speech upon the first point, namely, the historic claim of
51the Jewish people to Palestine ." In his statements
he referred to the "favorable declarations" which various
governments had made on the subject, and also gave an
explanation of the "attachment of the Jewish people to Eretz 
5 2Israel." The local Jewish questions in Europe, especially 
in Eastern Europe, according to his presentation, could be 
solved by creating a national home in^Palestine.
Weizmann, the next speaker for the Organization,
53"dealt with the economic position of th^ e Jewish people."
The war had displaced the East European Jew, leaving "Jewry
and Judaism" in a weakened condition never before seen, thus
54creating "a problem very difficult of solution." The
solution— since the problem revolved around the homelessness
of the Jew— was to be found in the creation of a national 
55home. The essence of the Zionist desires was that: the
mandatory would promote Jewish immigration; cooperate with a 
Jewish council or agency in the development of the Jewish
for the United States; Baron Sonnino for Italy; and 
Clemenceau was present for the first few minutes of the 
session. Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 243.
^^Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 243. ^ Ibid.
53 54Ibid. Ibid.
55Ibid., Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, II, 1157-58.
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national home in Palestine; and would offer priority to the 
Jewish Agency in obtaining concessions for growth and devel­
opment;, for natural resources which the mandatory government
. , . 56might desire.
5 7After comments by Ussishkim, and Andre Spire, the
final speaker was Sylvan Levi. His remarks can be divided
into two parts: "In the first he soared to heaven, Hand 1
58in the second he came plumb down to earth." He began his
presentation by pointing out the great achievements of the
farming colonies established by Baron de Rothschild, in
Palestine; and made the point that the work of Choveve Zion.
and the significance of the Alliance Israelite Universelle
could hardly be ignored. The only significance of the
Zionist movement, however, according to Levi, was that "it
had uplifted the Jewish masses and oriented them to 
59 /Palestine." Levi then proceeded to damn the entire future
of the Organization and its goals. Palestine was too small
and too poor to absorb the millions of Jews that would wani
to migrate to the area. The large influx of this "foreign"
population.would lead to the eventual displacement of the
60600,000 Arabs already in the area. He then continued in a
56Miller, Diary, XV, 108.
57Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 243.
5 8Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 244.
59Ibid. 60Ibid.
115
highly rhetorical manner stating his belief that the bulk of 
the Jews who would flock to Palestine would come from Russia.
g? 1
The Russians, "who were of 'explosive' tendencies," would.
create countless problems in the area. Possibly the most
dangerous result of such a venture by the Zionists would be
the introduction of the dangerous idea of dual citizenship
among world Jewry, possibly consigning the Jew to the ghetto
as in the Middle Ages.
The Zionist representatives sat i^ i shocked and
embarrassed silence, regarding Levi's discourse as a "public
6 2desecration" of their being. The four Zionists did not
want to degrade themselves, the Organization, nor the
Council, by turning the meeting into a debate, which would
6 3have been "an exceedingly undignified spectacle." Their
problem was resolved, however, according to Weizmann, by
64"something in the nature of a miracle ." The
American Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, at the end of 
LeVi's discourse, interpolated a question which allowed 
Weizmann a rebuttal to the "traitor's" remarks. Lansing 
asked Weizmann what was actually meant by the term "Jewish
National Home." Did it mean an autonomous Jewish govern-
, 065 ment?
61 , . 62-p, . ,Ibid. Ibid.
^Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 244. ^ Ibid.
^5Miller, Diary, XV, 104-17. cf. Lloyd George,
Peace Treaties, II, 1158.
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In answering the question, Weizmann replied in the 
negative.^ The Jewish national home meant the creation of 
an administration which would come from the natural condi­
tions of the country— never to the detriment of the non- 
Jewish community. Through immigratipn it was hoped that
Palestine would eventually become Jewish as England was 
6 7 /English. As to Levi's charge of dual allegience,t Weizmann
maintained that there was nothing in any o£ the Zionist pro-
68posals which could possibly raise such a problem. The
charge against the Russians was without foundation, for
although they lived in an "excitable atmosphere," the early
/
work in Palestine, which had been praised by Monsieur Levi,
69had been done by Russian Jews. The proceedings ended with
this conversation. The Zignists had stated their case, and
Weizmann had delivered his rebuttal, according to Balfour,
70with the sureness of "the swish of a sword."
"The Zionist Organization did not want an autono­
mous Jewish G o v e r n m e n t b u t  merely to establish in Palestine, 
under a Mandatory Power, an administration, not necessarily 
Jewish,t which would render it possible to send into Palestine
70,000 to 80,000 Jews annually. The Zionist Association 
would require to have permission at the same time to build 
Jewish schools, where Hebrew would be taught, and in that 
way to build up gradually a nationality which would be as 
Jewish aq the French nation was French and the British 
nation was( British. Later onj when the Jews fopmed thq large 
majority, they would be ripe to establish such a Government 
as would answer to the state of the development! of the 
country and to their ideals." Miller,* Diary, XV, 104-17.
6 7 68Weizmann^ Trial and Error, p. 144. Ibid.
69
Ibid.. p. 244.
70 Ibid. , p. .245. Weizmann and the otjier members 
were at a loss to understand Levi's motivations, for on the
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The Zionists appeared to be receiving favorable
reception for their program in France, and the night of the
Zionist hearing, Tardieu issued a statement that France
would not openly oppose Palestine as becoming a British
mandate, nor would they oppose the creation of a Jewish
state. This openly friendly reception apparently scared
Faisal, for in an interview with Le Matin, he was openly
71hostile toward the Jewish state. Although this was a 
surprising shift in position, Faisal probably acted out of 
pressure'from the Various Arab nationalist movements, in an 
attempt to reinforce his own position at home. Faisal's 
secretary, when contacted by the Zionists, disavowed the 
attitude, and a meeting between Felix Frankfurter, an 
American Zionist, and the Emir was arranged. After the 
meeting Faisal sent Frankfurter a letter, which restated the
72friendly attitude of the Arabs towards their ethnic brothers.
73Faisal was not afraid of the Ziopist program in Palestine. 
Apparently Faisal was straddling the diplomatic fence, hoping 
to achieve western support and also to maintain supremacy
Palestine Commission in 1918 he had acted "correct enough"; 
there was also confusipn as to why Baron de Rothschild 
"supported his candidacy for membership in the delegation 
. . to come before the Council. Ibid.
71Ibid. 72Ibid.. pp. 245-46.
73 "Our deputation here in Paris is fully acquainted 
with the proposals submitted by the Zionist Organization to 
the Peace Conference, and we regard them as moderate and 
proper. We will do our best, in so far as we are concerned, 
to help them through; we will wish the Jews a most hearty 
welcome home." Ibid.
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at home.
Just as Faisal had prepared the Syrians for the
coming of the King-Crane Commission ip May and June, so did
the Zionists prepare the Palestinian Jews. In a letter tor
Friedenwald, a ^ member of the Zionist Commission in Jaffa,
Weizmann asked that the Zionist cause be presented to the
Commission "with firmness, moderation and dignity on Cthe]
74lines submitted " to the Peace Conference.
In placing all their hopes on Faisal, the Zignists
had acted in the belief that he would help them in negotiat-
75 . .ing an agreement with the Palestinian Arabs. With the
increase in Arab tensions in the Middle East, however, Faisal
was forced to change his position, and from April onward
there was increased activity among the Arabs in Palestine
in an effort to insure the exclusion of the Zionists from 
76Palestine. This attitude was expressed by the Palestinian 
Arabs when they were questioned by the King-Crane Commission, 
and was also evident in Faisal's statements at Damascus in 
June.
At the time of the Arab and Zionist appearances in 
74Woodward and Butler, Documents, IV, 2 78. The note 
then continued: "Inform them our cooperation with Feysal
and our desire to work harmoniously with Arab population for 
the good of Palestine. Draw their attention to achievements 
Jewish colonization under difficult circumst/ances and great 
possibilities now when greatest majority Jewish people all 
over world resolutely, supports Zionist aims and considerable 
numbers waiting first opportunity settle Palestine." Ibid.
^Cohen, Israel. p. 143. ^ Ibid. . p. 148.
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Paris, an undeniable entente existed between Great Britain
and these two parties, with reference to the disposition of
Palestine in accord with the Balfour Declaration. Although
each party must have had a different interpretation of the
Declaration there was unanimity on the main point— the Jews
would be allowed to settle in Palestine. The Arabs, at this
time, agreed to the creation of Palestine as a separate unit
from the Arab state or states, and also that a government,
safeguarded by Great Britain, would be instituted and would
work for the development of a Jewish national home. It was
only after Damascus that Faisal 1s attitude changed, for in
conjunction with the other statements there his remark on
Palestine was an uncompromising one:
We oppose the pretentions of Zionists to create a 
Jewish commonwealth in the southern part of Syria, 
known as Palestine, and oppose Zionist migration to 
any part of our country; for we do not acknowledge 
their title but consider them a rare peril to our 
people from the^ational, economical, and political 
points of view.
The P^ris Conference did not immediately work on the
problem of the Middle East after the initial presentations
had been made. As soon as the hostilities of the war had.
ceased, the enthusiasm for the creation of the Arab and
Jewish states began to diminish.
At the Peace Conference, all ideals of national 
self-determination and of making the world safe for
77Hanna, British Policy, p. 43.
democracy withered away in the icy climate of 
power politics anc^insatiable greed for terri­
torial expansion.
Nothing cohesive could be accomplished in drafting or award
ing mandates until the petty squabbles between France and
Great Brifain had been resolved.
The Anglo-French disagreement was complete by March 
but England and France still awaited a solution of theirt
difficulties. They had, however, no doubt that they would
eventually be able to bridge the chasm of differences that
was separating them./ The unpleasant consequences of their
quarrel fell on the
luckless countries of the Near East . . . .  They 
were now to be made the sport of antagonistic 
ambitions . . . and political and sectarian
passions were to be awakened and continually 
sustained among their restless populations.
Faisal1s hope for Arab independence slowly disinte­
grated over the months of 1919, and the safeguards that he 
had employed, and had hoped would assure independence were 
removed one at a tipie: the principle of self-determination
was being ignored; multilateral negotiations, with the 
influence of disinterested tjiird parties, ,had not worked; 
attempts to use a European type of diplomacy had resulted 
in failure; thq reliance upon England to implement hier war 
promises, and to intervene, on the Arab's behalf, with the
78Sokolow, Zionism. IX, 443.
79Kedourie."England and Middle E/ast, p. 141.
121
French, did not materialize; direct bilateral conversations 
with the French had come to no avail; and, ultimately, the 
King-Crane Commission— with its hope of an "impartial" report—  
had been ignored.
However, whijle the Arabs faired quite badly, the 
Zionists were actually beginning to realize their dream of a 
Jewish national home. The implementation of the mandate, 
however, had to be postponed for the resolution of the Franco- 
British rivalry in the Middle East. The calming of this 
altercatipn began to occur in September, 1919.
80Klieman., British Policy, p. 39.
CHAPTER VI
THE CREATION OF CONFLICT
Indifference to the significance of the Near 
East in the scheme of world affairs has been 
carried so far that it is not appreciated 
that almost irreparable harm is being done 
to British interests. 1
— The Near East, 2 January 1920
Basking in the after-glow of victory, Britain and 
France, in the immediate post-war period, extended and inten­
sified their activities in the Middle East. The resultant 
contest for supremacy led to serious international problems 
and had grave results for all concerned. Elements in both 
Syria and Palestine were seeking Great Britain as a mandatory
power and the joint Zionist and Arab requests for British
protection greatly aided Britain in the diplomatic struggle
2with France for pre-eminence in the area. This arrangement
also created some difficulties when the time came for a joint
3
Anglo-French accord at the Peace Conference.
To solve the many imperialistic rivalries evident at 
Paris, two solutions were introduced and, after discussion,
^Klieman, British Policy, p. 45.
2
Supra, chap. v, pp. 99-100.
3
The Chronicles of the Hagana. I, part 2, p. 542, as
cited by Cohen, Israel, p. 161.
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combined: Woodrow Wilson's idea for a League of Nations,
and Jan Christian Smuts' suggestion for a system of mandates. 
Under the mandate plan, the principal allies would become 
trustees for new states to be carved out of the land confis­
cated from the defeated Central Powers, with supervision of 
the administration of the areas to be. a responsibility of 
the League. Though a compromise, this system appeared to be 
the only possible way of reconciling the differences that 
existed between the imperialistic reality of the conference,
and the idealistic desire for self-determination, that was
4so evident among the "submerged nationalities." The mandate 
system was incorporated ipto the Covenant of the League of 
Nations, in Artigle 22. In the implementation of this pro­
gram, Greater Syria, as well as other areas of the defeated 
Ottoman Empire, came under the influence of Great Britain 
and France.
Great Britain, already having secured France's
5
approval of her policy towards the Zionists m  Palestine, 
opened formal discussions with the Zionist representatives 
at the Peace Conference in Paris, for the primary, purpose of 
determining the terms of the proposed mandate.^ The first
4
Quincy Wright, Mandates under the League of Nations 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1930), p. 591.
Hereafter cited as Wright, Mandates.
5
Supra, chap. iii, p. 62.
^The negotiations for drafting the mandate was under 
the directions of Weizmann and Sokolow; auxilary aid came 
from Felix Frankfurter.
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stage of the negotiations included a tentative draft of 
mandate arrangements which w^s sent to David Hunter Miller,
, t
1 7for his opinion, on March 28, 1919. The general suggestions
contained in this draft, delivered by Felix Frankfurter, were
designed to establish Palestine as a mandate under the.
auspices of the League, but the League would not be allowed
to dominate. The preamble of the draft spoke specifically
of establishing in Palestine a Jewish national home, through
historic right, and included the request that Great Britain
b e ;assigned the position of mandatory power. After several
conferences, and. resultant revision, th^-s draft was submitted
to th^ members of the British delegation in Paris on July 15,
1919. Its framers intended that the draft, in its final formr
would be included in the peace treaty^with Turkey as an
integral part of that document.
A later text of July 15, however, was inclined to
7
"Whereas the inhabitants of Palestine are unable at 
the present time effectively to constitute and to maintain an 
autonomous commonwealth, and
"2. Whereas the League of Nations and the Signatory 
Powers recognize thie historic title of the Jewish people to 
Palestine and the right of the Jews to reconstitute Palestine 
as their national home: and there to establish the founda­
tions of a Jewish Commonwealth, and
"3. Whereas it is the wish of the inhabitants of 
Palestine and of the Jews that governmental and administra­
tive powers to be exercised over the territory and its inhabi­
tants should be confined to Great Britain as the Mandatory 
of the League and as trustee of the Signatory Powers,
"4. Now therefore the Signatory Powers hereby con­
stitute Great Britain the Mandatory of the League of Nations 
for the Government and Administration of Palestine."
Miller, Diary, pp. 369 ff.
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favor French interests. Negotiated by Weizmann and Sokolow, 
as representatives of the Zipnist Organizatipn, it was con­
structed in such a way as to cause the Zionists to think that
y
it would be acceptable to both the British and the French.
Amazingly enough, however, the objections to i£ came, not
from France or England, but from the Zionist Action Committee
in London. They felt that the dr^ft was not specific enougli,
and said that it should be made more clear that the "historic
«
connection" was, in fact, an "historic right" of the Jewish 
people to settle in Palestine. Because of the internal fric- 
tiqn among the Zionist leaders , a second text\ was prepared. 
Generally, the moderatipn of Weizmann and Sokolpw wa$ carried
Q
"1. Recognition should be given to the 'historical 
connection' of the Jews with Palestine and the claim which
this gives them to found a national home in that country.
"2. The proposed mandatory should be made respon­
sible for placing Palestine under such political, administra­
tive and economic conditions as would secure the establish­
ment there of the Jewish national home.
"3. The ultimate aim of the mandate should be the 
creation in Palestine of a self-governing commonwealth.
"4. A provisional— to be qhanged subsequently into 
a permanent— Jewish Council should be formed representing 
Jewish opinion in Palestine and in the world at large . . . .
"5. The Palestine administration should be under a 
Governor appointed by the Mandatory Power who would be 
assisted by an Executive Council. Not less than half of the 
members of the Executive Council should be representative of 
the Palestine population, Jewish and non-Jewish, and of the 
Jewish Council. Provision should also be made for a Repre­
sentative Assembly of an advisory character, gradually to be 
given wider powers as the Palestinian nation progressed 
toward full self-government.
"6 . Jewish immigration >and colonization should be 
facilitated by the British government.
"7. Hebrew was to be recognized as an official 
language." Reports of the Executive to the Xllth Zionist 
Congress. I, p. 28.
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over* into the revised document. The revised document was 
completed by the end of 1919, and apparently received the 
approval of the British government. Although the term 
"historic connection" was not replaced by the stronger term 
"historic right, " the revised draft did tend to be a'’ more 
generally worded document: there was to be a wider concept
of self-government^and administration of the state, and the 
Zionist Organization appeared to have won certain necessary 
conditions for the development of a Jewish national home.
The idea of a Jewish Commonwealth, however, was not favored
9
by Great Britain, and the phrase was dropped from the draft.
The spring of 1920 witnessed a set-back for the 
Zionists in negotiations with Great Britain with regard to 
the terms for the mandate: the Arabs were creating a great
deal of difficulty in the Middle East, and Lord Curzon, known 
for his anti-Zionist attitude, replaced Balfour as Foreign 
Secretary. Curzon felt a need for a more lenient policy 
towards the Arab groups, which proved to be detrimental to 
the Zionists1 goals. As a result, basic changes were made 
in the drafted mandate, and a new proposal issued by the 
government on June 10, 1920. In this government prepared 
draft— the first official draft from the British— reference, 
to the "historic connection" of the Jews to Palestine was 
deleted: limits were placed on the authority of the Jewish
9
Reports of the Executive to the Xllth Zionist 
Congress. I, p. 30.
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Agency; and the idea of a Jewish Commonwealth was completely
, ,10 dropped.
Finally realizing that Weizmann had been correct in 
his moderation, the Actions Committee concentrated on re- 
obtaining a position which they had previously disfavored.
The members consolidated their efforts to work out a com­
promise, directing their attention to three essential areas: 
the necessity for the inclusion of the idea of "historic 
connection"; need for a "self-government" clause was neces­
sary because of Palestine's status as a Class A Mandate; and
the right for internal autonomy was necessary if the area
11was to become self-supporting. Between June and November,
19 20, the Zionists were actively involved in attempts to
12modify the "restrictive" governmental draft. In spite of 
the activities of the Organization and Lord Balfour, who had 
once again come to the aid of the Zionist group, only one 
change was allowed: the phrase "historic connection"was re­
instated. On December 6 , 1920, Balfour submitted the approval 
draft for the mandate to the League of Nations for its ratifi­
cation. One major triumph for the Zionists, which was incor­
porated into the draft, was the replication of the Balfour 
Declaration; this statement, therefore, would become part of 
the formal mandate for Palestine.
"^Reports of the Executive to the Xllth Zionist 
Congress, I, p. 30.
11ibid.. p. 31. 12Ibid., p. 32.
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The draft, circulated in the Council of the League,
did not survive intact, however, for certain changes were
deemed necessary*. Changes in the mandate were not concerned
with Palestine, however, but rather with the Transjordan
area. With the addition of Article 25, Great Britain was
given the right to withhold implementation of the Balfour
Declaration in those territories that were located east Of 
. 1 3the Jordan River, and the terms of the final draft awarded
Great Britain complete control over foreign, legislative and
administrative, and defense policies. Because the mandatory
was bound "so far as circumstance fpermitted, tojf encourage
14local autonomy" and m  compliance to this, a Jewish Agency
was set up for the purpose of advising and jointly con-
15trolling the administration of Palestine.
The "final draft" was submitted to the British 
Parliament in August, 1921, and eventually ratified by the 
League of Nations on July 24, 1922. There were numerous 
events which delayed its. final ratification and implementa­
tion, however, not the least of which was the still existent 
Anglo-French rivalry. France refused to give its consent to
13The Transjordan was separated from Palestine in 
19 22, and therefore not open to Jewish immigration as described 
in the mandate. Williams, Britain and France, p. 27. Infra, 
chap. vi, p. 140.
14Williams, Britain and France, p. 24.
15 Ibid. Text of the.mandate can be found in Wright, 
Mandates, pp. 600 f f . , and Lloyd George, Peace Treaties. II. 
1194-1201.
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British intent in the Middle East, until Britain had resolved 
its differences with her concerning the Syrian question.
Also holding up the peace treaty with Turkey was the uncer- 
tain and "ambiguous attitude of the United States." The* 
assumption had been made that the United States would parti­
cipate in the Turkish negotiations, but by the fall of 1919, 
this was becoming doubtful, and Amerigan delay was creating
17an increase m  the tension of an already irritable situation.
The French were in a very precarious position in the
Middle East at the end of the war. After informal talks with
18Lloyd George in November and December of 1918, Clemenceau 
returned to France confident that the problem had been solved. 
Both he and Lloyd George had handled the situation in the 
manner they were most familiar with— the methods of nine­
teenth century imperialism. Neither of them had any
"experience with the green timber of Wilsonian idealism in
19the construction of a 'new world1 ." and out of thi£
confusion of method came the inevitable conflict.
As early as March,- 1919, Lloyd George and Clemenceau 
were meeting in Paris to discuss allocation of the mandates 
which they felt would be granted by the future League. On
Stein, Balfour, p. 652.
17
Woodward and Butler, Documents, IV, 826-27.
^ Supra, chap. v, pp. 99-101.
19Yale, The Near East, p. 334.
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March 7, 1919, the two leaders came to the understanding that
France would receive Syria, and Great Britain would be alio-
20cated both Palestine and Mesopotamia, including the Mosul.
France was still suspicious of British activities in the
Syrian region, due to the presence of a military force, and
21m  spite of constant reassurance from Great Britain that
22it would not accept a mandate for Syria, her suspicions
remained. ’’French opinion saw in the continued British
23occupation only a sinister agency . 1 for the implemen­
tation of British desires.
This problem was slowly rectified, however, and in 
August, 1920, Lord Curzon made the public statement that
a Mandate for Syria had been accepted by France and 
a Mandate for Palestine and Mesopotamia had been 
accepted by Great Britain. Each country had left 
the other with a free hand to proceed with those 
Mandates, and this decision ^<3 been pursued with 
equal loyalty by both sides.
On September 15, 1919, an agreement concerning the
military aspects of the,problem wa$ reached, and plans were
made for withdrawal of British troops, and their replacement
by French troops. The French military would garrison Syria,
west of the line agreed upon in the Sykes-Picot Treaty, and
20Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, I, 288.
21Ibid.. II, 1046.
22Woodward and Butler, Documents, IV, 298.
23Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 151.
24Woodward and Butler, Documents, VIII, 109.
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Cilicia; Arab forces would occupy Damascus, Horns, H a m a , and 
25Aleppo. This agreement fulfilled, in part, Great Britain's 
undertakings with the Frenchvin the Sykes-Picot Treaty, and 
also the pledges that had been made to Hussain in the McM^hon- 
Husain Correspondence. The joint move by the French and 
British, however, left the Arab regime in Damascus without 
British aid in dealing with the French, and the Syrian Arabs 
were becoming desperate as a result of imminent French 
occupation.
Faisal, upon hearing of the possibility of such an
Anglo-French arrangement, wrote Lloyd George on September 9,
1919, that only a guarantee of Syrian unity could prevent
the collapse of hj.s regime, and, therefore, the "peace" of
the Middle East. The Emir left for London, in a vain hope
to forestall any agreement that would endanger the unity of
his country, and "before any decision [was*j taken in London
or disaster ^overtook thern^ both . " in London aand
Syria. He arrived too late to stop the agreement, however,
and November 1, 1919, was set as the date for British troop 
27withdrawal.
While in London, Faisal did participate in several 
meetings where he attempted tp have troop withdrawals
25Ibid., IV, 384-85.
26Ibid., IV, 388.
27Ibid., IV* 395-400, 413-19, 458-63.
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cancelled, or, at the minimum, postponed, until the situation 
in the area was not so tenuous. Hoping to bring an end to 
the Syrian problem, from the British standpoint at' least, 
Lloyd George wrote Faisal, on October 10, 1919, that the
British government had no recourse, but to implement the
•\
decision it had arrived at with France.
His Majesty's Government [bad*} made up their mind 
that it Jwas] impossible . . .  to contigue the 
occupation of Syria by British troops.
Considering the domestic situation and the public statements
of March and August, that Britain would not accept a mandate 
29for Syria, they could no longer consider the occupation of
Syria and Cilicia as part of their duty, at least until the
30Peace Conference had settled the situation. Great Britain,
through this letter, illustrated its desire to withdraw from
the complicated and embarrassing Syrian situation, and to
halt its role as mediator between; France and Faisal.
Desperate because of the situation at home, and wary of the
severe criticism from his. father, Faisal, upon the advice of
Lloyd George, left for Paris for direct negotiations with 
31Clemenceau.
British troops began their withdrawal from Syria on 
November 1, and bye early December were completely out of the
28Woodward and Butler, Documents. IV, 451.
O Q  o n
Ibid.r XV. 449. Ibid.. IV. 451.
31Ibid.. IV, 475.
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area. As a result of British withdrawal the "French and
Arab troops now faced each other across the new zones of 
32occupation." To further complicate the situation, Henri 
Gouraud, French Commissioner for Syria, arrived in Beirut bn 
November 1, thereby illustrating France's determination to 
secure and entrench itself in Syria. All of these occurrences, 
which Faisal had attempted to prevent, occurred while he was 
in France, and his absence from the area tended to make the 
situation in Damascus and Syria grow at a worsening rate.
His meetings and correspondence with Clemenceau proved use­
less, for he was out of his element in these negotiations,
i 33and Clemenceau had won the round. The Emir felt, not
unjustly, that he had been betrayed and "handed over, tied
34by feet and hands, to the French."
With the French occupation of Syria, the "hour of
grace" between the Zionists and Arabs came to an end, for
the Arabs had not secured their "big Arab State," and there-
35fore were not willing to concede Palestine to the Zionists.
"Savage disappointment gripped the Arab national movement 
36." and with the expulsion of Faisal from Damascus, by
32Klieman, British Policy, p. 41.
33Williams, Britain and France, p. 21,
34K1ieman, British Policy, p . 41.
35Supra, chap. v, pv 119.
^Eban, My People, p. 3 76.
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the(French, the Arab nationalist movement made claim for
complete liberation of Syria, union with Palestine, and
militant resistance to the creation of a Jewish national
3 7home in, Palestine.
The distribution of the controversial mandate was
soon to be settled. The proposal for
unqualified Syrian independence . . . stood no
chance of acceptance by*the Conference^ if only 
for the reason that the granting of such indepen­
dence would mean the ^gfinite end of French dreams 
in the Levant - - .' ,
but with the events whiph preceded the Conference, the Syrian 
fate had been decided— there would be no independence. With 
the * Arabs acknowledgement of this fact, riots brokei.oub in 
the Middle East, in which the Arabs made vain attempts to 
overthrow the French and buying the plight of their situation 
before the Conference.
Confronted with this situation, Great Britain and 
France condemned the activities of the rebels, stating that 
the mandate question had to be settled by the Peace Confer-- 
en.ce, and not*.through violent revolution. The Paris Confer­
ence had adjourned without discussing the situation of the 
mandates, however, thereby^passing it on to the San Remo 
Conference.
On April 24, 19 20, the Conference decided that both-* 
Syria and Iraq would become independent states, according to
3 7 38Ibid. Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 156.
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Article 22, under the protective guidance of a mandatory
power. The powers were to be the French in Syria, and the
39English were to administer Iraq and Palestine. The man­
dates for Syria and Lebanon were conferred upon France by 
the Supreme Council on April 4, 1920, and consequently con­
firmed on May 5, 1920. The mandate for Palestine was granted 
at the same time as those for Syria and Lebanon- The terms
of the mandates were drafted and "deposited with the Council
40of the League m  December, 1920." They were then approved, 
as drafted, by the League on July 24, 1922, and, therefore, 
ready for promulgation in the designated areas.
The basic guide lines for the division of the Ottoman 
territory in Syria were those that had been drawn up in the
Sykes-Picot Treaty of 1916, in accordance to the revisions of
4-1 ✓1918. In the Treaty of Sevres, August 10, 19 20, the man­
date for Palestine and other areas in the Middle East were 
described in specific and minute detail. Turkey, however, 
did not ratify the Treaty, and the terms were not officially 
in effect until September 28, 1923, with the signing of the 
Treaty of Lausanne. On the premise that the Treaty of Sevres 
would be ratified, the main principles of the mandate had 
been used to direct the government in Palestine from July 1,
39Ibid.. VI, 157. 40Ibid.. VI, 169.
Supra, chap. v, pp. 100-101.
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1920, when the military government was replaced by a civil 
administration.
The basis for the Palestine government was incor­
porated into the mandate in the form of- the Balfour Declara­
tion. Although there were originally many objections to its 
inclusion,
. . . all the Powers could do was to concede the
substance of the Declaration— that is, to subscribe 
to thg2establishment °f a national home for the 
Jews.
Because of this concession, on the part of the other powers,
the Declaration became a corporate part of the mandate.
Looking for an administrator for Palestine, Curzon,
Lord George, and Balfour settled upon Herbert Samuel— a Jew
who was also a late convert to the Zionist cause. When he
was offered the position on April 24, SamUel was hesitant.
about taking the post, but through the urgings of Zionist
43leaders in San Remo, he accepted. In, taking the 30b,
Samuel hoped to be representative of all Palestinians’. 
Speaking
with regard to the non-Jewish population, the 
desiredj not only to treat them with absolute 
justice . . . but also to adggt active measures
to promote their well-being.
42Woodward and Butler, Documents, VIII, 168.
43The appointment of a Zionist to. this post can be 
interpreted to be an expression of Lloyd George's belief that 
a Jewish Commission was to be created in Palestine. This 
Commission would work fop the eventual independence of the 
Jewish state.
^Storrs, Orientations, p. 458.
13 7
'To pursue this policy of equality, after his arrival in
Jerusalem on July 1, 1920^ one of his first official acts
was to declare a general amnesty for all Arab participants
45in the Jerusalem riots of May, 1920. Hoping to capitalize
on the calm this created, Samuel then began to translate
British proposals into actual programs. The most important
move was the creation of an advisory council composed of
Jewish, Arab, and British representatives— the "first step
46in the development of self-governing institutions."
By the end of October, the High Commissioner was able 
to report some progress in Palestine: travel restrictions,
because of the "calm" atmosphere, had been modified; pilgrim­
ages were being allowed and even encouraged to be re-newed; 
and the new Jewish immigrants, who were arriving daily, were 
not creating any serious threat to the status-quo of the area. 
Because of the easiness of the situation, Samuel was very 
optimistic about the ease of transition for Palestine to a 
Jewish national home.^^
Samuel was definitely acting in a sincere attempt to 
govern for all of the inhabitants of the country, and 
believed that a policy of good will towards the Arabs would
45Eban, My People, p. 3 78.
46Foreign Office, "Confidential Prints, Eastern 
Affairs, Iraq, 1920-22," Enclosure 2 in no. 83, 10 October 
1920, Paper E 13008, file 85/44, volume 406/4.4; as cited by 
Klieman, British Policy, p. 65.
47Klieman, British Policy, p. 65.
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serve the best interests of Palestine and the mandatory power.
Because of this apparent pro-Arab sentiment, he faced much
criticism. In spite of this, he was of the general opinion
that the goal of the Balfour Declaration was the eventual
48creation of a Jewish state m  Palestine, and he never veered 
from this contention. His Arab policy was not to the detri­
ment of the Palestinian, Jew, but rather was implemented t o * 
promote the necessary conditions of peace that were required 
for full independence of Palestine. Because of this position 
as a government official, hi,s main purpose was not immediate 
implementation of the idea of a Jewish state, but rather "to.
subject that aim to the task of securing tranquility within
49the Arab community." Samuel was doing his job m  fulfill­
ment of his obligations to the British government, of whom 
he was the official representative in Palestine.
The end of 1920 witnessed the strengthening of Great 
Britain's position in the Middle East, primarily as a result 
of Sir Herbert Samuel and Sir Percy Cox, serving as High 
Commissioners in Palestine and Mesopotamia,.: respectively. 
Because of the capabilities of these two men, Palestine and 
Mesopotamia hac^ been able to avoid the violence of 1920 that
48 It was Samuel who was the first member of the War 
Cabinet tp move for the establishment of a Jewish home in 
Palestine, and he was also active in the eventual fulfillment 
of this desire when the Balfour Declaration was issued.
Supra, chap. iii, p. 51.
49Eban, My People, p. 379.
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had ravaged other regions in the Middle East. Hoping to 
maintain this status, the Cairo Conference was convened on 
March 12, 19 20, in an attempt to coordinate the policies 
involved in the administration of the Middle East, and, 
hopefully, to end any potential threat of riot. This meeting 
was one of Winston Churchill's first official acts in the 
area of Middle Eastern affairs, and set the stage for his 
White Paper of 1922.^
While enroute to Cairo, Churchill was approached by 
an Arab Executive Committee, and asked to revise the govern­
ment's policy towards Palestine— to recind the Balfour 
Declaration. Churchill informed the delegates that he
neither wished, nor was able, to repudiate the Balfour
51Declaration or to halt Jewish immigration. Great Britain
had promised to aid the development of a national home for
the Jews and, obviously, this involved Jewish immigration
into Palestine. It was also on the basis of the Balfour
Declaration that Britain had received and eventually accepted
the mandate for Palestine. Therefore, the mandate would have
52to be implemented on these grounds.
Because of the increasing troubles in the area and 
the violent riots of May, 1921, it was finally realized that
50Klieman, British Policy, pp. 105ff. The dis­
cussions concerning Palestine at this conference were prim­
arily concerned with the. creation of a Palestinian defense 
force, and not with territorial questions. Ibid., pp. 118ff.
51Ibid.. p. 128. 5^Ibid.
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some conciliation with the Arabs would have to bes formulated,
and pressure was applied to force the Colonial Office to move
away from its apparently pro-Zionist position. An offer was
made in 1921 to extend Arab representation in the government
of Palestine, but"this was refused by the Arabs on the
grounds that it^ was only/a nominal gesture, and that such a
council would not have any real function in governmental.
53affairs. The Arab delegation felt it useless to talk about
v
a constitution, unless Britain denounced the Balfour Declara­
tion, halted non-Arab immigration, and'-granted immediate and
54complete self-government. Arab-Zionist discord in Palestine
continued to grow until May,i 1922,. when Samuel was forced to
go to London and ask for an official declaration from the
government"to aid in the conciliation of the Arabs. Great
Britaip was ready,, afte^* listening to - Samuel, to sponsor
proposals for independence, which included recognition to the
existing Arab majority in}Palestine, and, because of this,
55limit Jewish immigration into the area. As a result of the 
actions of the Arab delegation*in London, and Samuel's inter­
pretation of the situation/ the "Churchill White Paper of 
1922 was issued to explain and re-define the political situa­
tion of Palestine. As a preface to the White Paper, Trans­
jordan was excluded from the provisions of the Palestiine
Ibid.. p. 202.
54 Ibid.
55Ibid., pp. 200-02.
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mandate, thereby limiting Jewish immigration into the area, 
and partially fulfilling some of the demands made by the 
Arab delegation.^
The White Paper was composed of nine major points:
1) the Balfour Declaration was reaffirmed, and the British 
declared that it was not susceptible to change or alteration;
2) a national home for the Jews would be established, and 
those people in residence were there "as of right and not on 
suff.erence" ; 3) the British government did not contemplate 
the "disappearance or subordination" of the Arab peoples, 
language, or culture; 4) all citizens would be regarded as 
Palestinians; 5) His Majesty's Government intended to foster, 
gradually, a full measure of self-government; 6 ) the special 
position of the Zionist Executive did not entitle it to share 
in the government of the country; 8 ) immigration would be 
regulated by the legislative assembly in consultation with 
the administration; and, 9) any religious community or "con­
siderable section of population" which claimed that the
mandate's terms were not being met, had the right to appeal
57to the League of Nations.
The Arab delegation, on June 17, 19 22, replied in the
^^Ibid., pp. 230-34.
5 7Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers (House of 
Commons & Command), 1922, Vol. XXIII (Reports, vol. 8 ),
Cmnd. 1700, 26 June 1922, "Palestine: Correspondence with
Palestine-Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organization," 
pp. 17-21. The outline of the White Paper may be found on 
pp. 30-31 of the same report.
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negative, still demanding that Britain sever her tie with the
Balfour Declaration; the Executive of the Zionist Organiza-
tipn, on June 18, 1922; reluctantly agreed to conform to the
5 8new statement of policy. The Churchill statement, however, 
failed to reconcile any of the differences in Palestine, and 
when the mandate was approved the following month, the gov­
ernment repeated this same mistake, when it emphasized that 
i;t would implement the mandate along the lines of the 
Churchill White Paper.
In 1921-1922 the Arabs, Jews, and High Commissioner 
in Palestine could agree on only one item: any definition
of policy had to come from London, and a definition was 
drastically needed. This mood was indicative of the slowly 
evolving crisis in Palestine. The Middle East Department, 
however, showed little willingness to re-define the govern­
ment' s position, blindly believing that the Cairo Conference 
and the Churchill White Paper had been sufficient, and the 
iproblems no longer existed. The Palestine riots in May,
19 22, illustrated the failure of this policy. With the 
increase of tension in Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Trans­
jordan, as these three areas attempted to catch up with the 
spirit of Arab nationalist riots in other areas of the Middle 
East, action had to be forced from the British government. 
Churchill, however^ was more concerned with •yfre Irish problem,
58Klieman, British Policy, p. 203.
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and appeared to have lost interest in the situation taking
59place in the Middle East. The government would not go
beyond th,e White Paper of 1922, which remained the official
policy until 1939.
Great Britain was not ready to use force to assist
its authority in Palestine, and tended to favor a policy
which would ensure a mood of tranquility. Another aspect of
British policy, which began in 1921 and continued throughout
the period of the mandate, was a tendency to accept the
responsibility for Palestinian affairs, and yet this feeling
of obligation was "a strange air of resignation and even 
60cynicism." Great Britain preferred to persist in maintain­
ing a rather precarious status-quo, instead of actually 
dealing with the situation and attempt a solution. The 
apparent calm of Palestine, which experienced only minor 
riots in comparison to other Middle Eastern areas, was decep­
tive, for the calm was only temporary— >only superficial. Due 
to its indifference, Great Britain was doomed to failure in 
Palestine and the Middle East— resulting in catastrophe for 
its inhabitants.
59Klieman„ British Policy, p. 204.
CONCLUSIONS
As I sit in the Foreign Office and look out 
on the scene I am reminded of one of those 
lava-1akes . . * observing a great liquid
expanse, an uneasy movement troubling the 
surface, a seething and bubbling going on. 
From time to time a violent explosion occurs; 
here the banks, slip down into the mud and are 
engulfed, while there you see new landmarks 
emerge. That is the picture of what is going 
on all over the world at the present moment.^ 
— Lord Curzon, 1st Marquess of Kedleston
Prior to World War I British policy in the Middle 
East was clear-cut: to defend the routes to India and the
Far East, and to protect the Suez Canal. The war, however,, 
brought greater responsibilities to Britain■, primarily 
because of an extension of Imperial commitments * Exhausted 
by the war and confronted by hew Middle Eastern problems 
following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Britain faced 
unprecedented problems in"the area— a hot-bed of intrigue, 
revolution, and rebellion. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that mistakes were made; what is surprising ^s the over­
emphasis by some, and under-emphasis by others, of the facts 
that led to the situation in Palestine.
The basic misunderstanding regarding Palestine during 
this period was the failure to realize that it became the
^Klieman, British Policy, p. 77.
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"twice-promised land" as a result of the tangled and confus­
ing obligations which sprang from the Husain-McMahon Corres­
pondence (1915), the Sykes-Picot Treaty, (1916), and the 
Balfour Declaration (1917). Such failures, however, do not 
provide a valid excuse for many, of the actions of statesmen 
and nations during this period.
The question of whether or not Palestine was included 
in the terms of the Husain-McMahon Correspondence is easily 
answered. If the language of the Correspondence is carefully 
studied, and the geographical limits carefully noted, Pales­
tine was unmistakably excluded from the area that was reserved
2
for Arab independence. If a'line is drawn in a north-south 
direction through those cities that are mentioned— Aleppo, 
Hama, Horns, and Damascus— and is then extended to the south
3
Palestine clearly falls outside the Arab area. There can be 
little doubt that McMahon intended to exclude both the 
northern and southern areas of the Syrian coast, the exclu­
sion being based on his belief that the area was not "purely 
4Arab," and also that firm commitments regarding any area
5
could not be made without the consent of France.
To clarify the confusion regarding the interpretation
2 . .Supra, chap. n ,  p. 33.
3
Infra, Appendix H, p. 162.
4
Supra, chap. n ,  p. 33.
5 . .Supra*, chap. ii, p. 34.
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of the Correspondence, Sir Henry McMahon, in a letter to The
Times, dated July 23, 193 7, reiterated what governmental
committees had said in the past:
I feel it my duty to state, and I do so 
definitely and emphatically, that it w^s not 
intended by me in giving this pledge to King 
Hussein to include Palestine in the area in 
which Arab independence was promised.
I also had every reason to believe at the 
time that the fact that Palestine was not includeg 
in my pledge was well understood by King Hussein.
Whatever the true explanation— -whether there was a 
misunderstanding between McMahon and Husain, or whether the 
t Sharif temporarily agreed, hoping to alter the arrangement 
, at a later time— is not the important problem, for this was 
not the major point of Arab claims at Paris. Faisal was to 
use the Correspondence at Paris only as an auxiliary rein­
forcement to the primary claim of the Arabs— the right to 
govern by possession. In. fact he difl not refer to the 
Correspondence when he presented their terms at Paris, but 
rather based Arab claims on^the military contribution of the 
Arabs; the raising of, the Arab flag over Damascus; the recog­
nition of the Syrians as belligerants; and upon the basis of
the broad promises for independence which were made at the
7end of the war. D. G. Hogarth feels that the British "were* ■
guiltless, therefore, of any betrayal of King Hussein. The 
The Times (London), July 23, 193 7*
7Supra, chap. v, p. 102.i r
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sole condition of his action— that he be freed from his 
Ottoman overlords and recognized as an independent,, sovereign 
had been fulfilled.
v
From the standpoint of international law the claim 
to the area by the Arabs on the basis of the Correspondence, 
was without validity, since it was not endorsed by the allied 
countries, nor the League of Nations. Great Britain had 
acted in a unilateral manner, but had backed up any pledges 
with the proviso that they were subordinate to their
9
committments to France. Husain had accepted this provision.
The Sykes-Picot Treaty was dictated by the imperial^ 
istic motives of the three signatory powers. The British, 
in negotiating this agreement, did everything possible to 
include considerations that would be beneficial to the 
Arabs Sykes insisted that Aleppo, Hamma, Horns, and
Damascus should be left in Arab hands, and was seeking to
Q
D. G. Hogarth, "Wahabism and British Interests," 
'Journal of the British Institute of Internatipnal Affairs,
IV (1925), pp. 72-73. " ~
9 . .Supra, chap. 11, p. 35. The argument that Palestine
was included in the Arab region— west .of the vilayet of 
Damascus, Horns, Hamma, and Aleppo-— is unfounded since the 
vilayet of Damascus went to the Gulf of Aqaba, and Palestine 
was to the west of this region. The invalidity of such an 
argument rests on the fact that there were no such things as 
vilayets of Horns and Hamma; they were included in the vilayet 
of Damascus. It follows, therefore, that the term vilayet, 
which can have two meanings, was intended as "district" and 
not "territory." To argue in any other way is not logical, 
nor is it profitable. Kirk, Middle East, p. 146.
1^Supra, chap* ii, p. 40.
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keep the treaty as consistent as possible with Great Britain's 
pledges to Husain.
With the publication of the Sykes-Picot terms by the 
Bolsheviks, Great Britain stated that the agreement had only 
been a "provisional" treaty, and had been compiled prior to 
the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire.^ The problem 
created by this document was that both France and Britain 
had limited definitions of Arab sovereignty, each consider­
ing themselves the prgtectors of the Arab peoples. Each 
felt that only they could create adequate administrative 
systems that could function in the area, and out of this
12attitude came the future problems of the Peace Conference.
Generally speaking, the Sykes-Picot Treaty did place
Great Britain in a position of seeming duplicity, and little
can be said in her defense. The best that can be said about
the Treaty is that the Arabs were guaranteed more than they
had had prior to the war— which was practically nothi-ng. The
only possible improvement in the Arab position could have
been if "the agreement could have been carried out faithfully
^forj the Sykes-Picot Agreement might have offered a
workable compromise of English, French and Arab interests in 
13the Levant." It was not the Tr eaty, /that created the
■^Antonius, Arab Awakening, p. 25 7. Supra, chap. id 
pp. 38 ff.
12 -Supra, chap. v, p. 107.
13Hanna, British Policy, p. 30.
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undesirable post-war situation, however, but the fact that it
was not followed in...its entirety. It was the breakdown of
the Treaty, when it came time for its implementation and
enforcement, not its contradiction with other agreements
14that created the conflict.
The precise impact of the Balfour Declaration on the
Arab peoples of the Middle East is not clear as there is no
clear evidence that Palestine was included in the negotiations
with Husain; and as it was provided in the Sykes-Picot Treaty
that the region was to become an internationally controlled 
15area. Likewise, statements made by Faisal, prior to and 
during the Peace Conference, indicated that Palestine would
16not be included in the area destined for Arab independence.
In addition, Faisal at this time often talked of friendship
between the Zionists and Arabs, based upon their ethnological 
17relationship. Husain, as well, seems to have understood
that Palestine was to be opened to Jewish immigration and 
18settlement.
This quixotic gesture of the British to. the Zionist 
Organization, created nothing but controversy, however. The 
general opinion as to the motivation for the Declaration
14Supra, chap. v, pp. 98-105.
15Supra, chap. ii, p. 64.
^^Supra, chap. v, p. 105.
17Supra, chap. v, p. 103.
18Supra, chap. iv, p. 87.
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clearly indicates that it was a war measure designed to win
support after the collapse of Tsarist Russia. It was only
intended that a home for the Jews would be established in
19Palestine at some undetermined time in the future. Lord
Balfour stated that the Declaration was
. . . inspired by sentiment, although I am free to
admit I think we owe the Jews something substantial 
for the way . . . they have rallied to the support
of the Allies . . .  I came out for a Jewish home­
land in Palestine in so far as it could be estab­
lished without infringing on the rights of the 
Arab communities . . . I should think any person 
would see that my pronouncement was not dictated 
by sentiment, but was a war measure.
Because of the revisions in the Sykes-Picot Treaty, 
and the unofficial status of the Husain-McMahon Correspond­
ence, the Balfour Declaration— a tenuous document, at best, 
which was open to wide and varied interpretation— became the 
basis at San Remo for the mandate for Palestine.. The problem 
which Palestine created, arose out of the ambiguous nature 
of the Declaration. Nobody knew what a "national home" was, 
or was not; the term "Jewish people" did not refer to a 
recognized judicial entity, but rather a loose grouping of 
peoples with different goals and varied backgrounds; 
certainly there was no such country, at the time the Declara­
tion was issued, as Palestine— it was merely a geographic
19 Supra, chap. iv, pp. 78-82.
20Stephen Bonsul, Suitors and Supplicants: The
Little Nations at Versailles (New York: Kennikat Press,
Inc., 1946), p. 61. Hereafter cited as Bonsul, Suitors 
and Supplicants.
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region in the southern area of Greater Syria. This was the
basic problem of the Declaration: What did it mean? The
Declaration, and its impact on the world, had, in fact, been
underestimated by the British and its authors.
The resistance of the Arabs to Jewish nationalism
was intense throughout the entire period of this study, but
at no time did it present problems that defied solution.
The fact that no attempt was made by the mandatory power to
explain to the Arabs, or define the idealogical basis of the
Jewish state is evidenced by the fact, that revisions were not
made to the Churchill White Paper of 19 22— even after future
21disturbances broke out. • The rising tide of Arab nation­
alism throughout the Middle East— a nationalism that seems 
to have been nurtured, in part, in England, appears to have 
been overlooked by the British government. Years later, 
Israeli statesman Abba Eban said:
A clear support of Jewish adjudication in Palestine 
in the 1920's and 1930's might:'have prevented the 
'inevitable1 conflict that was evolving, but 
Faisal's vision was allowed to perish. Arab 
nationalism an^Zionism were locked in mortal 
combat . . . .
He saw developments as, a clear result of the indifference of 
Britain and the world powers to problems of the area.
Regardless of the interpretation of the three docu­
ments, and in spite of where the blame is laid for the Middle
21 Supra, chap. vi, pp. 142 ff.
22Eban, My People, p. 3 77.
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Eastern problem, there is one undeniable fact: Great
Britain, for its own reasons and advancement, encouraged the 
Zionist movement, while at the same time the London govern­
ment was clearly encouraging Arab nationalism. These two 
movements created an explosive situation which was destined 
to erupt in sharp conflict.
Responsibility for the Middle East cannot, of course,.
be placed on the shoulders of the statesmen of any one
country, rather it is a responsibility of all of the allied
powers of the First World War for as Colonel Lawrence said
at the Paris Conference1:
The main trouble is . . . there have been too many
cooks out there ancj^between them they have certainly 
spoiled the broth.
23Bonsul, Suitors and Supplicants, p. 50.
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Appendix A
Basle Program
The aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish 
people a home in Palestine secured by public law.
The Congress contemplates the following means to 
the attainment of this end:
1. The promotion, on suitable lines, of the coloni­
zation of Palestine by Jewish agricultural and industrial 
workers.
2. The organization and binding together of the 
whole of Jewry by means of appropriate institutions, local 
and international, in accordance with the laws of each 
country.
3. The strengthening and fostering of Jewish 
national sentiment and consciousness.
4. Preparatory steps towards obtaining government 
consent, where necessary, to the attainment of the aim of 
Zionism.
Sokolow, Zionism. I, 268.
154
Appendix B
Outline of a Programme for a New Administration 
of Palestine for a Jewish Resettlement of Palestine 
in Accordance with the Aspirations 
of the Zionist Movement
1. The recognition of a separate Jewish nationality 
or national unit in Palestine.
2. The participation of the Jewish population of 
Palestine in local self-government insofar as it affects all 
the inhabitants without distinction.
3. The protection of the rights of minority 
nationalities.
4. Autonomy in exclusively Jewish matters, such as 
Jewish education, religious and communal organization.
5. The recognition and legalization of the existing 
Jewish institutions for the colonization of Palestine.
6 . The establishment of a Jewish chartered company 
for the resettlement of Palestine by Jewish settlers.
Report of the Executive of the Zionist Organization
to the Xllth Zionist Congress. Part IV (London: National
Labour Press, 1921)^! p. 71.
Appendix C
Zionist Proposal Submitted to Balfour 
by Lord Rothschild on July 18. 1917
His Majesty's Government, after considering the aims 
of the Zionist Organization accepts the principle of recog­
nizing Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish people 
and the right of the Jewish people to build up its national 
life in Palestine under a protection to be established at 
the conclusion of peace, following upon the successful issue 
of the war.
His Majesty's Government regard as essential for the 
realization of this principle the grant of internal autonomy 
to the Jewish nationality in Palestine, freedom of immigra- 
tion for Jews, and the establishment of a Jewish National 
Colonizing Corporation for the re-establishment and economic 
development of the country.
The conditions and forms of the internal autonomy 
and a Charter for the Jewish National Colonizing Corporation 
should, in the view of His Majesty's Government, be elaborated 
in detail and determined with the representatives of the 
Zionist Organization.
Report to the Xllth Zionist Congress, Part IV
(L o n d o n N a t i o n a l  Labour Press, 1921) , pp. 71-72•
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Appendix D
Amended Draft of October 10# 1917
His Majesty's Government view with favor the 
establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish 
race and will use its best endeavors to facilitate the 
achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that 
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and 
religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in 
Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed in any 
other country by such Jews who are fully contented with 
their existing nationality and citizenship.
Report to the XIIth Zionist Congress, I (London: 
National Labour Press, 1921), pp. 12ff.
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Appendix E
The Balfour Declaration
Foreign Office 
November 2nd, 1917
Dear Lord Rothschild,
I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf 
of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of 
sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been sub­
mitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.
"His Majesty's Government view with favour the 
establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish 
people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the 
achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that 
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and 
religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in 
Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by 
Jews in any other country."
I should be grateful if you would bring this 
declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.
Yours sincerely,
ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR
Report to the Xllth Zionist Congress. Part IV, p. 72.
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Appendix F
Statement of the Zionist Organization 
Regarding Palestine 
(February 3, 1919)
1. The High Contracting Parties recognize the 
historic title of the Jewish people to Palestine and the 
right of the Jews to reconstitute in Palestine their National 
Home.
2. The boundaries of Palestine shall be as declared 
in the Schedule annexed hereto.
3. The sovereign possession of Palestine shall be 
vested in the League of Nations and the Government entrusted 
to Great Britain as Mandatory of the League.
4. (Provision to be inserted relating to the appli­
cation in Palestine of such of the general conditions attached 
to mandates as are suitable to the case.)
5. The mandate shall be subject also to the follow­
ing special conditions:
(I) Palestine shall be placed under such politi­
cal, administrative and economic conditions as will secure 
the establishment there of the Jewish National Home, and 
ultimately render possible the creation of an autonomous 
Commonwealth, it being clearly understood that nothing shall 
be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights
of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights 
and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.
(II) To this end the Mandatory Power shall
inter alia:
(a) Promote Jewish immigration and close 
settlement on the land, the established rights of the present 
non-Jewish population being equally safeguarded.
(b) Accept the cooperation in such measures 
of a Council representative of the Jews in Palestine and of 
the world that may be established for the development of the 
Jewish National Home in Palestine and entrust the organiza­
tion of Jewish education to such Council.
(c) On being satisfied that the constitution 
of such Council precludes the making of private profit, offer 
to the Council in priority any concession for public works or 
for the development of natural resources which it may be 
found desirable to grant.
1595
(III) The Mandatory Power shall encourage the 
widest measure of self-government for localities practicable 
in the conditions of the country.
(IV) There shall be forever the fullest freedom 
of religious worship for all creeds in Palestine. There 
shall be no discrimination among the inhabitants with regard 
to citizenship and civil rights, on the grounds of religion, 
or of race.
(V) (Provision to be inserted relating to the 
control of the Holy Places.)
Miller, Diary. XV, pp. 15-29.
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Appendix G
Outline of Personagest
Allenby, Field Marshal Sir Edmund, 1st Viscount of Megiddo 
(1861-1936)
1917-1919 Commander-in-chief of Egyptian 
Expeditionary Force
1919-1925 High Commissioner for Egypt
Asquith, Herbert Henry, 1st Earl of Oxford and Asquith 
(1852-1928)
1908-1916 Prime Minister and First Lord of the 
Treasury
1920-1921 Leader of the Opposition
Balfour, Arthur James, 1st Earl of Balfour (1840-1930) 
1902-1905 Prime Minister
1916-1919 Foreign Secretary
1919-1922 President of the Council of State
Cambon, Paul (1843-1924)
1898-1920 French Ambassador to London
Churchill, Winston Spencer (1874-1965)
1919-1921 Secretary of State for War and Air
1921-October, 1922 Secretary of State for the 
Colonies
1940-1945 Prime Minister, First Lord of the 
Treasury, and Minister of Defense
Clemenceau, Georges (1841-1929)
1917-1920 Premier of France
Faisal ibn Husain (1885-1933)
1916-1918 Commander of the Hejazi Army in Middle 
Eastern Theatre 
1919 Representative for the Hejaz at Paris
1918-1920 Head of British administration in Syria 
Aug'ust 23, 19 21 Proclaimed King of Iraq
Georges-Picot, M. F.
1915-1916 Represented France in negotiations with 
Great Britain on future disposal, of 
Arab regions
1611
1917 With General Allenby in Palestine to
upholid French claims in the area; High 
Commissioner in Beirut until 1920
Grey, Sir'Edward, 1st Viscount of Fallodorioo (1862-1933) 
1905-1916 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Hogarth, David George (1862-1927)
1916 Director of Arab Bureau in Cairo
1919 Nominated as British member of Inter-
Allied Commission (King-Crane)
Husain ibn Ali (1856-1931) Sharifian of the family of Hashim 
Sons: Abdullah (Transjordan), Faisal (Iraq)
1908 Emir of Mecca
1916 Self-proclaimed "King of the Arab Countries"
Lloyd George, David (1863-1945)
1915-1916 Minister of Munitions 
1916 Secretary of State for War
1916-19 22 Prime Minister and First Lord of the
Treasury
McMahon, Colonel Sir Henry (1862-1949)
1914-1916 First High Commissioner for Egypt;
represented Great Britain in correspondence 
with Husain
1919 Nominated as a member of the Inter-allied
Commission (King-Crane)
Samuel, Herbert, 1st Viscount of Mount Carmel and Toxteth 
(1870-1963)
1914-1915 President of the Local Government Board 
19 20-19 25 High Commissioner of Palestine 
1931-1935 Leader of the Liberal Parliamentary Party
Sokolow* Nahum (1860-1936)
19 20-1931 Chairman of the Zionist Executive
Author of History of Zionism, 1600-1918
Sykes, Lieutenant Colonel Sir Mark (1879-1919)
1911 Elected to House of Commons
1915 Member of deBunsen Comifiittee
1916 British representative in negotiations 
with France over partition of Arab regions
1916 Chief Advisor to the Foreign Office on
Near Eastern Policy
Weizmann, Dr. Chaim (1874-1952)
President, World Zionist Organization and Jewish 
Agency for Palestine (1921-1931 and 19315-1946)
First President of Israel
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Palestine and Syria in 1915
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Appendix
The Sykes-Picot Agreement, 1916
Esco Foundation, Palestine, I, 61
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Arab Territories and Palestine
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